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Abstract

An Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR) mitigation strategy is proposed to mitigate
the effects of Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Transient (SET) radiation
effects. AHR is adaptive because it switches between Triple Modular Redundancy
(TMR) and Temporal Software Redundancy (TSR). AHR is hybrid because it uses
hardware and software redundancy. AHR is demonstrated to run faster than TSR
and use less energy than TMR. Furthermore, AHR allows space vehicle designers,
mission planners, and operators the flexibility to determine how much time is spent
in TMR and TSR. TMR mode provides faster processing at the expense of greater
energy usage. TSR mode uses less energy at the expense of processing speed. AHR
allows the user to determine the optimal balance between these modes based on their
mission needs and changes can be made even after the space vehicle is operational.
Radiation testing was performed to determine the SEU injection rate for simulations
and analyses. A Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) was used to expedite
testing in hardware.
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ADAPTIVE-HYBRID REDUNDANCY FOR RADIATION HARDENING

I. Introduction

1.1

Research Context
Space electronic components experience radiation effects at a much higher rate

than terrestrial components, which are protected by the Earth’s atmosphere. These
effects disrupt low level computing elements in unpredictable ways and must be mitigated if the computed results are to be trusted. The typical approach is to apply
some form of radiation hardening to the processors. However, this is a significant
effort amortized over fewer processors, making these processors expensive. In addition, it takes years to develop a radiation hardened version of a processor, therefore
a radiation hardened version of a state-of-the-art processor is necessarily two or more
generations behind commercially available state-of-the-art processors.
Space data processing has traditionally been performed on the ground because
of computing limitations; however, newer sensors generate significantly more data
than current bandwidth limitations allow. As a result, space vehicle designers are
interested in solutions to perform more processing on-board space vehicles.
Another consideration when using radiation hardened processors is that they typically use more power than their commercial counterparts, and when incorporated
into a space vehicle, require the space vehicle to provide more power generation and
energy storage in the form of larger solar panels and batteries. Larger solar panels
and batteries directly increase the cost of the space vehicle. The added weight of the
larger solar panels and batteries directly increase the vehicle’s launch costs.
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Researchers and space vehicle designers seeking to increase space based processing capability and reduce power requirements, vehicle weight, and launch costs are
turning to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) state-of-the-art processors and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Rather than hardening these technologies directly,
designers may be able to mitigate errors caused by radiation through on board redundancy. One way to accomplish this is by running multiple processors in parallel
and using a voter to determine the correct output. Alternatively, redundancy could
be incorporated in the software. These approaches are discussed in Chapter II.
The motivation for using these approaches is to field space systems sooner and at
lower cost. This is especially true for United States Air Force satellites tasked with
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) missions. The Air Force often designates these types of systems
as being in the interest of national security and as such, follow the most stringent
radiation hardening protocols. According to a 2014 article in Space News, GPS III
satellites cost about $547 million each [32]. If Air Force satellites could utilize COTS
processors and FPGAs, the Air Force could potentially save millions of dollars on
development and procurement of radiation hardened processors for future C4ISR and
GPS satellites.
FPGAs and COTS processors share some advantages and disadvantages, but differ
in others. One significant difference is that FPGAs can be reconfigured at any time,
including after deployment. Both are susceptible to Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and
Single Event Transients (SETs), though in slightly different ways. FPGAs are more
vulnerable to SEUs which affect configuration memory. They are also vulnerable to
SEUs and SETs affecting user logic. COTS processors are vulnerable to SEUs and
SETs affecting their registers. FPGAs and COTS processors both suffer from Total
Ionizing Dose (TID) and Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS) effects which
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cause permanent damage over time. This research does not examine the hardening
techniques designed to mitigate TID and ELDRS, but instead focuses on SEU and
SET mitigation. Furthermore, this research does not examine hardening through
design changes at the transistor level or shielding of FPGAs and COTS processors
but rather on redundancy.
FPGA SEU and SET vulnerabilities are minimized when implementing mitigation
strategies such as internal scrubbing of configuration memory and user logic redundancy. COTS processors also utilize logic redundancy, but not internal scrubbing
because they do not have configuration memory. This research focuses on mitigation strategies employing redundancy in much the same way as previous approaches
discussed in Chapter II. The main difference between this research and previous research is that previous research typically implemented a single redundancy method
which could not be changed once implemented on a space vehicle. This meant that
the space vehicle was constrained to the power and performance penalties incurred
by the redundancy method for the duration of its mission.
Two such redundancy methods are triple modular redundancy (TMR) and temporal software redundancy (TSR). Each redundancy method has its benefits and
drawbacks. This research seeks to enhance the benefits and minimize the drawbacks
by switching between redundancy techniques in real-time depending upon the radiation environment, processor loading, and energy consumption. This can be achieved
by using a controller to switch between redundancy methods. This flexible form
of redundancy is called Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR) and provides satellite
designers tradespace between energy consumption, and time to complete a processing task. The ability to switch between redundancy methods makes this approach
adaptive while the use of both hardware and software redundancy methods makes it
hybrid. The AHR processor proposed in this research switches between TMR and
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TSR.

1.2

Assumptions
To maintain focus and scope, the following assumptions are made throughout the

remainder of this dissertation.
1. The only radiation effects considered are Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single
Event Transients (SETs)
(a) All other radiation effects do not occur
(b) Multiple-bit upsets (MBUs) where a single radiation strike causes errors
in two or more adjacent registers are highly unlikely and do not occur
2. The processor refers only to the Controller and Datapath of a processor
(a) The Controller consists of a finite state machine with a state register,
instruction register, and instruction decoding logic that translates instructions into control signals for the Datapath
(b) The Datapath consists of general purpose registers (GPRs) that store data
to be processed, a program counter (PC) register, logic to update the GPRs
and PC register, an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) used to process data, and
logic to control the disposition of processed data. The function of the
Datapath is controlled by control signals from the Controller
(c) Modern processors are typically super-scalar and make use of combinational logic and many additional registers for branch prediction and other
applications. The additional combinational logic and registers used by
super-scalar processors are also considered to be part of the processor
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3. The processor and all components therein are subject to SEUs and SETs with
few exceptions
(a) The TMR Voter in TMR MIPS described in Section 3.3 is immune to
errors
(b) The AHR Controller in AHR MIPS described in Section 3.5.1 and the
multiplexers used by the AHR Controller for signal routing described in
Section 3.5.2 are immune to errors
4. Memory refers to the location where instructions and data are stored prior to
being read by the processor. It is also the location where the processor may
write data. In practical applications, this memory may be cached memory,
random access memory (RAM), read only memory (ROM), a hard disk drive
(HDD), or a solid-state drive (SSD)
5. Memory is immune to all errors
(a) Memory hardening is not implemented in this research
(b) Memory may be hardened by error correcting codes (ECCs), redundancy,
shielding, or any combination of these methods

1.3

Research Questions
This research seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Can multiple redundancy methods be incorporated into the redundancy design?
2. Is it possible to allow flexibility in redundancy methods for the duration of a
space vehicle’s lifetime?
3. Is it possible to switch between these methods based on mission needs?
5

4. What are the timing and energy tradespaces available to a designer, mission
planner, or operator?

1.4

Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter II provides

background for this research. Chapter III develops the AHR architecture. Chapter
IV evaluates AHR against TMR, TSR, and an unmitigated processor in a perfect
environment with no errors present. Chapter V discusses how an error rate and error
injection method were devised and mathematical tools were developed to evaluate the
performance of AHR when compared to TMR and TSR when subjected to errors.
Chapter VI presents the results of evaluating AHR against TMR and TSR when errors
are injected. Chapter VII presents conclusions and contributions of this research as
well as suggestions for future work.
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II. Background

2.1

Introduction
This chapter lays the foundation for the development of Adaptive-Hybrid Re-

dundancy (AHR). It begins with a discussion of radiation effects in Section 2.2 that
delves into radiation effects known as Single Event Effects (SEEs) with an emphasis
on Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs). The discussion
continues with the mitigation of those radiation effects in Section 2.3, which provides
an overview of many mitigation strategies that have previously been applied in radiation environments. Section 2.4 examines a method for making comparisons between
orbital radiation environments and experimental radiation environments with the goal
of making a comparison between a particular flight experiment and an experiment
performed in this research.
These first three sections are followed by a brief introduction to the hardware
upon which AHR is implemented for this research in Section 2.5. Finally, Section
2.6 discusses previous methods to evaluate radiation vulnerability and redundancy
techniques and leads to the selection of the evaluation methods used in this research.

2.2

Single Event Effects
SEE is a broad term applied to effects caused by radiation striking a computer

processor which have immediate impacts on the internal state and outputs. (In contrast, there are also effects caused by long term radiation exposure which do not
immediately affect the internal state or output of the processor, which are also problematic, but outside the scope of this research.) While all SEEs have an immediate
impact or effect, some impacts may be permanent, such as Single Event Gate Rupture
(SEGR), Single Event Burnout (SEB), or Single Event Latchup (SEL). SEL can be
7

corrected before device failure if a gate’s power is cycled, but SEGR and SEB cannot
be corrected this way. Still others are truly transient, but may have permanent computational or program effects if left unmitigated. These include the SET, SEU, and
Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) [17, 26, 65, 108]. Because they are more
common, and because this research is primarily concerned with onboard mitigation
techniques, this chapter will focus on SEUs and SETs; however, the related categories
of SEGR, SEB, SEL, and SEFI are included to complete the discussion on SEEs.

2.2.1

Permanent Single Event Effects

Both the SEGR and the SEB are caused when radiation strikes a transistor with
sufficient energy to cause immediate and permanent failure. SEGR results from a
failure of the insulating layer between the gate and depletion region of the transistor;
which effectively destroys the gate. In contrast, SEB arises when radiation activates
some parasitic component inherent in the chip. In each of these categories of radiation
events, the effects are permanent and non-recoverable [26, 65].

2.2.2

Semi-Permanent Single Event Effects

The mechanism causing Single Event Latchups (SELs) is distinct from the mechanism that causes SEGR, SEU, and SET, but somewhat similar to SEB. To better
understand SELs, consider that some computer chip technologies make use of CMOS
gates where the silicon comprising the gates are placed on top of a doped base material. This doped base material allows for the formation of parasitic P-N-P-N transistors between NMOS and PMOS transistors. In normal operation, these parasitic
transistors are off, but a radiation strike has the potential to activate them. Once
turned on, these parasitic transistors form a positive feedback loop that causes the
parasitic transistors to draw more current. If the feedback loop is not broken, the
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logic gate could burn out and fail. Some CMOS technologies have current sensors
that detect current spikes caused by SELs; then turn off power to the logic gate or a
portion of the computer chip where the logic gate is located. Turning off the power
stops the positive feedback loop and prevents the SEL from becoming destructive.
Power is then restored and normal operation resumes. SELs can also be prevented by
using silicon on insulator CMOS technology or other means of isolating NMOS and
PMOS transistors so that parasitic transistors cannot form [26, 65, 108].
Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs) can be the result of SETs that are
stored in registers and SEUs that propagate throughout a computer processor over
several clock cycles. The propagated errors influence various intermediate and final
results that the processor is tasked with computing. They may also affect the flow
of a program that is running on a processor if that program contains any branch
or jump instructions that are impacted by SEU and SET propagation. SEFIs may
also occur when radiation triggers a built-in-self-test mode or a reset of a processor
[17, 26, 65, 108].

2.2.3

Transient Single Event Effects

Single Event Transients (SETs) are caused when ionizing radiation produces a
voltage and current pulse in a transistor. That pulse has the capability to propagate energy through neighboring combinational logic. The pulse may travel through
several, or only a few gates, depending upon a number of factors. First, the pulse
may be attenuated or amplified depending upon the parameters of the gates through
which the pulse passes (i.e., length, width, depth, doping concentrations, type of
gate, etc.). Second, the pulse may be logically masked, which can occur when a logic
1 pulse encounters an AND gate where another signal is a logic 0. Because both
inputs would have to be a logical 1 for the output to change, the erroneous logic 1
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pulse has no further effect. Third, the pulse may be temporally masked; this can
occur when a pulse reaches the input to a memory element, such as a register or
flip-flop, but does not arrive with sufficient voltage and duration during the memory
element’s setup and hold time. On the other hand, if the pulse is not masked, it
may be stored in one or more registers, and will likely result in incorrect computation
[4, 5, 15, 24, 26, 41, 60, 65, 81, 89, 90, 108].
Single Event Upsets (SEUs) are caused when ionizing radiation strikes a transistor
that is part of a memory element with sufficient charge to directly flip that memory
element. In other words, the radiation causes a memory element storing a logic 0 to
store a logic 1 or vice versa [8, 16, 17, 26, 33, 65, 105, 108]. While this is a problem
generally, SEUs can be particularly bothersome for Field Programmable Gate Arrays
(FPGAs). FPGAs often utilize SRAM cells in their configuration memory to instantiate a user design. They govern the routing of signals as well as the implementation
of specific logic functions. Beyond merely changing the value of an operand, configuration memory SEUs can alter the users desired functional logic and even create
short circuits. At a minimum, these errors have the potential to prevent the FPGA
from accomplishing its designed task. In extreme cases, configuration logic SEUs may
permanently damage the FPGA.

2.3

Mitigating SEUs and SETs
There are numerous methods through which SEUs and SETs may be mitigated.

These include shielding, hardware modifications, software modifications, and redundancy.
Hardening can be achieved through physical shielding at the circuit level, system
level, and various levels in between. The ability to shield at various levels depends
on how much is known about the layout of a processor. Shielding could be applied to
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specific critical circuits like power transistors that ensure proper power distribution
or transistors tasked with clock distribution; however, specific circuit shielding only
works if the exact physical locations of circuits are known. Shielding can also be
applied to an entire processor by placing metal over the processor. Physical shielding
is not within the scope of this research as this research focuses on hardening through
redundancy.
Hardware modifications, software modifications, and redundancy for SEU and
SET mitigation are further discussed. These modifications can be divided into two
distinct levels. The first is circuit level hardening and the second is system level
hardening. At the circuit level, hardening is achieved by making changes to transistors
or adding components to combinational logic and memory elements. System level
hardening is achieved through redundancy of components at the logic gate level,
system level, or any level in between. System level hardening may also be achieved
through software redundancy. Circuit level hardening is discussed first, then system
level hardening.

2.3.1

Circuit Level Hardening

Some methods of circuit level radiation hardening make changes to the material
properties of the transistor. Hughes et al. discuss a radiation hardened gate made
of heavily doped n-type silicon where they built and tested gates before and after
irradiation and demonstrated positive results [43]. Uemura et al. make changes
to the transistors’ physical dimensions and also create cancellation regions between
transistors to “cancel out” trapped charges that would otherwise cause a multi-node
upset. They also discuss the use of triple well versus double well technologies in their
mitigation approach [102].
Other methods of circuit level radiation hardening require changes to the circuitry
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comprising combinational logic and the memory cells. One such modification is the
introduction of a special filter into combinational logic to mitigate SETs. These filters
prevent short pulses from passing, but allow longer pulses to pass [82]. This effectively
eliminates radiation induced pulses while permitting desired signals to pass. Filters
can also be added in memory elements to prevent bit flips caused by SEUs. Filters
can be composed of delays created by inverter chains coupled with a guard gate
or a simpler filter comprised of resistors and/or capacitors [3, 17, 29, 64, 82, 85].
Another modification changes the structure of memory elements to mitigate SEUs.
One example modification of the simple SRAM cell is the Dual Interlocked storage
Cell (DICE) [11], which effectively blocks transient pulses from causing upsets to the
memory cell. Another SRAM cell modification, called the Soft Error Interception
Latch [47], implements multiple delay elements and gates to stop any pulses from
propagating and causing an upset to the memory cell. Unfortunately, adding filters
and changing the basic structure of the SRAM cell unavoidably require costly and
time consuming processor redesign as well as changes to the fabrication process. The
addition of filters also typically cause an increase in the amount of time required to
store a value to the SRAM cell.

2.3.2

System Level Hardening

System level hardening through redundancy can be achieved in hardware, software, or a hybrid of hardware and software. Hardware redundancy can take place at
the gate level, the processor level, or somewhere in between. Hardware redundancy
may use multiple copies of specific circuits or subcircuits where inputs are driven
by a single source and outputs can be compared to determine the correct result for
that circuit. Hardware redundancy may also employ error correcting codes in various
stages. Some hardware redundancy strategies make use of both, and they are fur-

12

ther discussed in the subsections on Hardware Redundancy and Hybrid Redundancy.
Software redundancy typically performs a single instruction on a processor multiple
times and compares the results of each iteration to determine the correct result to
forward to the next stage. Hybrid designs make use of both hardware and software
redundancy; some designs will place more emphasis on the hardware or software
while others will utilize both equally. The following pages provide specific examples
of various hardware, software, and hybrid redundancy strategies.

2.3.2.1

Hardware Redundancy

Multiple Copies of Circuits or Subcircuits This section discusses some
examples of hardware redundancy where there are multiple copies of circuits or subcircuits.
The first example is of redundant registers to store the processor’s state. The
processor’s state consists of all user defined registers, the program counter, and the
instruction register. The registers are assumed to be radiation hardened and immune
to SEUs while the processor’s combinational logic is vulnerable to SETs. At any
given time, the current state is being written to one set of the redundant registers
while the other set of registers stores the previous state. If a SET occurs, it may
impact the set of registers to which the processor is currently writing data. The SET
can be detected by the processor, which is able to continue processing using the set
of registers that hold the previous state. The set of registers which were potentially
impacted by the SET are then overwritten when the processor processes the data
from the previous state and stores the updated state [34].
The second example illustrates the use of dual modular redundancy (DMR). DMR
makes use of two processors and a single comparator/controller. Both processors run
in lockstep (meaning that they simultaneously receive identical inputs, including the
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clock) and produce outputs that are checked by the comparator. The controller periodically interrupts the two processors to create a save/restore point in memory that
saves the processor’s internal state at a particular moment in time. If the two processors ever disagree on their outputs, the comparator/controller can then go back by
restoring the internal state of both processors to the most recent save/restore point.
(This approach assumes that the save/restore point is saved in radiation hardened
memory [20, 22, 27].) In some implementations, the two processors are implemented
differently (i.e. two different chips from the same manufacturer or different manufacturers), but designed to produce identical results [95]. Figure 1 provides a simple
illustration of DMR.

Figure 1. Dual Modular Redundancy Simplified Block Diagram

A different method of DMR makes use of two processors that do not run in
lockstep. In this example, two cores of a four core processor are utilized such that
one core runs a program and the second core runs the same program, but a fixed
number of instructions behind the first core. The first core provides values loaded
from memory to the second core so the second core does not have to load them
from memory. The first core also provides the second core the outcome of its branch
decisions. The second core compares the address information provided by the first
core to its own as well as the first core’s branch outcomes to its own branch decisions to
14

determine if an error has occurred. In the event that the program needs to store data
to memory, the store only occurs after the second core processes the store instruction
and determines that the address and data to be written to memory match those of
the first core [30].
Another approach uses two processors, similar to DMR, but only one processor
runs the program while the second processor acts as a watchdog to detect errors.
The watchdog monitors the main processor’s inputs and outputs to detect errors
in the flow of the program and the data being written to memory [58]. While the
watchdog approach cannot detect every error that DMR detects, it is able to detect
errors at a lower cost in terms of size of the second processor and power used by
the second processor. In one particular watchdog approach, signatures are embedded
into the program so the watchdog can determine whether the program flows correctly
(i.e. ensures no illegal/incorrect program branches are taken). The main processor is
designed to ignore the embedded signatures while the watchdog processor compares
the embedded signatures to the ones it computes in real time [72].
The next example uses Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) at a low level. An
ARM Cortex-R4 processor was modified such that all flip-flops were replaced with
three copies of the same flip-flop, followed by a voter. Different delay elements were
added at the inputs to the flip-flops to reduce the probability of a SET causing more
than one of the three flip-flops to store an erroneous value [74].
In another TMR example, TMR is implemented at the system level. In this
configuration, three copies of the same processor operate on the same inputs and
their outputs are examined by a voting circuit. All three processors produce the same
outputs when there are no errors. If the output of one of the three processors differs,
it is assumed to have encountered an error, and the correct output is determined
by majority vote. The voter circuity resets the “incorrect” processor and sets the
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processor’s internal state to match the internal state of the two correct processors.
If all three processors disagree on the output (i.e. no majority exists), the voter
resets all three processors and restores them to a previously saved internal state
(the TMR restoration process is identical to the DMR restoration process). This
approach also assumes that the save/restore point is saved in radiation hardened
memory [6, 7, 10, 45]. TMR is such a commonly used mitigation technique that
some FPGA manufacturers incorporate TMR into their hardware documentation as
a means to harden their processors [12]. TMR is considered the “gold standard” by
the U.S. Air Force for protecting electronics aboard spacecraft and launch vehicles.
Figure 2 provides a simple illustration of TMR. This research uses this TMR approach
in the development of Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR). This is the simplest of
the TMR approaches presented in this chapter, which makes it an ideal candidate for
evaluating AHR. TMR is selected over DMR because TMR is considered the “gold
standard” for U.S. Air Force space systems.
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Figure 2. TMR MIPS Simplified Block Diagram

While full TMR is very effective, it is also costly in terms of energy. The next
TMR approaches described are more energy conscious. In one approach, TMR is
only implemented when radiation levels exceed some threshold, as measured by an
external radiation sensor. However, when radiation levels are below the threshold,
a single processor is used, thereby minimizing power consumption [55]. In other
approaches, TMR is selectively implemented for critical subcircuits on an FPGA or
critical processors in a larger computer system rather than implementing TMR for
every subcircuit or an entire processor. [31, 91]. These approaches reduce power
consumption as fewer components are triplicated.
Another TMR approach has no independent voting circuitry. In this example, all
three processors compare the outputs of the other two processors to their own outputs
to detect errors. Upon detecting an error, the processors execute exception handling
code. One of the processors is designated as the “master” processor, and when an
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error occurs, the first processor to complete error handling becomes the master and
reboots the other two. If the new master fails to correctly reboot the other two
processors, the next processor to finish exception handling detects this and becomes
the master and reboots the other two processors. The “master” processor loads its
own internal state into the two rebooted processors to ensure all three processors have
the same internal state before resuming normal operations [56].
Hardware redundancy may also be achieved by using TMR and NMR (N-Modular
Redundancy) systems where permanently failed processors are replaced with spares.
NMR is like TMR where there are N processors rather than three processors and
outputs are decided by majority vote. Replacements are needed when a processor fails
due to Total ionizing Dose (TID), Enhanced Low Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS),
SEB, SEGR, SEL, or some other permanent damage. In this way, a TMR system can
continue with three functioning processors or an NMR system with N functioning
processors even after a permanent failure. As in the previous TMR with voting
example, temporary faults are corrected by copying the system state of the correct
processors to faulty processors [87].
Another NMR system uses a total of four processors where two processors are on
one FPGA and two processors are on another FPGA. All four processors receive the
same inputs. The outputs of the two processors on the same FPGA are compared.
Next, the output of the two FPGAs are compared. At this stage, processors in error
are identified. Because the number of processors is even, if one pair of processors reach
one result and another pair of processors reaches a different result, error recovery must
follow the same approach as if all processors are in error as discussed for TMR. If
two processors agree on a result and the other two processors have differing results,
the two that agree are assumed to be correct and the internal states of the other two
processors are corrected to match the internal states of the correct processors [21, 94].
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Yet another distinct approach is halfway between DMR and TMR. In this approach, two “main” processors proceed in lockstep, periodically saving checkpoints,
until an error occurs at a checkpoint. The two main processors proceed to another
checkpoint after the one at which the error occurred while a third processor starts
from a prior, error-free checkpoint. The third processor proceeds past the checkpoint
at which the error occurred and catches up with the main processors at the following
checkpoint. All three processors are compared and the erroneous processor can be
identified and corrected if the third processor matches one of the main processors. The
third processor is turned off after this checkpoint. If there is no agreement between
the third processor and the main processors at this checkpoint, the main processors
are restored to the last error-free checkpoint [75].

Error Correcting Codes Error correcting codes (ECCs) began with simple
parity bits; these bits indicated whether there were an even or odd number of logic
1s in a byte or other grouping of bits (i.e. 16-bit half-word, 32-bit word, and etc.).
Unfortunately, parity bits can only detect when an odd number of bits are in error.
If there are an even number of errors, the errors go undetected. Additionally, the
number of errors and the location of the error or errors is unknown [10]. Newer ECCs
incorporate multiple bits such that the number of errors and location of the errors is
precisely known.
The most common ECCs can detect and locate two errors while being able to
correct a single error through the use of combinational logic. These codes are commonly referred to as single error correcting-dual error detecting (SEC-DED) codes
[10, 54, 93] Some of these codes can be expanded to detect and correct more errors.
Other ECCs are designed to survive addition and multiplication operations. These
codes include AN (cyclic code with ring of integers modulo 2n − 1 for some n), BoseChaudhuri-Hocquengham (BCH) codes, Modified Reflected Binary (MRB) code, num19

ber theoretic transforms, and residue codes [10, 19, 40, 48, 52, 53, 54, 76].
While ECCs are more commonly used to protect memory, they may also be used to
protect registers in a processor. In one example, ECCs were used to only protect the
most vulnerable registers while parity bits were used to detect errors in the remaining
registers [50].

2.3.2.2

Software Redundancy

Redundancy achieved through software is also referred to as Temporal Software
Redundancy (TSR) and is characterized by duplicating instructions, spreading them
out over time, and comparing results at critical points in a program.
One simple implementation of software redundancy is called Error Detection by
Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) and duplicates all instructions except for store instructions [71]. The instructions are duplicated such that the original instruction
and its duplicate use different registers for the arguments and different registers for
the results. The use of different registers means that the outcomes of the duplicated
instructions are independent of one another in terms of radiation events. This implementation also adds a check prior to every store instruction. This check ensures
a match between the value to be stored to memory and the values’ duplicate along
with the address to which it is to be stored and the address’ duplicate. If the values
or addresses do not match, an error has occurred and error recovery must begin. If
both values and addresses match, the store word instruction is executed [71]. This
is better explained by looking at the following example in Table 1 which compares a
simple program with a program incorporating EDDI.
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Table 1. Simple Software Redundancy Example

Instruction
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Original
Set
LUI R1 1
LUI R2 2
ADD R3 R1 R2
SW R3 R0 OFFSET

Redundant
Set
LUI R1 1
LUI R15 1
LUI R2 2
LUI R16 2
ADD R3 R1 R2
ADD R17 R15 R16
BNE R3 R17 ERR
SW R3 R0 OFFSET

In this example, LUI R1 1 is a load upper immediate instruction that loads the
immediate value, 1, into the upper 16-bits of a 32-bit register named R1. ADD R3
R1 R2 is an addition command that adds the contents of registers R1 and R2 and
stores the sum in register R3. SW R3 R0 OFFSET is a store instruction that stores
the contents of register R3 to the memory location specified by R0 plus a constant
offset specified by OFFSET. The register R0 always contains the value 0. The original
program loads 1 and 2 into registers R1 and R2 so that they contain the values 1 · 216
and 2 · 216 respectively, adds the two values and stores the result of 3 · 216 to R3,
and stores R3 to memory location OFFSET. The redundant program does the same
thing as the original set until the add instruction, but does it twice. The second time
it performs each operation, the results are stored in different registers. If no errors
occur, R15 = R1, R16 = R2, and R17 = R3. Additionally, the values of R15, R16, and
R17 do not depend upon the values of R1, R2, and R3 because they were computed
independently. The next big difference is the comparison performed on line 7. The
BNE R3 R17 ERR instruction is a branch if not equal instruction. The instruction
decides that if R3 does not equal R17, code execution should jump to some error
recovery instructions at the location specified by the branch distance as ERR. If R3
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does equal R17, instruction 8 is performed which stores R3 to the memory location
specified by OFFSET.
Each register and its duplicate must be maintained so long as it is needed by
future instructions. For example, if R1 and R15 are used to compute another value
to be stored in R4 and R18, R1 and R15 must not be overwritten. One particular
question asked why the redundant set could not perform original instructions 1, 2, and
3 followed by original instructions 1, 2, and a modified form of redundant instruction
6 “ADD R17 R1 R2”. This would still achieve the desired independence between R3
and R17 for the comparison of redundant instruction 7; however, R1 and R2 would
have no duplicates and be unprotected from errors should R1 and R2 be needed
for future instructions. Additionally, the LUI instruction is the only Basic MIPS
instruction that does not require any previously computed values stored in another
register. If R1 and R2 were assigned as the result of an ADD, AND, SUB, or any
other instruction, recomputing R1 and R2 based on the same values supplied by the
register arguments to the ADD, AND, or SUB instruction would not make them
independent, and therefore susceptible to identical errors.
This research uses the EDDI TSR approach in the development of AdaptiveHybrid Redundancy (AHR). This is the simplest of the TSR approaches that will
be presented in this chapter, which makes it an ideal candidate for evaluating AHR.
While more complicated forms of TSR could be implemented, it could obfuscate some
of the results such that the advantages of AHR over TMR or TSR alone would not
be readily apparent.
Some implementations of this approach created a compiler that would automatically convert a non-duplicated program like the one shown in Table 1 to a redundant
set like the one shown in Table 1 [71, 101]. Oh’s specific implementation also sought
to minimize the time penalty incurred by the additional instructions by making use
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of a pipelined architecture in a super-scalar processor [71]. While Oh et al. and
Tokponnon et al. did not specify the nature of the error recovery instructions; it is
worth noting that duplication more than doubles the total number of instructions
when the additional error recovery instructions are added. Oh and McCluskey also
developed a method that does not duplicate all instructions in order to realize energy
savings [69].
Oh et al. further improved upon their work by adding signature detection instructions to ensure that programs were followed sequentially and that branch instructions
were executed properly [70]. These signature detection instructions ensured that errors affecting the program counter (PC) were detected. When combined with instruction duplication, a more robust software redundancy method called SWIFT was
created [79]. This was further strengthened by SWIFT-R which modifies SWIFT by
triplicating all instructions rather than duplicating all instructions. This is essentially
software implementation of TMR with additional protections for PC errors [80].
Reis et al. also discussed two additional software redundancy methods in the same
paper. In the one referred to as trump, an instruction duplication method creates
duplicate instructions that are AN-encoded where AN-encoding could be applied [80].
The other, referred to as Mask, “enforces statically known invariants to eliminate
faults that can be reasoned away. Using these invariants, Mask can remove faults
that would otherwise be deleterious, thus increasing reliability without redundant
execution.” [80]. The paper goes on to discuss hybrids between SWIFT-R, trump,
and Mask. SWIFT-R and SWIFT-R/trump provide the greatest protection but have
normalized run times that are nearly twice as long as a program that implements no
redundancy. The trump and trump/Mask methods provide minimal protection and
have normalized runtimes that are 36% longer than an unprotected program.
Software signature detection has also been used purely to detect illegal branches
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while not simultaneously protecting against data errors. In one particular example, a
program is broken into blocks and each block is assigned a parity value that depends
upon its predecessor block. This parity value is computed at compile time. Signature
checking instructions are inserted into the blocks that also compute the parity values
at runtime. If runtime and compile time signatures do not match, then an illegal
branch has occurred in the code. This particular example provides no recovery method
when an error is detected [103].

2.3.2.3

Hybrid Redundancy

Hybrid redundancy refers to any amalgamation of one or more redundancy methods, and more particularly if those methods are fundamentally different. Hybrids can
include hardware/software, hardware/ECC, software/ECC, hardware/software/ECC,
methods that combine processor and memory hardening, and many more.
The first example of hybrid redundancy is specific to FPGAs and cannot be applied to other computer processors because the mitigation approach focuses upon
SEUs affecting an FPGA’s configuration memory. The primary means by which
FPGA designers can overcome configuration memory SEUs is by implementing internal scrubbing. Internal scrubbing is the process where configuration memory is
reprogrammed from an external, radiation hardened source to correct any errors that
occur. This process takes time and must be performed periodically to ensure errors
are corrected as soon as possible after they occur. However, errors can still occur
between internal scrubbing intervals. To ensure these errors do not cause problems,
additional mitigation is needed in the form of user logic redundancy. By making user
logic redundant, a configuration error affecting one of two or more redundant user
logic components will not be able to alter the desired system state or outputs. Redundancy gives the periodic internal scrubbing an opportunity to correct configuration
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errors before there are enough errors to affect desired system state or outputs. One
approach utilizes internal scrubbing with dual redundancy of user logic [23]. This
mitigation approach also uses dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) instead of periodic internal scrubbing of the entire configuration memory [23]. DPR consists of
constantly reading the configuration memory to detect errors, then only reconfiguring
portions of configuration memory that contain errors [92]. DPR saves a significant
amount of time and energy [23]. TMR for user logic in concert with internal scrubbing
is another common strategy [57, 65, 73]. Another study paired TMR with DPR to
take advantage of the ability of TMRs majority voting scheme to process faster than
DMR (which has to return to a previously saved system state every time it encounters
an error) and the time and energy savings provided by DPR.[59].
The next example of hybrid redundancy uses TMR (or NMR) for computer processors and ECCs to protect memory. A majority voting system is in place so the
processors in agreement (2 of 3, 3 of 5, and etc.) determine the correct outputs and
processors that are in error are periodically reset so that their states match the state
of the processors in agreement [42]. A very similar approach selectively implements
TMR for critical circuits to minimize the overall impact of SETs while still utilizing
an ECC to protect memory [88].
Another approach performs a single calculation twice on the processor and uses
a radiation hardened comparator to compare the results. If there is no match, the
calculation is re-performed twice more. The first calculation of each round is compared
and the second calculation of each round is compared. The ones that match are
assumed to be the correct result [13]. This is a hybrid between software instruction
redundancy and hardware radiation hardening.
Czajkowski also discusses redundancy achieved through temporal and spatial redundancy by placing duplicated instructions on different cores of a single processor
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and separated by a clock cycle. If the results of the two instructions do not match,
the instruction is carried out a third time on a third core. If the results of two out
of three executions of the same instruction match, processing continues to the next
instruction, if not, recovery operations are started [14].
One hybrid method uses a primary processor to run programs and a second processor that checks the first for faults. The second processor only checks certain error
prone portions of the primary processor. Software recovery is used to restore the primary or secondary processor when a fault is detected. This method is an alternative
to the DMR approach, but is smaller and more energy efficient [83].
Another hybrid technique implements NMR in virtual processors running in lockstep in the same way that NMR runs on physical processors. The approach examined the differences between DMR, TMR, and quadruple modular redundancy
(4 processors). The voter and recovery operations are also implemented as virtual
processes [46].
Reinhardt and Mukherjee discuss three different architectures. The first detects
errors by comparing outputs of two identical threads running at the same time on
different processors [78]. The second compares the outputs of two identical threads
running at different times on the same processor [78, 104]. Vijaykumar et al. improved
this second architecture by adding error recovery so that errors are corrected rather
than only being detected [104]. The third compares the outputs of two identical
threads at different times on two different processors where one thread leads the
other in execution by a fixed minimum amount of time [62, 78, 84].
Another approach that also uses a redundant thread running simultaneously also
makes use of ECCs to protect the processor’s cache memory and some registers.
This approach creates redundant threads at runtime for each instruction. Errors
are detected when the results of each thread are compared before committing the

26

results. When an error is detected, the processor “rewinds” to the last committed
change, which is immediately prior to the start of the instruction that resulted in the
error. This method may also recover from errors by majority voting on the results of
redundant threads when there are three or more redundant threads [77].
Another hybrid method combines TMR with ECCs to protect memory [49]. This
approach has two layers of protection. ECCs protect each word stored in memory.
Each word is also triplicated for added redundancy. The correct output for a specific
word stored in memory is the majority vote of the three copies of the word stored in
memory.
A different hybrid uses a specialized compiler to determine which instructions in
a program are critical to its output at compile time and flags those instructions. A
modified super-scalar out-of-order processor detects those flags at runtime and creates
one or more replicas of the instruction at runtime. After the processor processes a
flagged instruction and its replicas, it compares the results before storing them. If
any of the results differ, the processor performs error recovery operations [63].
While ECCs were previously discussed as a hardware redundancy method, they
have also been implemented by software in a hybrid approach. This approach assumes
that hardware ECCs are unavailable or too expensive for an application. A software
program was created that would periodically scrub memory to create codes for words
in memory which did not have codes and update codes for words that already had ECC
protection. The program allocated space in memory to store the code words since the
memory was not designed to accommodate ECCs. The research examined vertical
Hamming, vertical cyclic, 2-dimensional, and Reed-Solomon codes and determined
that all codes provided a level of protection far greater than unprotected memory,
but not as much protection as hardware implemented ECCs [86].
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2.3.2.4

Adaptive Redundancy

One method of adaptively responding to changes in error rates chooses an error
correcting method that minimizes errors, delays, and energy in cached memory. It
utilizes three different software modular redundancy schemes with varying levels of
error protection and performance costs. When error rates are low, the lowest cost
redundancy scheme with the least error protection is used. As error rates increase,
the intermediate cost redundancy scheme with greater error protection is used followed by the one with the highest cost and greatest error protection. As error rates
decrease, lower cost redundancy is used [106]. This adaptive method could potentially be applied to TMR, NMR, backup redundancy, hybrid redundancy, or any other
redundancy methodology implemented in hardware and/or software to minimize performance costs for a given radiation environment. While Wang et al. apply this adaptive approach to cached memory, this research applies this approach to the processor.
The use of adaptive redundancy for a processor has not been extensively explored
in the literature before. The only example discovered was previously mentioned in
which TMR is turned on and off based on the radiation environment detected by a
radiation sensor [55]. This example only provides a choice between redundancy and
no redundancy. No examples were found in literature that allowed a choice between
different redundancy techniques for a processor.

2.3.3

Summary of Mitigation Techniques

All of the mitigation techniques discussed in this section, with the exception of the
TMR adaptive approach, are fixed once implemented on a space vehicle. The TMR
adaptive approach is not a viable option since it affords no error protection in the
event that a SEU occurs when the processor is in single processor mode. These fixed
redundancy methods each come with fixed energy and processing speed advantages
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and disadvantages that cannot change for the duration of a space vehicle’s mission.
This research seeks to answer whether it is possible to implement multiple redundancy
methods and switch between them in order to provide a tradespace in terms of energy
and processing speed performance.

2.4

Radiation Comparisons
Although making comparisons between different radiation experiments is inher-

ently difficult, even a rough order of magnitude comparison is valuable in the task
of evaluating radiation hardening and mitigation efforts. Radiation experiments vary
widely in the types of radiation, energy levels, and flux levels used. Experiments that
cause SEUs and SETs use particle radiation which are known to cause SEUs and
SETs rather than x-rays and gamma rays which are not known to cause SEUs and
SETs. Particle experiments may use protons, neutrons, or heavier ions which can be
as “light” as helium or as “heavy” as gold (or heavier) in terms of atomic number.
Indeed, many elements across the periodic table can and have been used in radiation
experiments. In addition, the energy level also plays a major role. The energy level of
particles depends on the velocity to which the particles are accelerated before striking
their target. If these concerns were not enough, the flux also plays a role. Flux is
essentially a particle flow rate or density measure; it describes the number of particles
that pass through a cross sectional area over a certain period of time.
In addition to these factors, the materials used to construct the electronic device
(i.e. silicon, doping levels, device sizes, and etc.) also have an impact on the rate at
which SETs and SEUs occur. As a result, comparing the results of one radiation experiment to another is inherently difficult. Typically, any radiation comparisons are
made on a case by case basis and any data on radiation comparisons have come from
past empirical data. One method of comparing SEU rates with different radiation
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environments is provided by Normand et al. [66, 67]. In these papers, a comparison
is made between SEU rates of identical microelectronics exposed to broad spectrum
(10 MeV to 1 GeV) neutrons and 400 MeV protons [67] at Los Alamos National Laboratories. The SEU rate comparison was nearly one-to-one across all of the different
microelectronic devices that were tested. One additional piece of information from
n
, but the proton
Normand et al. is that the neutrons had a flux of 1 × 109 2
cm · hr
flux was unspecified [67]. This neutron flux will be important when making SEU rate
comparisons when discussing the results of neutron experiments conducted in this
research. Those results are presented in Section 5.2.2.1
While these comparisons are inherently difficult, some similarities may be noted
between experiments where similar radiation environments are used. For example,
the Cibola flight experiment saw a peak proton flux between 10 and 100 MeV as
shown in Figure 1 in [108]. Normand et al. suggested that 200 to 300 MeV protons
could also replicate the neutron environment in [66], but did not provide test data to
support that claim. Assuming that the Cibola proton environment is similar enough
to Normand’s proton environment, it could be argued that the Cibola SEU rate
could be used to predict the SEU rate in an equivalent neutron environment. This
is an unfounded assumption, but making this assumption enables a rough order of
magnitude comparison between the Cibola SEU rate and the SEU rate seen in the
neutron experiment conducted in this research.
Some other problems with this assumption are the unknown proton fluence levels
in Normand’s work. Additionally, the goal of Normand’s work was to match the SEU
rates of microelectronics in a known neutron environment by using proton radiation
at varying energy levels using identical electronic devices. Note that the electronic
devices used in this research (Intel Cyclone V FPGA on a Terasic DE10-Standard
board) differ from the Xilinx FPGAs used by the Cibola flight experiment.
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The Cibola flight experiment experienced a mitigated SEU rate of 0.78 SEUs/device/day, or a failure-in-time FIT rate of 3.25 × 107 [108]. This is a good goal for
mitigated SEU vulnerability and will serve as a point of comparison for the radiation
experiments performed in this research. The Cibola flight experiment’s mitigation
technique was TMR combined with configuration memory scrubbing.

2.5

Hardware Selection
This research attempts to implement the proposed Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy

(AHR) on an Intel Cyclone V FPGA. Intel FPGAs were chosen because they have
not been publicly studied for radiation hardness to the extent that other brands of
FPGAs, such as Actel and Xilinx FPGAs, have been studied. This research sought
to add to the body of knowledge on radiation hardness of FPGAs by examining an
Intel FPGA rather than a more extensively researched brand of FPGA. The Cyclone
V was chosen over other available Intel FPGAs because it is representative of an
inexpensive Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) FPGA.
The Cyclone V’s unmitigated vulnerability to SEUs and SETs must be understood in order to determine the appropriate rate at which to inject errors into AHR
simulations. It is also necessary to determine a baseline with which to compare AHR’s
performance in the presence of radiation. This will allow a determination to be made
about whether AHR is providing mitigation by lowering the number of undetected
and uncorrected errors. This research will examine the unmitigated vulnerability of
the Cyclone V to configuration and user logic SEUs as well as user logic SETs.
It is expected that the unmitigated Cyclone V will be equally vulnerable as other
unmitigated FPGAs; however, this research does not seek to draw conclusions about
the radiation vulnerability of various FPGA brands. This is primarily because research on the unmitigated vulnerability of FPGAs has proven difficult to locate.
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Much of the existing FPGA radiation research focuses on the error rates of various mitigation strategies when compared against one another and does not consider
comparisons to an unmitigated FPGA. Additionally, determining the unmitigated
vulnerability of various FPGA brands is out-of-scope for this research. However, as
previously noted in the previous section, a rough order of magnitude radiation comparison will be made between a satellite utilizing Xilinx FPGAs and the Cyclone
V FPGA used in this research. Because this comparison is an order of magnitude
comparison, it is viewed more as a qualitative measure than a quantitative one.
On a final note, this research does not seek to attribute the source of Cyclone V
errors to either configuration logic SEUs or user logic SEUs or SETs. This research
does seek to establish a baseline of Intel FPGA radiation vulnerability as a secondary
objective with the goal of taking the first step toward hardening Intel FPGAs in the
same way that other FPGA brands have been hardened.

2.6

Test Approaches
This section discusses some commonly used approaches to determine the effective-

ness of mitigation techniques in past works. The test approaches include analysis,
simulation, and radiation testing as well as the types of hardware used and the programs implemented in hardware.
Some researchers performed an analysis or proof [48, 52, 59, 87, 91, 95]. Kolla et
al. used analysis and mathematical proof to demonstrate that a residue code based
error detection method could detect multi-bit errors with 99% accuracy [48]. Lala et
al. used a proof to show the effectiveness of their residue code approach to designing self-checking circuits [52]. Mahmoud et al. conduct an analysis to demonstrate
the ability of their Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) voter to mitigate errors [59].
Singh and Gray utilize mathematical analysis to demonstrate the effectiveness of their
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redundancy approach which uses TMR and also incorporates replacing failed processors with spares [87]. Sterpone and Du use analysis to demonstrate the effectiveness
of their FPGA radiation hardening approach, which utilizes a specialized compiler to
add guard gates and other circuitry to mitigate SETs [91]. Tamir uses analysis to
demonstrate the effectiveness of his approach to redundancy in a computer network
[95].
Many researchers performed simulations to determine radiation vulnerability [3,
23, 47, 49, 55, 57, 71, 73, 78, 82, 91, 92, 93, 101, 106]. Some of the simulations
were performed on individual transistors or gates [47]. Other simulations examined combinational and sequential logic such as inverter chains, counters, decoders,
and multiplexers [55, 57, 82, 92]. Some simulations were performed on memory
[3, 49, 73, 93]. Other simulations were performed on processors running benchmark
programs: some of these simulations used hardware-in-the-loop (HITL) [23, 71, 78,
79, 91, 94, 101, 106]. Many of the simulations also injected faults to determine
how their redundancy schemes would detect and correct the errors. Fault injection
was performed with software for software only simulations. Fault injection was performed using software manipulation or direct electrical injection for HITL simulations
[23, 57, 71, 73, 92, 94, 106].
Other researchers performed radiation testing to determine radiation hardness or
vulnerability [3, 31, 43, 57, 73, 82, 88]. These researchers used a number of different
types of ions including protons, neon, argon, cobalt, copper, krypton, silver, and
xenon [3, 43, 57, 82, 88]. Some of the researchers performed radiation tests on memory
[3, 43]. Rezgui et al. performed tests on inverter chains and other combinational and
sequential logic structures [82]. Ostler et al. implemented shift registers [73]. Other
researchers performed their tests on processors running programs during the tests
[31, 57, 88].
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Another common approach to determining vulnerability of a device is to implement a static pattern. The device is then irradiated and the pattern on the device is
compared to the original pattern. This comparison can be performed during or after
irradiation. When the two patterns differ, an error has occurred. Common patterns
include all 0’s, all 1’s, and checkerboard patterns [9, 25, 28, 43, 61].
This research presents a combination of analysis, software simulation, and HITL
simulation to determine the effectiveness of AHR and using radiation testing on a
checkerboard pattern to determine the vulnerability of the Intel Cyclone V FPGA.

2.7

Background Summary
This chapter discussed Single Event Effects (SEEs) and focused on the impact of

Single Event Upsets (SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs) because mitigating
the effects of SEUs and SETs through the use of Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy is
a focus area of this research. Additionally, numerous redundancy techniques were
discussed. Of these, the simplest Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) and Temporal
Software Redundancy (TSR) strategies were selected to implement AHR.
The chosen TMR strategy is system level TMR that triplicates a processor, utilizes
a majority voter to determine the correct output, detects single processor errors and
corrects them by copying the state of the agreeing processors to the processor that
disagrees, and corrects multiple processor errors by restoring all three processors to
a previously saved state. This strategy was chosen because it is the simplest of the
TMR approaches and it is typically used for U.S. Air Force space vehicles.
The chosen TSR strategy is Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions (EDDI),
which duplicates all instructions, adds check instructions before all store word instructions, adds code to create save/restore points which store the system state, and adds
error recovery code to recover to a save/restore point when an error is detected at
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one of the check instructions. This TSR strategy was chosen because of its simplicity
and to ensure that more complicated TSR strategies would not obscure the results of
this research such that it would be difficult to determine the advantages of AHR over
TMR or TSR alone. This choice also reduces the scope of work because choosing to
implement a more complex TSR method would substantially increase the workload.
A simpler TSR method enables this research to focus more exclusively upon AHR.
This chapter also discussed radiation comparisons so that a useful comparison
could be made between SEU rates from a real space mission and the the SEU rates
measured from neutron radiation testing performed on an Intel Cyclone V FPGA in
this research. These comparisons enable a determination of the appropriate SEU rate
to use in simulations of TMR, TSR, and AHR.
Finally, this chapter looked at previous testing and analysis approaches used by
other researchers looking at SEU mitigation through redundancy and it was determined that a simulation and analysis approach would be used for this research to
demonstrate the advantages of AHR over TMR and TSR alone.
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III. AHR MIPS Development

3.1

Introduction
In order to answer the research questions posed in Section 1.3, it is necessary to

develop a processor architecture to implement Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR).
This architecture should incorporate multiple redundancy methods and switch between these methods. The architecture would therefore be adaptive in that it could
switch between two or more redundancy methods. The architecture would also be
hybrid to allow for two or more different types of redundancy, and more specifically, a
combination of hardware and software redundancy. The selected hardware approach
is a form of Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) while the selected software approach
is a form of Temporal Software Redundancy (TSR). The adaptive nature of the architecture will allow it to switch between TMR and TSR depending on the energy
and performance requirements for the processor at any given time.
The TMR approach implemented in this research is a system level approach where
three copies of the same processor operate on the same inputs and their outputs are
examined by a voting circuit. All three processors produce the same outputs when
there are no errors. If only one of the three processors encounter an error, the correct
output can be determined by majority vote. In the case of a single processor’s output
differing from the other two, the voter circuity resets the “incorrect” processor and
sets the processor’s internal state to match the internal state of the two “correct”
processors. If all three processors disagree on the output (i.e. no majority exists),
the voter resets all three processors and restores them to a previously saved internal
state. This approach also assumes that the save/restore point is saved in radiation
hardened memory [6, 7, 10]. This approach was presented as the first TMR approach
in Section 2.3.2.1.
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The TSR approach selected for this work is one in which all instructions except
for store instructions are duplicated. A branch instruction is inserted before all store
instructions to ensure that the value to be stored to memory and its duplicate are
equal. This was the first TSR example provided in Section 2.3.2.2 and was illustrated
in Table 1. This TSR approach is called Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions
(EDDI) [71].
The AHR architecture builds upon these TMR and TSR approaches by combining
them in a common architecture with a controller selecting between the two. The
intent is that the TMR architecture could be fully utilized when the TMR mitigation
strategy was needed for faster processing and the TSR architecture could be used
when energy conservation is important. The TSR program will run on one of the TMR
architecture’s three processors while bypassing the TMR Voter, thereby avoiding a
fourth processor. To experiment with such an approach, this architecture will be
implemented on an FPGA due to the ease and speed of implementation on an FPGA
by encoding the architecture in VHDL. For this work, the architecture was specifically
implemented on a Terasic DE10-Standard board with an Intel Cyclone V FPGA.
The AHR architecture requires three identical processors for TMR and the use
of one of these processors for TSR. The experimental processor should be designed
with testing in mind. Testing requires comparing TMR and TSR performance in the
presence and absence of errors. Testing must be able to inject errors and observe
the effects in both TMR and TSR; namely testing will determine how TMR and
TSR respond to errors and the performance penalty (time to complete a program
and energy consumed in completing the program) of responding to those errors. A
simplified MIPS processor, called Basic MIPS, is designed and used to fulfill these
conditions.
The design of the Basic MIPS processor and its associated programs are detailed in
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Section 3.2. The Basic MIPS processor then facilitates the TMR MIPS architecture
and program development in Section 3.3. Basic MIPS development also provides
insight into the development of the TSR architecture and programs in Section 3.4.
After TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS are fully understood, the discussion will return to
the development of AHR in Section 3.5.

3.2

Basic MIPS
3.2.1

Basic MIPS Development

Basic MIPS is an architecture that implements 33 instructions from MIPS32TM .
These instructions are shown in Table 2. It was designed in such a way that the two
fundamental building blocks are a 2-input NAND gate and a D-Flip-Flop (also called
a register). All other components are comprised of these two building blocks, up to
and including the Controller and Datapath which comprise the two interconnected
components of the Basic MIPS processor. There is no additional logic required by the
Basic MIPS processor outside of the Controller and Datapath. This design strategy
allowed for complete insight into the operation of the processor and full traceability
of all injected errors. If a previously designed processor were used, significant time
and resources would have been taken away from implementing AHR to understanding
the processor and adapting it to the error injection and analysis requirements as well
as ensuring it is compatible for use in TMR, TSR, and AHR.
The only storage elements this architecture contains are a 30-bit register to store
the program counter (PC) in the Controller; a 32-bit register to store an instruction
in the Controller; a 4-bit register to store the state of the Controller; thirty two 32bit registers of which 31 are user programmable while one is always a 32-bit zero in
the Datapath; and a few single bit registers in the Datapath to account for timing
delays when processing certain instructions. Instructions to be run on Basic MIPS are
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stored separately in memory. As previously mentioned in the assumptions in Chapter
I, memory is immune to errors and not a part of the processor. These instructions are
retrieved from memory and operated upon sequentially; each instruction is retrieved
and operated upon until completion before the next instruction is retrieved.
Before continuing to a discussion on Basic MIPS interface with memory, it is
important to note why a sequential design was chosen over a pipelined or super-scalar
design. A sequential processor is far simpler and less time-consuming to implement
than a pipelined or super-scalar processor. Pipelined and super-scalar processors are
also irrelevant to implementing AHR which switches between TMR and TSR since
pipelined and super-scalar processors would simply speed up both TMR and TSR.

Table 2. List of Implemented Basic MIPS Instructions

Abbreviation
SLL
NOP
SRL
SRA
SLLV
SRLV
SRAV
ADD
ADDU
SUB
SUBU
AND
OR
XOR
NOR
SLT
SLTU
BGEZ
BLTZ
BEQ

Name
Shift Word Left Logical
No Operation
Shift Word Right Logical
Shift Word Right Arithmetic
Shift Word Left Logical Variable
Shift Word Right Logical Variable
Shift Word Right Arithmetic Variable
Add Word
Add Unsigned Word
Subtract Word
Subtract Word Unsigned
Bitwise Logical And
Bitwise Logical Or
Bitwise Logical Exclusive Or
Bitwise Logical Not Or
Set on Less Than
Set On Less Than Unsigned
Branch on Greater Than or Equal to Zero
Branch on Less Than Zero
Branch on Equal
Table 2 – Continued on next page
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Table
Abbreviation
BNE
BLEZ
BGTZ
ADDI
ADDIU
SLTI
SLTIU
ANDI
ORI
XORI
LUI
LW
SW

2 – Continued from previous page
Name
Branch on Not Equal
Branch on Less Than or Equal to Zero
Branch on Greater Than Zero
Add Immediate Word
Add Immediate Unsigned Word
Set On Less Than Immediate
Set On Less Than Immediate Unsigned
Bitwise Logical And Immediate
Bitwise Logical Or Immediate
Bitwise Logical Exclusive Or Immediate
Load Upper Immediate
Load Word
Store Word

Basic MIPS communicates with memory using six signals. These signals are illustrated in a simple block diagram shown in Figure 3. The inputs are on the left and
begin with “i ” and outputs are on the right and begin with “o ”. The signal “i clk”
is the clock signal and “i reset” is used to reset Basic MIPS so that all registers are set
to zero. Basic MIPS requests data from memory by asserting the “o MEM READ”
signal and providing an address on the “o MEM ADDRESS” signal. Memory responds by providing the data at the given address on “i MEM OUT” and asserting
the “i MEM READY” signal. Basic MIPS stores data to memory by providing an
address on the “o MEM ADDRESS” signal, the data to store on the “o MEM IN”
signal, and asserting the “o MEM WRITE” signal. Memory responds by asserting
the “i MEM READY” signal to indicate that the data provided was stored to the
address supplied by Basic MIPS.
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Figure 3. Basic MIPS Inputs and Outputs

A detailed Air Force Institute of Technology technical report on the Basic MIPS
Architecture covers all of Basic MIPS’ inner workings and can be made available upon
request [36].

3.2.2

Basic MIPS Programs

Because the Basic MIPS architecture does not support all MIPS instructions, no
existing benchmarks can be used to evaluate the performance of the Basic MIPS processor. Therefore, programs are generated to evaluate its performance as a baseline
against which the performance of TMR, TSR, and AHR may be compared. The processor’s performance is evaluated in terms of time and energy required to complete
a program. The programs are randomly generated to ensure that all Basic MIPS
instructions are fairly represented across multiple programs. The distribution of instructions is intended to be uniform, but that is not necessarily the case after all
processing actions to create programs are completed.
A set of Basic MIPS instructions is first created with variable names instead of
register names. The set of instructions is randomly generated using all of the Basic
MIPS instructions except the branching instructions and load word instruction. The
first instruction is required to be a load upper immediate instruction with a uniformly
random immediate value. After the first instruction, arguments to the following
instructions must come from the zero variable (analogous to the 0 register in the
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Basic MIPS architecture in that its value is always 0) or a randomly selected variable
that was the result of a previous instruction. In order to simplify things, store word
instructions always have the 0 variable as their base. The offset portion of store word
instructions are not randomized, and with a base address of 0, the offset specifies
the desired memory location. Additionally, the immediate value of any immediate
function is always uniformly random. Finally, the last instruction must be a store
word.
This randomized set of instructions, however, may not be representative of real
world programs which are hardly random. Real programs are carefully designed and
implemented by computer programmers, computer scientists, and software engineers.
This random approach creates a lot of variables that are never used or stored to
memory. Real world programs do not typically create unused variables, so the next
step is to eliminate all instructions that produce unused variables from the set of Basic
MIPS instructions. All variables that contribute to the computation of a variable
which is stored to memory by a store word instruction are considered essential while
those that do not are considered superfluous and removed by this step. Variables
which are stored to memory by a store word instruction at this step are considered
to be the desired end results of the program and are stored to permanent memory.
After eliminating all unused variables, variable names are converted to register
names. However, Basic MIPS only has 31 user definable registers. Additionally, one
more register is reserved for a loop counter for reasons that will be discussed in a few
paragraphs. This means that the set of Basic MIPS instructions may never use more
than 30 registers. If the variable instruction set never uses more than 30 variables,
then the transformation process is very simple and each variable can be assigned to a
single register. If more than 30 variables are used, they can be carefully examined to
determine if more than 30 variables are in use simultaneously. For example, a program
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might use 40 variables, but some may only be used for a short period of time before
storing them to memory and never using them again: this could occur in such a
way that there are no more than 30 variables being used at any given time. Registers
holding variables that have been permanently stored to memory and never used again
are freed for use by other variables. In this scenario, it is also fairly simple to assign
variables to registers so long as variable names to register assignment mappings are
carefully tracked. If more than 30 variables need to be used simultaneously, then
extra steps must be taken in the variable to register assignment process and extra
instructions must be added. If 30 variables are currently being used and the next
instruction is creating a new variable that must be assigned a register, an algorithm
determines which of the 30 variables currently in registers is going to be accessed the
furthest amount of time from the next instruction. The algorithm then inserts a store
word instruction to store that variable to a temporary storage location in memory,
then the new variable is assigned to the register that was just vacated. When the
variable stored to temporary storage in memory is needed, it is reloaded into a register.
If all the registers are full when this reload must occur, another variable is selected
(again the variable that is going to be accessed the furthest amount of time from the
next instruction) to be temporarily stored to memory to make space for the reload.
All of these determinations are made at compile time by the compiler (a series of
Matlab functions) which does the variable to register mapping.
A second DE10-Standard’s Cyclone V was used to store the set of instructions
rather than in the DE-10 Standard’s Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) in order
to isolate the memory from radiation effects and enable energy measurements of the
processor alone. The set of instructions were implemented in a memory emulator
or “Memulator” This Memulator stores all of the instructions in a series of 32-bit
registers on the Cyclone V. This was accomplished by using VHDL code to create

43

the Memulator as well as provide the interface for Basic MIPS to read and write from
the Memulator.
Storing the set of instructions in a Memulator on a Cyclone V greatly restricted its
size. The Cyclone V only possesses 166,036 registers capable of holding no more than
5,188 32-bit memory locations. It is also limited by routing constraints to read and
write to all of the registers, which means that not all of the 5,188 addresses are usable.
The limited size meant that running the set of instructions one time in hardware would
make the runtime very short. This in turn limits the observability of the duration
and energy usage when the FPGA implementing the Basic MIPS processor runs the
set of instructions. To overcome this observability limitation, additional code was
added to create a loop around the set of instructions. This loop would cause the
set of instructions to execute 999 times to increase the observability of the time to
complete the 999 loops through and the energy used by the processor. In order to
add this loop, one of the 31 user registers was reserved for the loop counter (counts
from 999 down to 1) and no longer available as a user definable register. That is why
the variables must be mapped to 30 user registers.
After the end of the set of instructions and loop code, empty memory locations are
added (containing all 0s) for use as temporary and permanent memory. As previously
mentioned, temporary memory is used to store variables when there are more variables
than registers available while permanent memory is used to store program results. The
instruction set, loop code, and temporary and permanent memory are collectively
referred to as a program.
A sample Basic MIPS program is shown in Table 3 without the temporary and
permanent memory. In this example, the first two instructions set up the loop counter.
The first instruction loads 999 into the upper 16 bits of R31 so that the value stored in
R31 is 999 · 216 . The second instruction shifts the value 16-bits to the right, effectively
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dividing by 216 and changing the value in R31 to 999. The third instruction marks
the beginning of the randomly generated set of instructions. Most of the instructions
are omitted here for brevity, but the final store word instruction is shown on line 46.
The next instruction subtracts one from the loop counter. Instruction 48 branches
back to the start of the loop on line 3 if the value in R31 is greater than 0. Once
the loop counter reaches 0, the branch on line 48 is not taken and code execution
proceeds to line 49. This instruction causes code execution to branch to a region
outside the program. When the processor attempts to read the instruction from the
Memulator, the Memulator recognizes that the instruction is outside the range of
addresses allocated for the program. The Memulator further understands that this
means the program is complete.
Table 3. Basic MIPS Code Example

Line Number
1.
2.
3.
4 - 45
46.
47.
48.
49.

Instruction
LUI R31 999
SRL R31 R31 16
LUI R1 30277
...
SW R24 R0 228
ADDI R31 R31 -1
BGTZ R31 -45
BEQ R0 R0 END

Upon program completion, the Memulator sends a “DONE” signal to reset itself
and the Basic MIPS processor. This causes the program to start over from line 1 in
the example above.
One additional constraint on the program is that it must have at least enough
instructions that a TMR to TSR transition is triggered in AHR. If a program running
AHR completes in TMR mode, AHR will never transition from TMR to TSR. Since
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the main purpose of this research is to develop AHR and evaluate its performance
compared to TMR and TSR, AHR must transition from TMR to TSR. Therefore,
any program which has insufficient instructions to trigger the TMR to TSR transition
is discarded.

3.3

TMR MIPS
3.3.1

TMR MIPS Development

To implement TMR, three Basic MIPS processors are connected to a voter which
is then connected to memory as shown in Figure 4. This figure also combines memory
signals into directional arrows and a bi-directional arrow is used to denote the two-way
flow of communication between the voter and memory. Notice how there is no direct
connection between the Basic MIPS processors and memory. The Basic MIPS processors each communicate with the voter as if they were communicating with memory
using the exact same control signals as Basic MIPS normally uses to communicate
with memory. The voter compares the memory control signals “o MEM READ”,
“o MEM WRITE”, “o MEM ADDRESS”, and “o MEM IN” to determine if all three
processors are working in unison. During normal operation, if all three processors are
attempting to read data from memory, all three processors will simultaneously signal
a read operation and provide an address. The voter will confirm that all three processors are attempting to read from the same address, then the voter will attempt
to read data from the supplied address in memory. Memory then provides the data
and ready signal to the voter. The voter then simultaneously provides the data and
a ready signal to each of the Basic MIPS processors. For a write operation, all three
processors simultaneously signal a write operation and provide data and an address.
The voter confirms that all three processors are attempting to write the same data to
the same address, then the voter attempts to write the data to the supplied address
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in memory. Memory then provides the ready signal to the voter. The voter then
provides the ready signal to each of the processors.

Figure 4. TMR MIPS Block Diagram

If one of the three processors suffers an error such that it fails to provide a read
or write signal at the same time as the other two processors, the address provided is
different than the other two processors, or the data provided for a write operation differs from the other two processors’ provided data, a single processor error is detected.
This error is called a TMR Type A error. When this occurs, the voter switches into
a single processor error state. The voter first resets the processor that is in error and
stores the PC value of the two agreeing processors at which the error occurred. Then,
a store word command is issued to the two agreeing processors to store the data in
user defined register 1 (R1). The two agreeing processors will then attempt to store
R1 to memory, which is really the voter. The voter takes the value of R1 from the two
agreeing processors and confirms that the two R1 values are equal. Then, the voter
issues a load word command to the processor in error to load a value into R1. When
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the processor in error attempts to load a word from memory, the voter responds by
supplying the R1 value from the two agreeing processors. This process is repeated
for the remaining 30 user registers (R2-R31, not R0 because it is the zero register).
At this point, all of the user registers in the processor in error now match those in
the agreeing processors. However, all three processors PC values do not match the
value at which the error was detected. The voter then issues branch commands to
all three processors to return them to the PC value at the point where the error was
detected. This process is shown as a flow chart in Figure 5. This figure references a
Type B error which will be discussed shortly. When a Type B error occurs, Type B
error recovery begins.
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Figure 5. TMR MIPS Type A Error Recovery Flow Chart
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If two or three processors suffer an error such that they do not agree on the type of
operation, read or write, the address, or the data to be written for a write operation,
then a multiple processor error has occurred. This error is called a TMR Type B error.
It is possible that one of the three processors is correct, but the voter has no way
to determine which one is correct. The voter resets all three processors, and begins
performing error recovery operations to restore the internal state of the processors to
a previous save/restore point. Processing resumes from that save/restore point and
will eventually return to the location in the program at which the error occurred, then
proceed past that point so long as another multiple processor error does not occur.
The save/restore point consists of 65 memory locations split into two main segments and one additional memory location bit. Each of the two main segments can
store the value of the 30 user definable registers, the loop counter from R31, and the
PC at a specific moment in time. The additional memory location stores a value the
indicates which of the two segments contains the most recently created save/restore
point.
During save/restore point creation, the TMR Voter determines which segment was
most recently updated. The TMR Voter then instructs the Basic MIPS processors to
store R1 to the first location in the segment that was not most recently updated. The
TMR Voter ensures that at least two of the three R1 values match, then writes it to
memory. The TMR Voter continues this process until all 30 user definable registers,
the loop counter in R31, and the PC are written to memory. Finally, the TMR Voter
updates the additional memory location bit to point to the new most recently updated
segment. This processes is illustrated as a flow chart in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. TMR MIPS Save/Restore Point Creation Flow Chart

51

The TMR Voter creates save/restore points after TMR MIPS processes a predetermined number of instructions. The TMR Voter does not possess the capability to
determine when a program is starting or ending a loop; therefore, the TMR Voter
cannot intentionally create save/restore points based on progress through the loop or
the value of the loop counter. This is why the save/restore point must store the PC
value as well as all the register values. One constant that must be defined for these
experiments is the number of instructions between save/restore point creation for
TMR MIPS. This value was arbitrarily set to be 10,000. The number of save/restore
points created by TMR MIPS, will depend upon the total number of instructions in
the program. For example, a program with only 12,000 instructions (including all 999
loop iterations) will only have one save/restore point created while a program with
95,000 instructions will have nine save/restore points created.
During Type B error recovery operations, the TMR Voter first resets all three
processors, then issues load word commands to all three processors to sequentially
load R1 to R31 from the most recent save/restore point in memory. Once R1 to
R31 have been restored from memory in all three processors, all three processors are
issued a branch command to return them to the PC value at which the most recent
save/restore point was created. Figure 7 illustrates Type B error recovery as a flow
chart.
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Figure 7. TMR MIPS Type B Error Recovery Flow Chart
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A Type B error can also be triggered when all three processors fail to interact with
memory before a predefined timeout period. This indicates that the processors are
stuck in a state from which they cannot recover without voter intervention. A Type B
error is also triggered when recovering from a Type A error if the two processors that
were thought to be in perfect agreement disagree on the value of a register or stop
responding to the voter. A Type B error also occurs if all three processors disagree
on the value to be stored during save/restore point creation.
One final note is that it is assumed that the TMR Voter is hardened such that it is
immune to errors. If the TMR Voter were subjected to SEUs and SETs, its internal
state could be affected by radiation with adverse consequences to the behavior of
TMR MIPS. A state error could place the TMR Voter in conflict with the Basic
MIPS processors in such a way that the TMR MIPS processor would freeze. A state
error could also trigger error recovery when no error has occurred or save/restore
point creation when it is not time to create a save/restore point. Another possibility
is that error recovery or save/restore point creation could skip steps leaving some
portions of the processor vulnerable to undetectable errors.
A detailed Air Force Institute of Technology technical report on the TMR MIPS
Architecture covers all of TMR MIPS’ inner workings and can be made available upon
request [38].

3.3.2

TMR MIPS Programs

TMR MIPS programs are identical to Basic MIPS programs and are used by TMR
MIPS with minimal modification. The only modification is the addition of 65 blank
memory locations to be used by the save/restore point.
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3.4

TSR MIPS
3.4.1

TSR MIPS Development

The TSR MIPS architecture is identical to Basic MIPS. The TSR MIPS processor
is the Basic MIPS processor. The only difference is that TSR MIPS makes use of
a specialized program that incorporates redundancy while still computing the same
results as an equivalent Basic MIPS program.

3.4.2

TSR MIPS Programs

TSR MIPS program generation follows the same process for register assignment
as Basic MIPS programs in Section 3.2.2; however, there are far more store and
load instructions required for managing temporarily stored variables because TSR
can only access 14 user definable registers instead of 30. TSR only has access to
14 user definable registers because 2 registers are reserved for the counter (leaving
29 registers) and every register must have a duplicate (29/2 = 14.5). This leaves 1
unused register. One final note is that any store word instructions that were part
of the Basic MIPS program before the addition of store instructions to temporarily
store variables to memory are also in the TSR MIPS program. These original store
word instructions are viewed as storing words to a permanent memory which could
be utilized later. The values stored in permanent memory will be identical for Basic
MIPS, TMR MIPS, and TSR MIPS while the values in temporary memory will not
be identical.
Each TSR program also contains code to create a loop around the set of instructions as was done for Basic MIPS programs. This loop also executes the set of
instructions 999 times. At the end of the set of instructions, and before the branch
to restart the loop, additional instructions are added to determine when save/restore
point creation instructions should be executed. A save/restore point is created when
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the counter equals 750, 500, and 250. After the end of the set of instructions and loop
code, empty memory locations are added (containing all 0s) for use as temporary and
permanent memory.
Table 4 shows a sample TSR MIPS program without the temporary and permanent memory. Also excluded are save/restore point creation instructions, error
recovery instructions, and save/restore point memory which will be further discussed
in the following paragraphs.
In the example in Table 4, the first four instructions set up the loop counter and
its duplicate. The first two instructions load 999 into the upper 16 bits of R30 and
R31 so that the values stored in R30 and R31 are both 999 · 216 . The third and fourth
instructions shift the values in R30 and R31 16-bits to the right, effectively dividing
by 216 and changing the value in R30 and R31 to 999. The fifth instruction marks
the beginning of the randomly generated set of instructions and the sixth instruction is the fifth instruction’s duplicate. Most of the instructions are omitted here for
brevity, but the final store word instruction is shown on line 92. Note the branch
instruction on line 91 that ensures that R12 and its duplicate, R26, are equal before
proceeding to the store word instruction. If they are not equal, code execution jumps
to the error recovery code which happens to be 129 addresses away from the branch
instruction. The next two instructions compare the current counter value to 250.
If the loop counter value equals 250, then code execution jumps to the save/restore
point creation instructions which happen to be 19 addresses away from the branch
instruction on line 94. Similarly, the instructions on lines 95 and 96 determine if the
counter equals 500 and lines 97 and 98 determine if the counter equals 750. In both
of these cases, if the counter equals either of these values, code execution also jumps
to the save/restore point creation instructions. If the counter does not equal 250,
500, or 750, code execution proceeds to instructions 99 and 100 which subtract one
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from the loop counter stored in registers R30 and R31 respectively. The values in R30
and R31 are compared to ensure the loop counter is not in error before proceeding
to the branch instruction on line 102. If the values are not equal, code execution
jumps to error recovery instructions which happens to be 119 addresses away from
the branch instruction on line 101. If the values match and are greater than 0, the
branch instruction on line 102 causes code execution to return to the beginning of
the loop on line 5. If the loop counter value is 0, code execution proceeds to line
103. This instruction causes code execution to branch to a region outside the program. When the processor attempts to read the instruction from the Memulator, the
Memulator recognizes that the instruction is outside the range of addresses allocated
for the program. The Memulator further understands that this means the program
is complete and sends the DONE signal to reset itself and the Basic MIPS processor
running the TSR instructions.
Also note that the example in Table 4 is the TSR equivalent program to the Basic
MIPS program example in Table 3.

Table 4. TSR MIPS Code Example

Line Number
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7 - 90
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
Table 4 –

Instruction
LUI R30 3
LUI R31 3
SRL R30 R30 16
SRL R31 R31 16
LUI R1 30277
LUI R15 30277
...
BNE R12 R26 129
SW R12 R0 444
ADDI R29 R30 -250
BEQ R29 R0 19
ADDI R29 R30 -500
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – Continued from previous page
Line Number Instruction
96.
BEQ R29 R0 17
97.
ADDI R29 R30 -750
98.
BEQ R29 R0 15
99.
ADDI R30 R30 -1
100.
ADDI R31 R31 -1
101.
BNE R30 R31 119
102.
BGTZ R31 -97
103.
BEQ R0 R0 224

TSR MIPS also requires save/restore point creation instructions that create a
save/restore point in memory and error recovery instructions to restore TSR MIPS
to a previously saved state if an error occurs. Unfortunately, while many previous
works discussed save/restore points and branching to error recovery instructions upon
encountering an error, no previous works were located that explained these processes
[68, 75, 71, 79, 95, 107]. This research developed these processes, but it is unknown if
they are unique. Before examining how save/restore points are created and recovery
operations are performed, a look at the structure of the save/restore point is needed.
The save/restore point is a block of memory reserved in order to restore the
internal state of TSR MIPS. This memory consists of two main segments and one
additional memory location. The two main segments each store the 14 user variables
stored in the user defined registers at some point in time. Each segment also stores
the loop counter value at that same point in time. Of the two main segments, one will
have been saved more recently, and the other less recently. The additional memory
location stores a value used by the TSR MIPS save/restore point creation code and
error recovery code to show which of the two segments is the more recent one.
The save/restore point creation code saves the current values of the 14 user defined
registers and the loop counter to the less recently updated segment, then updates the
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additional memory location to indicate that this segment is now the more recently
updated segment. Before each register value is stored to memory, the code compares
duplicated registers. If they match, the code stores them to memory. If they do
not match, error recovery is used to restore TSR MIPS to the more recent save/restore point. The additional memory location is only updated if all of the registers
match. At this point, the less recently updated save/restore point now becomes the
more recently updated save/restore point. After the additional memory location is
updated, a branch command is issued to return code execution back to the end of the
TSR program where the loop counter will be decreased before branching back to the
beginning of the loop.
Table 5 shows a sample of the TSR save/restore point creation instructions. A
portion of the instructions have been omitted for brevity. In this particular example,
1300 is the memory location of the save/restore creation point additional memory
location that indicates which segment is the most recent one. After that value is
loaded, it is compared to 0 and code execution jumps by 3 instructions if it is greater
than 0, or continues to the next instruction if it is less than or equal to 0. This value
only takes on the values of 0 or 60. The value 0 indicates that the first segment is the
most recently updated while 60 indicates that the second segment is the most recently
updated. If the value is 0, the next instruction changes it to 60, then branches 2 more
instructions forward, If the value is 60, the branch jumps 3 instructions forward, then
changes its value to 0. Both paths lead to the BNE R1 R15 102 instruction on line
6. This is the comparison that ensures R1 and its duplicate R15 are a match, if not,
code execution jumps to the error recovery instructions, which happens to be 102
memory locations after line 6. These same instructions are repeated for each of the
remaining user defined registers and also the loop counter. The instructions for the
loop counter are seen on lines 211 to 217.
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Notice that if the most recently created save/restore point is in the first segment,
it takes six instructions to save the value of a register to the second segment. If the
most recently created save/restore point is in the second segment, it takes only five
instructions to save the value of a register to the first segment. This means that it will
take more instructions and time to create a save/restore point in the second segment
than in the first segment. The exact amount of time to create a save/restore point in
the first and second segments will be provided in Section 4.4.

Table 5. TSR MIPS save/restore Point Creation Instructions Example

Line Number
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127 - 203
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
Table 5 –

Instruction
LW R29 R0 1300
BGTZ R29 3
ADDI R29 R0 60
BEQ R0 R0 2
ADDI R29 R0 0
BNE R1 R15 102
SW R1 R29 1180
LW R29 R0 1300
BGTZ R29 3
ADDI R29 R0 60
BEQ R0 R0 2
ADDI R29 R0 0
BNE R2 R16 95
SW R2 R29 1184
...
LW R29 R0 1300
BGTZ R29 3
ADDI R29 R0 60
BEQ R0 R0 2
ADDI R29 R0 0
BNE R14 R28 11
SW R14 R29 1232
LW R29 R0 1300
BGTZ R29 3
ADDI R29 R0 60
Continued on next page
60

Table 5 – Continued from previous page
Line Number Instruction
214.
BEQ R0 R0 2
215.
ADDI R29 R0 0
216.
BNE R30 R31 4
217.
SW R30 R29 1236
218.
SW R29 R0 1300
219.
BEQ R0 R0 -120

The save/restore point creation process is also illustrated in Figure 8 as a flow
chart.

Figure 8. TSR MIPS Save/Restore Point Creation Flow Chart
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Also note that the pointer to the most recently updated segment is repeatedly
reloaded into R29. This is done because the only free register is R29 and there is no
way in this TSR approach to duplicate R29 during the save/restore point creation
process. The only way to protect R29 is to frequently refresh it, but that does not
completely eliminate the possibility for error. Also note that the SW command always
makes use of R29 as the base address and that the offset addresses always point to
the first segment in the save restore point. Because the value of R29 is either 0 or
60 and the memory is byte addressable rather than word addressable (a word is four
bytes), the value of 60 corresponds to 15 memory locations. This means that if R29
is 0 during the SW instruction, the store word instruction stores the register value
to the first segment and if the value of R29 is 60, the SW instruction skips over the
15 memory locations in the first segment and stores the register value to the second
segment. The final instruction is a branch to return code execution back to the end
of the TSR MIPS program, just before the loop counter is decreased by 1. Note that
this example of save/restore point creation code is associated with the TSR MIPS
program in Table 4.
TSR MIPS also requires instructions to recover from errors called error recovery
instructions. Error recovery instructions restore the internal state of TSR MIPS
to the most recent save/restore point. The error recovery instructions examine the
additional memory location in the save/restore point memory to determine which of
the two segments is the most recently updated segment. It then issues load word
instructions to load the variables and the loop counter from the segment into the
user definable registers and duplicates. Once all variables and the loop counter have
been stored in the Basic MIPS architecture, a branch command is issued to return
code execution back to the end of the TSR program where the loop counter will be
decreased before branching back to the beginning of the loop. Figure 9 is a flow chart
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outlining the error recovery process.

Figure 9. TSR MIPS Error Recovery Flow Chart

Table 6 shows a sample of the TSR error recovery instructions. A portion of the
instructions have been omitted for brevity. The instructions start by loading the
save/restore creation point additional memory location that indicates which segment
is the most recent one. It then proceeds to load the value of R1 from the most recent
save/restore point in memory to R1 in the Basic MIPS architecture. The value
indicating the active segment is then reloaded from memory again before loading the
value of R1 from the most recent save/restore point in memory to R15. A comparison
is then performed to ensure R1 and R15 match, which they should if no error has
occurred. If they do not match, the process is repeated by executing the branch
command to go back to line 1. If no error occurs, the process is repeated for R2 and
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R16. This continues for the remaining user registers and is then finally performed for
the loop counter in lines 290 to 294. The branch instruction in line 295 causes code
execution to return to the end of TSR instructions set, just before the loop counter
is decreased by 1. Note that this example of error recovery code is associated with
the TSR MIPS program in Table 4.

Table 6. TSR MIPS Error Recovery Code Example

Line Number
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229
230 - 284
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Instruction
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R1 R29 1180
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R15 R29 1180
BNE R1 R15 -4
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R2 R29 1184
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R16 R29 1184
BNE R2 R16 -4
...
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R14 R29 1232
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R28 R29 1232
BNE R14 R28 -4
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R30 R29 1236
LW R29 R0 1300
LW R31 R29 1236
BNE R30 R31 -4
BEQ R0 R0 -196
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3.5

Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR)
3.5.1

AHR Controller Finite State Machine

The development of Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and their associated
programs lay the foundation for building a controller that can switch between TMR
and TSR as needed. This controller, called the AHR Controller, is a Finite State
Machine (FSM) that determines when to switch from TMR to TSR and vice versa.
The AHR Controller also controls the orderly transition between the two operating
modes. It is the backbone of AHR.
When the AHR Controller starts, it allows TMR MIPS to run. The AHR Controller continuously monitors the flow of information between the voter and memory
without interrupting or delaying that flow and is able to determine whether TMR
MIPS is operating normally or has encountered an error. The TMR Voter in AHR
MIPS creates save/restore points after every 10,000 instructions, just as when it operates outside of AHR MIPS . TMR MIPS was modified slightly so that it provides
an error signal to the AHR Controller that is 0 when no error is present and 1 when
it has encountered an error.
The AHR Controller switches from TMR MIPS to TSR MIPS after TMR MIPS
processes a predetermined number of instructions without an error. If an error occurs
before the predetermined number of instructions are completed, a counter responsible
for counting the number of error free instructions is reset to 0. The number of
instructions TMR MIPS must complete without error before transitioning to TSR
MIPS was arbitrarily set to be 15,000 initially. The transition process is complex and
requires a review of the differences between TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS.
While TMR and TSR MIPS store the same data to permanent memory, there are
marked differences between their temporary memory and their save/restore memory.
Additionally, TMR MIPS can utilize 30 registers while TSR MIPS can only utilize 14;
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this means that the internal states of TMR and TSR MIPS are incompatible. This
also means there is no way to directly copy temporary memory, save/restore point
memory, and internal state of TMR MIPS to TSR MIPS or vice versa. However,
one unique feature of the programs for both TMR and TSR MIPS is the values in
the registers in one loop iteration do not depend on the values in the registers of
the previous loop iteration. The only exception is the loop counter that decreases
by one on each loop iteration. The rule for all other registers is that their values
from one loop iteration are overwritten in the next iteration. This unique feature
points towards a solution. Only transition between TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS at
the beginning or end of a loop. At this point, the values in all the registers can be
ignored with the exception of the loop counter.
Note that this solution is unique to the chosen method of creating randomized
programs for use in place of benchmarks such that results from one loop iteration
does not impact the next loop iteration. In general, this is not the case for most real
world programs. A more complicated and comprehensive approach would need to be
implemented to ensure correct transition from TMR to TSR in real world applications,
but this simplistic approach is sufficient for the purposes of this research. A real world
approach might force any variables to be updated from one loop to the next to be
stored in permanent memory on each loop iteration, and retrieved from permanent
memory at the beginning of each loop iteration. If this were the case, the AHR
Controller would still only be burdened with transitioning the loop counter from
TMR to TSR and vice versa. The instructions in the loop would be responsible for
loading and storing variables from one loop iteration to the next. This approach was
not pursued due to time limitations and is considered out of scope of this research.
Other, more sophisticated approaches that allow TMR to TSR and TSR to TMR
transitions at any point in time may be possible, but are also out of scope of this
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research.
When transitioning from TMR to TSR, the AHR Controller not only waits for the
error free instruction counter to reach the predetermined number of instructions, but
also waits for TMR MIPS to request access to the memory location corresponding to
the start of the loop so that the transition will occur at the beginning of the loop.
If an error is encountered after the predetermined number of instructions but before
the start of the next loop, the AHR Controller will reset the instruction counter and
the transition will not occur at the start of the next loop. Additionally, in order
to successfully transition from TMR to TSR, a save/restore point must be created
during the transition. The save/restore point ignores the values of all registers except
the loop counter value, which is saved to the correct location in the TSR save/restore
point.
The TMR to TSR transition begins with interception of all communications between the TMR Voter and the Memulator. The AHR Controller then instructs TMR
MIPS to store the current loop count. The AHR Controller receives the loop count
and adds 1 to the loop count. The AHR Controller then writes the loop count + 1 to
both of the TSR save/restore point segments. The step of adding 1 to the loop count
is important because TSR error recovery instructions return code execution to the
TSR program at the end of the loop where the loop counter is decreased by one. If
TSR were to encounter and recover from an error prior to creating a new save restore
point and used the unmodified TMR loop counter value, the TSR instructions would
immediately decrement the counter value and skip a loop that was never completed
by TMR MIPS. The AHR Controller then sets the first save/restore segment to be
the most recent segment by writing a 0 to the TSR save/restore additional memory
location. The AHR Controller does not update the state of the registers because TSR
MIPS will return to the start of the loop after error recovery and promptly overwrite
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the values stored in the registers as a result of the error recovery process.
The AHR Controller then resets all three Basic MIPS processors, bypasses the
TMR Voter, and begins sending signals to one of the three Basic MIPS processors
while holding the other two processors’ reset signals high and remaining inputs low to
ensure they do not perform any processing actions. This effectively puts the two other
processors in a low power mode. The AHR Controller prepares the one processor by
instructing it to load the loop counter value to R31. This is the original loop counter
value from TMR MIPS before adding 1 because TSR MIPS will start processing from
the beginning of the TSR loop rather than at the end because the transition started
at the beginning of the loop, not the end of the loop. After storing the loop counter
in R31, a second command is sent to copy the value of R31 to R30 (ADDI R30 R31
0). The AHR Controller then issues a branch command to the Basic MIPS processor
so that it will branch to the beginning of the TSR MIPS program loop. Once this
is done, the AHR Controller then directly connects the Basic MIPS processor to the
emulator. At this point, TSR MIPS is now operating and the AHR Controller begins
monitoring communications between the Basic MIPS processor and the Memulator.
One particularly important communication between memory and TSR MIPS is the
“DONE” signal. In AHR MIPS programs, the TMR instructions are first and start
at memory address 0, followed by the TSR instructions. The “DONE” signal resets
the Basic MIPS processor operating in TSR mode and causes its PC to reset to 0. If
the AHR Controller takes no action, the Basic MIPS processor will begin processing
the TMR instructions with no error mitigation. This is undesirable; therefore, the
AHR Controller intercepts the first read command from the Basic MIPS processor to
memory after the reset and issues a branch command to the Basic MIPS processor.
The branch command tells the Basic MIPS processor to skip to the beginning of the
TSR program so that TSR MIPS will continue to operate correctly after the reset.
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The TSR to TMR transition occurs when TSR MIPS encounters two errors. If
TSR MIPS encounters one error, it is permitted to carry out its error recovery operations. The AHR Controller has knowledge of the location of TSR MIPS save/restore
code memory location and is able to determine that error recovery operations are in
progress. The AHR Controller allows TSR MIPS to continue operations after recovering from the first error. If TSR MIPS successfully creates a save/restore point by
executing its save/restore point creation instructions and returns to normal operation,
the AHR Controller intentionally forgets that the error ever occurred. To rephrase,
the AHR Controller sets a flag when TSR MIPS encounters an error and clears the
flag when TSR MIPS creates a new save/restore point. If TSR MIPS encounters a
second error before successfully creating a new save/restore point, that means that
TSR MIPS would have to recover from the old save/restore point a second time.
This indicates to the AHR Controller that the radiation environment is too severe to
continue operations in TSR mode. It is likely that the error rate is high enough that
TSR operations would continuously have to reset to an old save/restore point and
would make little forward progress in running the program. In order for the program
to continue running until completion, a more robust mitigation approach is needed,
so the AHR Controller transitions from TSR to TMR. That way, a single error is
more easily corrected without reverting to a previous save/restore point. The AHR
Controller makes this transition and has TMR MIPS continue processing from the
last TSR save/restore point.
The transition from TSR to TMR begins with resetting the Basic MIPS processor
running in TSR mode. The next step is to determine the most recent save/restore
point segment for TSR MIPS and load the loop counter stored in that segment. The
loop count loaded from memory has one subtracted from it, then the result is stored
to save/restore point memory locations 30 and 62; these are the memory locations
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for the TMR MIPS save/restore point segments. Then the address of the start of
the TMR program loop is saved to save/restore point memory locations 31 and 63;
these memory locations store the PC value for the two save/restore point segments
in TMR MIPS. The additional memory location for the TMR save/restore point is
then updated to point to the first segment. The next step is to stop sending reset
signals to the Basic MIPS processors and allow TMR MIPS to begin running. When
TMR MIPS requests the first instruction from memory, the AHR Controller sends
a load word command to load the loop counter, with one subtracted from it, into
register R31, which TMR MIPS uses as the loop counter register. One is subtracted
from the TSR save/restore point loop counter because TMR will begin at the start of
the TMR MIPS instructions rather than at the end of the TMR MIPS instructions
before decrementing the loop counter. After completing this step, a NOP command
is issued to TMR MIPS so that its next instruction will be the start of the TMR
program loop. A branch instruction could have been used instead to advance the
PC, but branch instructions take longer to execute than NOP instructions and the
branch would only need to advance the PC by one instruction. Finally, normal TMR
operations are allowed to resume.
One final note is that it is assumed that the AHR Controller is hardened such that
it is immune to errors. If the AHR Controller were subjected to SEUs and SETs, its
internal state could be affected by radiation with adverse consequences to the behavior
of AHR MIPS. A state error could place the AHR Controller in conflict with the TMR
Voter and Basic MIPS processors in such a way that the AHR MIPS processor would
freeze. A state error could also trigger a transition from TMR MIPS to TSR MIPS
or vice versa when it is not the proper time for that transition to occur. A state
error could also cause some steps of the transition process to be skipped. Another
possibility is that a state error could jump from normal TMR or TSR operation to a
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random transition state.
The Air Force Institute of Technology technical report on the AHR MIPS Architecture provides a more detailed look at the AHR Controller’s FSM. This report can
be made available upon request [35].

3.5.2

AHR MIPS Architecture

The previous section described the AHR Controller FSM that enables the transitions from TMR to TSR and vice versa. This section discusses how the AHR Controller integrates into the AHR MIPS Architecture. The AHR Controller provides
inputs and select signals to a number of different multiplexers that control which
signals flow between the Basic MIPS processors, the TMR Voter, and the Memulator. During TMR MIPS operations, the signals from the Basic MIPS processors are
connected to the TMR Voter and the TMR Voter is connected to the Memulator
through the multiplexers. During TSR MIPS operations, the signals from a single
Basic MIPS processor are connected to the Memulator through the multiplexers while
the other two Basic MIPS processors and TMR Voter are forced into a low dynamic
power state by sending a high reset signal to them and holding all other input signals
low. During the transition from TMR to TSR or TSR to TMR, the AHR Controller
routes the flow of signals as needed to ensure an orderly transition as described in
the previous section.
Figure 10 shows a diagram of how the AHR Controller is integrated into the
AHR MIPS Architecture. All of the individual signals have been grouped together
to provide a simplified overview of communications between the various components.
For a more detailed view of how the AHR Controller exercises control over the various
signals between the Basic MIPS processors, TMR Voter, and Memulator, please refer
to Figure 69 in Appendix A. Figure 70 in Appendix A is a more detailed version of
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Figure 10 which shows all of the signals between the Basic MIPS processors, TMR
Voter, AHR Controller, and Memulator.

Figure 10. AHR MIPS Simplified Block Diagram

One final note is that it is assumed that the multiplexers used for signal routing are
hardened such that they are immune to errors. If these multiplexers were vulnerable
to SETs, an incorrect signal could be sent to the TMR Voter, Memulator, or any of
the Basic MIPS processors resulting in undesirable behaviors. These behaviors could
include faulty memory ready or reset signals sent to the TMR Voter; undesirable
reads from or writes to memory; and incorrect memory ready or reset signals sent to
the Basic MIPS processors. Any of these behaviors could cause AHR MIPS to freeze
or experience errors that go unnoticed.
The Air Force Institute of Technology technical report on the AHR MIPS Architecture provides a more detailed look at the architecture. This report can be made
available upon request [35].

3.5.3

AHR MIPS Programs

AHR MIPS requires instructions for both TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS. This is
accomplished through simply placing the TMR MIPS program loop first, followed by
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the TSR MIPS program loop, temporary memory, permanent memory, TSR save/restore point creation instructions, TSR error recovery instructions, and save/restore
point memory. Because TMR and TSR differ in the amount of memory required for
temporary memory and save/restore point memory, the larger of the two is used. TSR
requires more temporary memory, so temporary memory space is allocated for TSR
memory requirements. TMR requires more save/restore point memory, so save/restore point memory space is allocated for TMR save/restore point memory requirements. All store, load, and branch instructions are updated so that they point to
the correct memory locations. Table 7 shows this graphically. The line numbers are
used to illustrate the relative sizes of the various segments stored in memory. The
line numbers come from an automatically generated AHR MIPS program. This set
also happens to be equivalent to the Basic MIPS program example in Table 3 and
the TSR MIPS program examples in Tables 4, 5, and 6. In fact, with the exception
of the memory locations and line numbers, these are the exact same instructions.
The Basic MIPS instructions from Table 3 are in lines 1 - 49 of Table 7. The TSR
MIPS instructions from Table 4 are in lines 50 - 152 of Table 7. The TSR MIPS
save/restore point creation instructions from Table 5 are lines 162 - 268 of Table 7.
The TSR MIPS recovery instructions from Table 6 are in lines 269 - 344 of Table 7.
Table 7. AHR MIPS Program Structure

Line Numbers
1 - 49.
50 - 152.
153 - 161.
162 - 268.
269 - 344.
345 - 409.

Description
TMR MIPS Program
TSR MIPS Program
Temporary and Permanent Memory
TSR MIPS Save/Restore Point Creation Instructions
TSR MIPS Error Recovery Instructions
Save/Restore Point Memory

The AHR MIPS programs are automatically generated at the same time as the
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TMR and TSR programs by combining the two sets and updating all memory location
references in both TMR and TSR programs.

3.6

Summary
This chapter developed the AHR architecture beginning with the implementation

of a simple MIPS-like architecture called Basic MIPS that was specifically developed
for this research to allow for ease of integration into TMR, TSR, and AHR as well as
to allow error injection. It further discussed the implementations of TMR and TSR
and culminated in the development of AHR, which combines TMR and TSR in an
architecture where the AHR Controller can switch between TMR and TSR depending
upon the rate at which SEUs occur. This architecture is designed to answer the
first research question, ”Can multiple redundancy methods be incorporated into the
redundancy design?” The next step will be to determine whether AHR functions as
intended and answers the remaining research questions concerning mode switching,
flexibility, and timing and energy tradespaces.
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IV. AHR MIPS Performance Evaluation

4.1

Introduction
Now that the architecture for AHR has been developed, its function must be

verified and its performance evaluated. This is necessary to answer the research
questions, which are repeated here.
1. Can multiple redundancy methods be incorporated into the redundancy design?
2. Is it possible to allow flexibility in redundancy methods for the duration of a
space vehicle’s lifetime?
3. Is it possible to switch between these methods based on mission needs?
4. What are the timing and energy tradespaces available to a designer, mission
planner, or operator?
The first step is functional verification of Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS,
AHR MIPS, and their respective Memulators. Functional verification means that
Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS perform as designed in a simulated environment. These simulations were carried out in Mentor Graphics QuestaSim, which compiles the VHDL code and simulates it. Functional verification culminated in full system software simulations that verified each of the architectures
could run a program to completion and successfully restart. Functional verification
of Basic, TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS is described in Section 4.2.
The next step is to perform timing analyses; however, there were limits to the
software simulations. The simulations were limited in duration by the number of data
points that RAM on the computer running the simulations could support. While the
full system software simulations verified functionality, they could not directly provide
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information on the total runtime of a program on each architecture. Fortunately,
the software simulation does provide information on how long it takes to execute
individual instructions, complete a loop in the program, create save/restore points,
perform error recovery operations, and transition from TMR to TSR and TSR to
TMR. This timing information, when combined with the known program, allows
determination of program runtime. The method for performing the timing analysis
is covered in Section 4.3.1. The results are discussed in Section 4.4.
In addition to timing analyses, energy analyses are also performed. Intel provides
a spreadsheet tool to calculate the static and dynamic power used by a Cyclone V
depending on the number of adaptive logic modules (ALMs) and registers a particular
design uses. The spreadsheet tool is called the Intel PowerPlay Early Power Estimator
for Cyclone IV and Cyclone V. When the power estimates are multiplied by the
results of the timing analyses, estimates of the energy used to complete programs by
the various architectures emerge. The method for performing the energy analysis is
covered in Section 4.3.2. The results are discussed in Section 4.4.
While software simulations and analyses determine the runtimes and energy usage of an equivalent program across the architectures and allow comparisons between
them, they do not provide any information on how they will perform when implemented in hardware. The next logical step is hardware-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations
where the architectures and Memulators are implemented in hardware. The chosen
hardware is the Intel Cyclone V FPGA implemented on a Terasic DE10-Standard
board. These HITL simulations are considered simulations because they are operating
in an error free environment and the FPGA is not necessarily the target technology,
but rather used as an expedient for research purposes. The HITL simulations and
results are discussed in Section 4.5.
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4.2

Functional Verification
4.2.1

Basic MIPS Verification

Functional verifications began with the lowest levels of the Basic MIPS architecture and worked their way to the highest level modules. All functional verifications
were conducted using Mentor Graphics QuestaSim software. The VHDL code for
components and subcomponents of Basic MIPS along with testbench VHDL files to
stimulate the inputs of the various components and subcomponents were compiled by
and simulated in QuestaSim. Low level verifications were conducted on the NAND
gate and D-flip-flop. These low level verifications were full factorial verifications; every possible input combination was attempted. Every NAND gate input combination
(00, 01, 10, and 11) were attempted to verify the correct output (1, 1, 1, 0). The
D-flip-flop was tested to ensure that every successive input was stored, whether the
input order was 00, 01, 10, or 11. Full factorial verifications were conducted for all
low level modules where the total number of input bits was fewer than nine (i.e. a
4-bit adder with two 4-bit inputs and one 1-bit input).
For higher level modules, full factorial tests were not conducted because there is
insufficient time to conduct such tests. Instead, test patterns were loaded and results
checked to ensure simulation results matched expected results for each test pattern
(i.e. 32-bit adders, 32-bit shift operations, 32-bit AND, ALU, GPRs, and etc.). It
was assumed that full factorial verifications of lower level modules when combined
with test patterns for higher level modules was sufficient to verify correct operation
of the higher level modules. For the Datapath module level, there are far too many
inputs which must be synchronized to correctly verify its function; therefore, the
Datapath functional verification was done in conjunction with overall Basic MIPS
functional verification. Basic MIPS functional verification combined the Datapath
and Controller to ensure they worked together correctly. If the Controller passes
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verification and correctly articulates all of the Datapath’s inputs, the Datapath’s
functional verification can be conducted in conjunction with Basic MIPS functional
verification.
The Controller functional verification consisted of supplying the Controller with
valid instructions when the Controller attempted to read an instruction from memory. Each of the 33 Basic MIPS instructions were verified. Branch instructions were
verified to ensure that they worked correctly whether the branch should be taken or
not taken. These inputs were much more manageable than the Datapath inputs. Additionally, erroneous instructions were also provided to ensure the Controller rejected
such instructions and attempted to re-read the instructions from memory.
After Controller verification, the Datapath was connected to the Controller to form
Basic MIPS. The same inputs that were supplied to the Controller for verification
were supplied to Basic MIPS for verification. These verification tests uncovered some
problems with the Datapath, the Controller, and the interface between the two. These
problems were corrected, then Basic MIPS passed functional verification.
Functional verifications were also performed on the Memulator to ensure that it
correctly performed read and write operations. These operations consisted of reading
and writing patterns to a number of different memory addresses; however, these
operations were not a full factorial test to test reading and writing to every possible
32-bit word to every possible 32-bit address. These operations were sufficient to
provide Memulator verification.
Finally, the Memulator was combined with the Basic MIPS processor to ensure
correct operation. The only inputs supplied by the testbench VHDL code were the
master clock and master reset signals used by both Basic MIPS and the Memulator.
Some errors were identified and corrected at this stage as well. After fixing these
errors, the Basic MIPS processor was able to successfully read instructions from
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memory and process them correctly. The processor was also able to successfully
write to memory. The Memulator successfully reset itself and the processor upon
program completion. To test program completion, the number of loops was reduced
to three because the software simulation cannot handle doing 999 loops due to resource
limitations of the computer running the software simulation.

4.2.2

TMR MIPS Functional Verification

TMR MIPS verification uncovered a couple of problems with Basic MIPS that
were previously unidentified. These Basic MIPS problems were corrected and Basic
MIPS was re-verified before resuming TMR MIPS verification.
The TMR Voter was verified as integrated into TMR MIPS rather than being
verified independently due to its complexity. TMR MIPS was verified by allowing
TMR MIPS to attempt to run Basic MIPS programs in a software simulation. These
simulations enabled verification of correct TMR Voter state transitions during error
free operations. Save/restore point creation was also verified. These simulations also
ensured that TMR MIPS would reset correctly upon receiving a DONE signal from
the Memulator at program completion. Some errors in TMR MIPS were uncovered
and corrected as a result of the verification tests.

4.2.3

TSR MIPS Functional Verification

TSR MIPS functional verification revealed that some branch instructions used
only by TSR MIPS programs were not being processed correctly by Basic MIPS.
Basic MIPS branch processing was corrected, then Basic MIPS and TMR MIPS
were re-verified before resuming TSR MIPS verification. After these corrections,
TSR MIPS programs successfully executed on the Basic MIPS processor in software
simulations. TSR MIPS save/restore point creation instructions were also verified.
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The simulations also confirmed that TSR MIPS was correctly reset by the Memulator
upon program completion. TSR MIPS error recovery instructions were verified once
errors were injected into TSR MIPS.

4.2.4

AHR MIPS Functional Verification

AHR MIPS functional verification began with ensuring AHR MIPS allowed TMR
MIPS to operate correctly since AHR MIPS begins in TMR mode after starting the
processor. The next step was to verify the TMR to TSR transition in an error free
software simulation. The TMR to TSR transition was also verified after some minor
problems with the AHR Controller FSM were discovered and corrected. All registers and memory locations were correctly updated as the AHR Controller correctly
transitioned between states. No additional problems were discovered in Basic MIPS,
TMR MIPS, or TSR MIPS during these verification tests. The verification tests were
also able to evaluate the TSR to TMR transition by using error injection.

4.3

Error Free Software Simulation
Error free software simulation is conducted to determine the time and energy it

should take to run programs in Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR
MIPS when no errors are present. Software simulation cannot run an entire program
(all the loops through a program) due to computer resource limitations, but software
simulation can be used to determine the time to run individual instructions, complete
a loop through the program, create save/restore points, and reset the processor upon
program completion. The simulations can also be used to determine the additional
time needed to transition from TMR to TSR MIPS in the AHR MIPS architecture.
These times are utilized to calculate the time to complete any program on each
architecture. The energy used to run each program is determined by multiplying
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the dynamic power used by each architecture multiplied by the time used by the
program run on each architecture. This dynamic power is determined using the Intel
PowerPlay Early Power Estimator for Cyclone IV and Cyclone V. This tool takes the
number of ALMs and registers used to implement the architecture and provides an
estimate of the dynamic power used by the architecture.
The analyses are completed for a total of 1,000 randomly generated instructions
sets. Each of the 1,000 programs has three variants. The Basic MIPS program is used
by Basic MIPS and TMR MIPS. The TSR MIPS program is used by TSR MIPS.
The AHR MIPS program is used by AHR MIPS. All three programs are equivalent
in that they all compute the same values and results, and the same results are stored
to permanent memory. The differences in the structures of the programs have been
previously explained in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.3. An additional 40 equivalent TMR
MIPS and TSR MIPS programs were generated for an early HITL simulation and
analyses are also completed for these.

4.3.1

Time Simulation and Analysis

The first step in the time simulation and analysis was to determine the amount
of time required for each type of Basic MIPS instruction to complete in Basic MIPS,
TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS. The next step was then to determine how
long it took each program to run on each of these architectures.
The time to complete a Basic MIPS program is shown in Equation 1 where
TBasic

M IP S

is the time to complete a Basic MIPS program, TBasic

init

is the time

to set up the loop counter before looping through the program, nloops is the number
of loops, TBasic

loop

is the time to complete a single loop of the program and TBasic

conc

is the time to complete the program after completing the final program loop. The
values for TBasic

init

and TBasic

conc

were measured from the software simulation. The
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time to complete a single Basic MIPS program loop is given by Equation 2 where
NBasic is the number of instructions in the program loop and tIBasic
of time to complete instruction number n. Measurements of TBasic
ensure that computing TBasic
TBasic

loop

is the amount

n

loop

were made to

according to Equation 2 is a valid way of computing

loop .

TBasic

M IP S

= TBasic

init

TBasic

+ nloops · TBasic

=

loop

NX
Basic

tIBasic

loop

+ TBasic

(1)

conc

(2)

n

n=1

The time to complete a TMR MIPS program is shown in Equation 3 where
TT M R

M IP S

is the time to complete a TMR MIPS program, TT M R

to set up the loop counter before looping through the program, TT M R

init
loop

is the time
is the time

to complete a single loop of the program, nSRP is the number of save/restore points
to create, TT M R

SRP

is the time to create a save/restore point, and TT M R

conc

is the

time to complete the program after completing the final program loop. The values
for TT M R

init ,

TT M R

SRP ,

and TT M R

conc

were measured from the software simulation.

The time to complete a single TMR MIPS program loop is given by Equation 4
where NT M R is the number of instructions in the program loop and tIT M R
amount of time to complete instruction number n. Measurements of TT M R
made to ensure that computing TT M R
computing TT M R

loop .

loop

n

is the

loop

were

according to Equation 4 is a valid way of

The number of save/restore points to create is calculated as

shown in Equation 5 where nT M R

init

is the number of instructions to initialize the

loop counter, which is two for all TMR MIPS programs; nT M R

conc

is the number of

instructions to complete the program after completing the final program loop, which
is one instruction; and nsave is the number of instructions to complete before creating
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a save/restore point, which is 10,000.

TT M R

M IP S

= TT M R

init

+ nloops · TT M R

TT M R

loop

loop

=

+ (nSRP − 1) · TT M R

NX
T MR

tIT M R

SRP

+ TT M R

conc

(3)

(4)

n

n=1


nT M R init + NT M R · nloops + nT M R conc
+1
=
nsave


nSRP

(5)

The time to complete a TSR MIPS program is shown in Equation 6 where
TT SR

M IP S

is the time to complete a TSR MIPS program, TT SR

init

is the time to

set up the loop counter before looping through the program, nloops is the number of
loops, TT SR

loop

is the time to complete a single loop of the program, TT SR

SRP 0

is the

time to create a save restore point in the first save/restore point segment, TT SR

SRP 1

is the time to create a save restore point in the second save/restore point segment,
and TT SR

conc

is the time to complete the program after completing the final program

loop. The values for TT SR

init ,

TT SR

SRP 0 ,

TT SR

SRP 1

and TT SR

conc

were measured

from the software simulation. The time to complete a single TSR MIPS program loop
is given by Equation 7 where NT SR is the number of instructions in the program loop
and tIT SR
of TT SR

n

loop

is the amount of time to complete instruction number n. Measurements
were made to ensure that computing TT SR

is a valid way of computing TT SR

loop .

TT SR

skip

loop

according to Equation 7

represents the time that would have

been used by the instructions after the branch taken to create the save/restore point,
but has been skipped because save/restore point creation always returns to the program instruction that decrements the loop counter. After creating three save/restore
points, a total of three add immediate and three branch on equal instructions are
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skipped. This time is calculated to be the sum of the these instructions and is not
directly measured from simulation. Note that the first save/restore point that TSR
MIPS creates is stored to the first segment of the save/restore point memory. Because TSR MIPS only creates three save/restore points when running a program, two
save/restore points are stored to the second segment and one is stored to the first
segment.

TT SR

M IP S

TT SR

conc

= TT SR

− TT SR

init

+ nloops · TT SR

loop

+ TT SR

SRP 0

+ 2 · TT SR

SRP 1

+···

(6)

skip

TT SR

loop

=

NX
T SR

tIT SR

n

(7)

n=1

The time to complete a AHR MIPS program is more complicated to compute.
The timing largely depends upon the number of program loops completed in TMR
and the number of loops to complete in TSR because TMR loops complete faster than
TSR loops. Additionally, the number of save/restore points created in TMR mode
depends on the number of instruction completed prior to the TMR to TSR transition
while the number of save/restore points created in TSR mode depends on the loop
count. The number of loops to complete before transitioning from TMR MIPS to TSR
MIPS (Ploops ) is determined according to Equation 8 where ntransition is the number
of instructions to complete without error in TMR MIPS before transitioning to TSR
MIPS. The ceiling function is used because the transition must occur at the end of a
loop after the transition point is reached. The number of instructions to initialize the
TMR loop counter is subtracted from ntransition because ntransition includes nT M R
(nT M R

init

init

instructions must be completed prior to starting the loop, but ntransition

counts loop instructions and nT M R

init ).
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Ploops

ntransition − nT M R
=
NT M R

init


(8)

After determining the loop number at which the TMR to TSR transition occurs,
the next thing to determine is the number of TMR save/restore points to be created
prior to the transition. This is calculated according to Equation 9 and is very similar
to Equation 5.


nCSRP

nT M R init + NT M R · Ploops
=
nsave


(9)

The total time to complete a AHR MIPS program is then given by Equation 10
where tAHR

T MR

and tAHR

T SR

are the time spent in TMR and TSR mode respectively

and tT M R→T SR is the time required to transition from TMR to TSR. The time spent
in TMR and TSR are separated to make the energy calculations simpler as will be
seen in Equation 14.

85

tAHR

T MR

TT M R

SRP

= tT M R

init

+ Ploops · TT M R

loop

+···

· nCSRP + tT M R→T SR

if Ploops < 250
tAHR

T SR

2 · TT SR

= (nloops − Ploops ) · tT SR

SRP 1

+ TT SR

conc

− TT SR

loop

+ TT SR

SRP 0

+···

+ TT SR

SRP 0

+···

skip

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops < 500
= (nloops − Ploops ) · tT SR

tAHR

T SR

TT SR

SRP 1

+ TT SR

conc

− TT SR

loop

(10)

skip

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops < 750
= (nloops − Ploops ) · tT SR
2
TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3
elseif Ploops ≥ 750
tAHR

T SR

tAHR

T SR

= (nloops − Ploops ) · tT SR

loop

+ TT SR

SRP 1

loop

+ TT SR

conc

+···

end
TAHR

M IP S

= tAHR

T MR

+ tAHR

T SR

The run times for Basic MIPS are expected to be the fastest, followed by TMR
MIPS, then AHR MIPS, and finally TSR MIPS. TMR MIPS is expected to take longer
to run than Basic MIPS due to the overhead of running all memory read and write
operations through the TMR Voter as well as the need to create save/restore points in
memory. TSR MIPS should require the longest run time because all instructions are
duplicated and there is the additional overhead of the creating save/restore points
in memory. AHR MIPS is expected to run faster than TSR MIPS because AHR
MIPS starts in TMR MIPS mode, but slower than TMR MIPS because AHR MIPS
transitions to TSR MIPS after completing a predetermined number of instructions
without error.
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4.3.2

Energy Analysis

Equation 11 shows how Basic MIPS energy usage is computed for each program
where PBasic

M IP S

is the dynamic power used by Basic MIPS as calculated using the

PowerPlay tool.

EBasic

M IP S

= PBasic

M IP S

· TBasic

(11)

M IP S

Equation 12 shows how TMR MIPS energy usage is computed for each program
where PT M R

M IP S

is the dynamic power used by TMR MIPS as calculated using the

PowerPlay tool.

ET M R

M IP S

= PT M R

M IP S

· TT M R

(12)

M IP S

Equation 13 shows how TSR MIPS energy usage is computed for each program.
Note that PBasic

M IP S

is used instead of TSR specific power because TSR MIPS uses

a single Basic MIPS processor, but runs a different program.

ET SR

M IP S

= PBasic

M IP S

· TT SR

(13)

M IP S

Equation 14 shows how AHR MIPS energy usage is computed for each program
where PCT M R

M IP S

is the dynamic power used by AHR MIPS when operating in

TMR as calculated using the PowerPlay tool and PCT SR

M IP S

is the dynamic power

used by AHR MIPS when operating in TSR as calculated using the PowerPlay tool.
Unfortunately, PowerPlay simply provides the overall power usage PAHR

M IP S

be-

cause it does not understand that AHR MIPS effectively shuts down two processors
and a voter when operating in TSR mode. When operating in TMR mode, the full
PAHR

M IP S

for PCT SR

equals the amount of power used by TMR PCT M R

M IP S

M IP S .

The correct value

is given by Equation 15 where the difference between PCT M R
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M IP S

and PT M R

M IP S

should be the power used by the AHR Controller. This difference is

added to the power used by a single Basic MIPS processor to determine how much
power AHR MIPS uses in TSR mode. It will be shown in Section 4.4 that there is
no difference in the PowerPlay results for PAHR
that PCT SR

M IP S

EAHR

= PT SR

M IP S

PCT SR

and PT M R

M IP S ,

which means

M IP S .

= PCT M R

M IP S

M IP S

M IP S

= PCT M R

· tAHR

M IP S

T MR

+ PCT SR

− PT M R

M IP S

M IP S

· tAHR

+ PBasic

T SR

M IP S

(14)

(15)

The energy used by Basic MIPS is expected to be the lowest, followed by TSR
MIPS, then AHR MIPS, and finally TMR MIPS. TSR MIPS is expected to take at
least twice as much energy to run as Basic MIPS due to the instruction duplication
and additional instructions to create save/restore points. TSR MIPS dynamic power
is identical to Basic MIPS, so the main cause of the energy increase is the increased
runtime. TMR MIPS is expected to use at least three times as much power as Basic
MIPS because it uses three processors and a voter. Additionally, the added time
caused by using the TMR Voter and creating save/restore points will add to the
energy use. AHR MIPS is expected to use more energy than TSR MIPS and less
energy than TMR MIPS because it divides its operating time between the two.

4.4

Error Free Software Simulation Results
This section begins by showing the timing results for individual instructions in

Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS. It also provides the timing
results for several key performance parameters needed to compute program runtimes.
Next, the results of the Intel PowerPlay Early Power Estimator are presented.
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This is followed by a timing and energy analysis for the 40 TMR MIPS and TSR
MIPS programs used in the First Attempt at Error Free HITL Simulation described
in Section 4.5.2. It then continues with the timing and energy analysis of an additional
1,000 programs for Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS.
The timing results for individual instructions is provided in Table 8 and all times
are given in nanoseconds. The instruction names are in column one. The timing for
Basic MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS operating in TSR mode are provided in
column two. The timing for TMR MIPS and AHR MIPS operating in TMR mode is
in column three. From this table, it is apparent that the inclusion of the TMR Voter
adds 100ns (five clock cycles) for each memory interaction. Most instructions have
only one interaction, but the store word and load word instructions have two memory
interactions, which is why these two instructions take 200ns (ten clock cycles) longer
in TMR than in TSR. This is in agreement with how the TMR Voter was designed
[38]. TSR MIPS has no hardware voter and suffers no hardware delay. TSR MIPS
instead has branch instructions prior to store word instructions to compare duplicate
registers and check for errors. These instructions add delay to the overall program,
but not the execution time of individual instructions when compared to Basic MIPS.

Table 8. Software Simulation Individual Instruction Timing Results in Nanoseconds

Instruction
SLL
NOP
SRL
SRA
SLLV
SRLV
SRAV

Basic MIPS
TSR MIPS
TMR MIPS
AHR MIPS TSR AHR MIPS TMR
160
260
160
260
160
260
160
260
160
260
160
260
160
260
Table 8 – Continued on next page
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Table 8 – Continued from previous page
Basic MIPS
Instruction
TSR MIPS
TMR MIPS
AHR MIPS TSR AHR MIPS TMR
ADD
160
260
ADDU
160
260
SUB
160
260
SUBU
160
260
AND
160
260
OR
160
260
XOR
160
260
NOR
160
260
SLT
160
260
SLTU
160
260
BGEZ
180
280
BLTZ
180
280
BEQ
180
280
BNE
180
280
BLEZ
180
280
BGTZ
180
280
ADDI
160
280
ADDIU
160
260
SLTI
160
260
SLTIU
160
260
ANDI
160
260
ORI
160
260
XORI
160
260
LUI
160
260
LW
280
480
SW
280
480

The aforementioned key performance parameters needed to compute program runtimes are provided in Table 9. Also note that the TSR to TMR transition time
(T SR → T M R) has been added to this table. While this value is not used in the
evaluation of AHR MIPS because the expected error rate is sufficiently low that a
TSR to TMR transition should never occur, it was still determined using software
simulation with error injection during the process of verifying that the TSR to TMR
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could be performed correctly.

[H]
Table 9. Software Simulation Key Timing Parameter Results in Nanoseconds

Key Timing Parameter
TBasic init
TBasic conc
TT M R init
TT M R conc
TT M R SRP
TT M R ttdA
TT M R recA
TT M R retA
TT M R repA
TT M R ttdB
TT M R recB
TT M R SRP Err
TT SR init
TT SR conc
TT SR SRP 0
TT SR SRP 1
TT SR skip
TT SR Rec
TT SR SRP 0 Err
TT SR SRP 1 Err
TT M R→T SR
TT SR→T M R

Time (ns)
320
180
520
280
11, 840
380
13, 920
20
480
320
11, 600
11, 600
480
180
16, 660
19, 360
1, 020
19, 680
15, 920
18, 620
1, 620
1, 980

The Intel PowerPlay Early Power Estimator was provided with the Adaptive Logic
Module (ALM) and register counts for Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and
AHR MIPS. The register ALM and register counts are shown along with the dynamic
power estimate in Table 10. Note that the power for TSR MIPS is identical to the
power for Basic MIPS because the architectures are identical. TSR MIPS is a Basic
MIPS processor that runs TSR instructions using Error Detection by Duplicated
Instructions as discussed in Section 2.3.2.2 [71]. Additionally, Equation 15 is used
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to compute PCT SR
PCT M R

M IP S

M IP S

= PT M R

equation, PCT M R

in Equation 16 which is identical to PBasic

M IP S

M IP S

M IP S

because

according to the PowerPlay tool. Also note that in this

= PAHR

M IP S

as discussed previously in Section 4.3.

Table 10. PowerPlay Results

Architecture
Basic MIPS
TMR MIPS
AHR MIPS

ALMs
1,664
5,455
5,748

Registers
1,076
5,391
5,200

PCT SR M IP S = PCT M R
PCT SR M IP S = PBasic

Dynamic Power (mW)
9
29
29

M IP S

M IP S

− PT M R

M IP S

+ PBasic

M IP S

Variable
PBasic M IP S
PT M R M IP S
PAHR M IP S

(16)

= 9mW

The next step is to compute the error free software simulation times for the 40
TMR MIPS and 40 TSR MIPS programs used in the first HITL simulation attempt
according to Equations 3 and 6. The energy used by these programs is computed using
Equations 12 and 13. The results are presented in Figure 11 where the energy used
to complete each program is plotted against the time to complete each program. Also
shown is the average time and energy to complete all programs for each architecture.
Both the TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS programs fall on lines. This makes sense because
the energy to complete a program is the dynamic power for the architecture upon
which the program is run, TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS, multiplied by the time needed
to complete each program; therefore, the slope of these lines equal the dynamic power
for TMR and TSR MIPS respectively.
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Figure 11. First HITL Attempt Software Simulation Energy vs. Time to Complete

After the first HITL attempt, an additional 1,000 programs were generated for
Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS. The TMR to TSR transition
point for AHR MIPS was set at 15,000 instructions. The timing and energy computations for the TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS programs were performed the same way
as for the first HITL attempt programs. The Basic MIPS and AHR MIPS timing
were computed according to Equations 1, 2, 8, 9, and 10. The Basic MIPS and AHR
MIPS energy were computed according to Equations 11 and 14. The results of these
computations are presented in Figure 12 where the energy used to complete each
program is plotted against the time to complete each program. Also shown is the
average time to complete all programs for each architecture.
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Figure 12. Error Free Software Simulation Energy vs. Time to Complete

These simulation results meet the expectation that Basic MIPS programs will
complete faster and use less energy than programs running on the other architectures.
TMR MIPS completes faster than AHR MIPS, and AHR MIPS completes faster
than TSR MIPS as expected. TMR MIPS uses more energy than AHR MIPS, and
AHR MIPS uses more energy than TSR MIPS as expected. These differences are
further quantified as percent differences when compared to Basic MIPS. The percent
differences were calculated for individual programs, then those percent differences
were averaged to determine an average percent difference. The formulas for these
calculations are shown in Equations 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22.
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P DT ime T M R v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TT M R M IP S (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime

T M R v Basic

= 65.16%

P DT ime T SR v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TT SR M IP S (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime

T SR v Basic

AHR v Basic

T M R v Basic

T SR v Basic

AHR v Basic

(21)

= 109.40%

P DEnergy AHR v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms EAHR M IP S (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DEnergy

(20)

= 432.19%

P DEnergy T SR v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms ET SR M IP S (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DEnergy

(19)

= 93.70%

P DEnergy T M R v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms ET M R M IP S (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DEnergy

(18)

= 109.40%

P DT ime AHR v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TAHR M IP S (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime

(17)

= 224.03%
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(22)

The 65% timing difference between TMR MIPS and Basic MIPS is consistent
with the expectation that TMR MIPS would take longer to run because of the delay
introduced by the TMR Voter. The 109% timing difference between TSR MIPS and
Basic MIPS is consistent with the expectation that TSR MIPS would take at least
twice as long as Basic MIPS. The 94% timing difference between AHR MIPS and
Basic MIPS is consistent with the expectation that AHR MIPS programs would take
more time than TMR MIPS and less time than TSR MIPS to complete because it
divides its time between TMR and TSR modes.
The 432% energy difference between TMR MIPS and Basic MIPS is consistent
with the expectation that TMR MIPS would use at least three times the energy of
Basic MIPS because it uses three times as many processors and the TMR Voter adds
delay. The 109% energy difference between TSR MIPS and Basic MIPS is consistent
with the expectation that TSR MIPS would use at least twice as much energy as Basic
MIPS because it takes at least twice as much time as Basic MIPS. This is reflected
in the fact that the timing and energy percent differences between TSR MIPS and
Basic MIPS are identical. Finally, the 224% energy difference between AHR MIPS
and Basic MIPS is consistent with the expectation that AHR MIPS would use more
energy than TSR MIPS and less energy than TMR MIPS because it divides its time
between TMR and TSR modes.
One thing that may not be evident from the analysis of Figure 12 and the percent
differences is that AHR MIPS can be adjusted. This adjustment can be made by
changing the number of instructions AHR MIPS must complete without error in TMR
mode before transitioning to TSR mode. If this transition point is made sufficiently
large, no transition to TSR would ever occur for most programs and the AHR MIPS
results would match the TMR MIPS results. If this transition point is set to 0, the
transition to TSR would occur at the beginning of every program and AHR MIPS
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results would match the TSR MIPS results. This effect can be observed in Figure 12
by more closely examining the two endpoints of the AHR MIPS results on the left
and right. On the left are shorter programs that spend most of their time in TMR
mode and very little time in TSR mode. The transition occurs towards the very end
of these programs. The results of these programs more closely match the results of
TMR MIPS than TSR MIPS. On the right are longer programs that spend much more
time in TSR mode than TMR mode. The transition occurs towards the beginning
of these programs. The results of these programs more closely match the results of
TSR MIPS than TMR MIPS. This highlights the versatility of AHR in allowing a
space vehicle designer, mission planner, or operator to adjust the transition point as
needed to perform more of the program in TMR or more in TSR.
It is also possible to examine how changing the TMR to TSR transition point
affects the average AHR MIPS program completion time and energy usage. Figure
13 illustrates what happens to AHR MIPS average completion time and energy usage
if the TMR to TSR transition point is varied from 11,000 instructions to 80,000
instructions in increments of 1,000. When the TMR to TSR transition point occurs
at 11,000 instructions, the average AHR MIPS completion time is around 17ms and
the average energy to complete is about 200µJ. As the transition point increases, the
AHR MIPS average completion time moves up and to the left, and approaches the
TMR MIPS average completion time of approximately 14ms and completion energy
of approximately 400µJ. This further highlights the versatility of AHR in allowing a
space vehicle designer, mission planner, or operator to adjust the transition point as
needed to perform more of the program in TMR or more in TSR to achieve faster
processing speeds or more energy efficiency.
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Figure 13. AHR MIPS TMR to TSR Transition Varying from 11,000 to 80,000 Instructions - Energy vs. Time to Complete

4.5

Error Free HITL Simulation
4.5.1

First Attempt Methodology

The first error free HITL simulations placed a processor and Memulator on the
same Intel Cyclone V FPGA. The early HITL simulations were performed on a Terasic SoCKit (10-31212180-C0) development board using an Altera Cyclone V chip
(5CSXFC6D6F31C8NES) rather than on the Terasic DE10-Standard board using an
Altera Cyclone V (5CSXFC6D6F31C6N), which was procured after the early HITL
simulations were completed. These early HITL simulations evaluated the timing and
energy consumption TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS for 40 equivalent programs (40 TMR
MIPS and 40 equivalent TSR MIPS programs).
Measurements of the energy usage were made using a Keysight DSOS054A Infiniium S-Series Digital Storage Oscilloscope. To do so, a Keysight N2873A Voltage
Probe was used to measure the voltage at the power input to the SoCKit and the
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Keysight N2821A Current probe fitted with the N2824A probe head capable of 50µA
resolution in series with the power supply to the SoCKit as shown in Figure 14, where
“V” indicates the voltage probe and “A” indicates the current probe. The physical
connections were made using a breadboard and are shown in Figure 15. This allowed
instantaneous power measurements. A second Keysight N2873A Voltage Probe is
used to measure the DONE signal to provide triggering for the oscilloscope as seen in
Figure 16. The DONE signal is provided as an output via the Terasic HSTC to GPIO
Daughter Board since there is no easy way to produce the DONE signal on a pin on
the SoCKit in such a way that the voltage probe can measure it. The DONE signal
is assigned to PIN D2 of the Altera Cyclone V chip which corresponds to SoCKit
signal HSMC TX p9. HSMC TX p9 is connected to pin 107 of the SoCKit HSMC
port [99]. This connects to pin 53 on the HSTC to GPIO Daughter Card because
of the manner in which the male and female connectors pins are assigned numbers.
Pin 53 corresponds to signal HSTC TX p7 which appears as pin 40 on the connector
named “J2” on the daughter card [100].

-

Figure 14. HITL Simulation Current and Voltage Measurement Setup
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Figure 15. Voltage and Current Probe Connections

Figure 16. DONE Signal Oscilloscope Connection
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There were no calibration steps outlined in the oscilloscope user manual [97]. The
calibration guide for setting up the N2873A voltage probe [96] was strictly followed.
An attempt was made to follow the calibration procedures for the current probe
as outlined in the N2821A user manual [98]; however, one of the steps called for
following the prompts on the oscilloscope. The oscilloscope prompts called for an
E2655 PV/Deskew Fixture which was unavailable at the time. However, a certificate
of calibration was received with the probe when it was purchased. It is possible that
calibration errors could have been introduced into the probe during shipment, but
there is no way of detecting or correcting those errors at this time. The user manual’s
guidance on allowing the current probe to warm-up for at least 15 minutes prior
to taking any measurements was followed. The grounding procedures laid out in the
DSOS054A, N2873A, and N2821A user manuals [96, 97, 98] were also strictly followed.
Additionally, the FPGA was allowed to run each architecture type and program for
at least five minutes prior to taking a measurement to alleviate any temperature
changes on the FPGA due to running different hardware for each program. An Extech
Instruments 3822000 DC Power Supply was substituted in place of the power supply
provided by Terasic with the SoCKit; an EDAC Power Electric model EA10402E120 DC supply with a marketed ripple/noise level of 250mV [18] and an observed
ripple/noise of 235mV. This decision was made after some initial testing with the
oscilloscope, voltage probe, and current probe revealed that the Terasic power supply
was too noisy to make useful voltage and current measurements. The current also
had an observed ripple/noise of 67mA. The frequency content of the voltage and
current ripple was much lower than the 50MHz FPGA clock speed and it appeared
to be consistent with the type of ripple this author has previously observed in some
switching power supplies.
In addition to the hardware testing for both TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS, a very
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simple VHDL program was also created that would connect one of the FPGA push
buttons to one of the LEDs. The push button is active low so that it is 0 when
pressed. The push button was connected to a single inverter so that the LED is on
when the push button is pressed and off when it is not pressed. The purpose of this
program is to make the absolute minimal use of the FPGA so that current and voltage
measurements can be taken to establish a baseline for FPGA energy consumption.
By doing this, the baseline energy can be subtracted from the measured energy for
TMR and TSR MIPS. This eliminates any energy used by the SoCKit and FPGA
that is always used regardless of the hardware implemented on the FPGA.
The data collection methodology consisted of running the simple program on the
FPGA for about five minutes prior to collecting a baseline reading for a TMR MIPS
program. While the baseline reading was saving, the FPGA was reprogrammed with
a TMR MIPS processor and Memulator. The baseline save took at least five minutes,
after which time two data sets were recorded on a TMR MIPS program. Each data
set showed the DONE signal pulsing six times, which means the program completed
five times. Five program completions were recorded for every data set by setting the
timescale on the oscilloscope to record five program completions based on the timing
results of the simulations and analyses. Then, another baseline reading was taken
before recording two data sets for the equivalent TSR MIPS program. This second
baseline serves as a baseline for the TSR MIPS program. This procedure recorded
a total of ten program runs for each of the 40 programs for TMR MIPS and TSR
MIPS. The total amount of data collected were 80 baselines, 400 TMR MIPS program
runs, and 400 TSR MIPS program runs. For each of these, voltage and current were
collected as well as the time to complete each program.
It was important to follow this procedure to minimize temperature variations between TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS program data collects. Early experimentation
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showed a significant change in baseline FPGA energy usage over time as the temperature varied in the room in which testing was performed. The room had very poor
temperature controls.
After collecting this data, the time to complete each program run was determined.
The instantaneous power at every point in time for every program run was calculated
according to Equation 23, then integrated over time using trapezoidal integration to
determine the amount of energy used as shown in Equation 24. In these equations,
the subscript T XR N T indicates whether the program was a TMR MIPS or TSR
MIPS program depending on whether “X” is “M ” or “S” respectively, the “N ” is the
instruction set number (i.e. 1-40), and “T ” is the program run number (i.e. 1-10).
The variables P~ , V~ , and I~ are vectors containing the instantaneous power, voltage,
and current at every point in time for a particular program run of a TMR or TSR
MIPS program number. The variable ~t is the time vector for a particular program
run of a TMR or TSR MIPS program number. The variable E represents energy. A
variable with a bar over it such as Ē or t̄ denotes an average value. The “·” operator
in Equation 23 denotes an elementwise multiplication. The “M ” in Equation 24 refers
to the number of data points collected during the program run, t refers to the time at
the specified index, and m is the indexing variable. The time and energy to complete
the 10 program runs for the same program were averaged to determine the average
time and average energy to complete each program as shown in Equations 25 and
26 respectively. Note that energy calculated here was the energy used by the entire
Terasic SoCKit board, and not just by the particular program running on the FPGA.
As a result, the baseline Terasic SoCKit board energy usage needs to be determined,
and subtracted from the energy used by the Terasic SoCKit board running TMR
or TSR MIPS on the FPGA. That is the rationale behind including “SOC” in the
subscripts for power and energy as these values include baseline power and energy in

103

addition to that used by the TMR or TSR MIPS running on the FPGA.
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Current and voltage measurements were also collected for the baselines. These
were used to calculate the instantaneous power for each baseline according to Equation
27, then integrated to determine the energy used by the Terasic SoCKit board when
it is running the simple program according to Equation 28. In these equations, the
baseline power, voltage, and current replace “SOC” with “base” to indicate that
they are baseline measurements. This energy is divided by the time for the baseline
to determine a baseline energy usage rate Ėbase T XR N , or baseline average power
according to Equation 29. This baseline energy usage rate is multiplied by the average
time for the program to which the baseline corresponds to determine the average
baseline energy used by the Terasic SoCKit during the time in which the program
was running according to Equation 30. At this point, the average energy used by the
particular program running on the FPGA is determined by subtracting the average
baseline energy from the average energy used by the entire Terasic SoCKit board
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when the program was running on the FPGA according to Equation 31.
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The results of this initial HITL simulation are fully discussed in Section 4.5.2.

4.5.2

First Attempt Results

Data for the first attempt at an Error Free HITL Simulation were collected following the procedures set forth in Section 4.5.1. Then, the data were processed according
to Equations 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31. Furthermore, the values of ĒT XR N
~
~
and t̄T XR N are composed into vectors Ē
T XR and t̄T XR which are plotted in Figure
17. Note that this figure plots the experimental results against the simulation results
from Figure 11.
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Figure 17. First HITL Attempt Energy vs. Time to Complete

Aside from the obvious discrepancy in energy, the software simulation timing predictions appear to match the HITL simulation results and meets the expectation that
TSR MIPS programs would take longer to run than TMR MIPS programs. The
discrepancy between the energy values predicted by the software simulations and the
energy values recorded from the HITL simulation appears to be several orders of magnitude. Additionally, the energy used by TSR MIPS programs is significantly more
than the energy used by TMR MIPS programs, which is contrary to the expectation
that TMR MIPS would use more energy than TSR MIPS.
This discrepancy may be explained by the decision to combine the processor and
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memulator onto a single SoCKit Development Board’s Cyclone V FPGA. The energy
measurements not only include the processor’s energy usage, but also the memulator’s
energy usage. No accounting was made of memulator’s power requirements when
using the PowerPlay tool to estimate the FPGA’s power requirements.
The violation of the expectation that TMR MIPS would use more energy than
TSR MIPS may be explained by the fact that TSR MIPS programs are significantly
larger than TMR MIPS programs. Not only do the TSR MIPS programs contain
double the number of instructions as TMR MIPS programs, they also contain more
temporary memory to temporarily store variables, additional instructions to create
save/restore points, and additional instructions to recover from errors. The memory
implemented in the TSR MIPS memulator is therefore more than twice the size of
the memory implemented in the TMR MIPS memulator and would likely require at
least twice as much power.
The Memulator consists of a large number of 32-bit registers (one for each instruction and needed memory location for a program) and surrounding combinational logic
to store data to them and retrieve data from them. It would be reasonable to assume that these registers consume a significant amount of energy. It would also be
reasonable to assume that a TSR MIPS Memulator would use more energy than an
equivalent TMR MIPS Memulator because TSR MIPS programs not only double
the number of instructions, but also add more instructions for creating save/restore
points and error recovery. The logical conclusion of these assumptions is that the
combination of TSR MIPS and TSR Memulator might consume more energy than
the combination of TMR MIPS and TMR Memulator; however, to determine whether
this is the case and whether the initial hypothesis was correct would require separating the Memulator from the processor so that the energy used by the processor can
be measured separately.
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To confirm these theories about the large energy discrepancy and expectation
violation, the PowerPlay tool is used to analyze TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS when
the memulators for those architectures are included on the same FPGA. While it is
expected that the power required by the memulator is dependent upon the size of the
program, only one program is used to confirm these theories. More specifically, one
TMR MIPS program is implemented in a memulator with the TMR MIPS processor
and the equivalent TSR MIPS program is implemented in a memulator with the
TSR MIPS processor. This is done in order to quickly determine if these theories
are correct because using Quartus to recompile 40 TMR MIPS programs with TMR
MIPS processors and 40 TSR MIPS programs with TSR MIPS processors is a very
time consuming task which is not attempted. If these theories do not prove true, not
much time is wasted attempting to verify them.
The results of the revised PowerPlay analysis are shown in Table 11. The results
of the updated analysis are used to compute simulated energy usage and the results
are plotted in Figure 18
Table 11. PowerPlay Results for Processor and Memulator Together

Architecture
TMR MIPS
TSR MIPS

ALMs
8,845
13,298

Registers
9,270
12,642

Dynamic Power (mW)
46
63
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Figure 18. First HITL Attempt Energy vs. Time to Complete with Updated Energy
Estimates

This updated power estimate clearly did not rectify the orders of magnitude difference between the simulation results and the measured results. This suggests that
some other factor is affecting the HITL simulation results. One possibility is that
there may be a problem with the method of collecting baseline energy usage and
subtracting it from the energy used by the TMR MIPS or TSR MIPS processor and
memulator. Another possibility might stem from static power consumption. TMR
MIPS and TSR MIPS may consume different amounts of static power that were not
accounted for in the baseline or in the PowerPlay tool. Static power was ignored
because it was assumed that it was subtracted out when subtracting out the baseline.
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Additionally, the PowerPlay tool showed no difference in static power for different
architectures. It is also possible that the PowerPlay tool provided inaccurate power
estimates. The ability of the PowerPlay tool to correctly estimate Cyclone V power
usage was not independently verified or validated. More work will need to be done
to investigate and address this issue.
Figure 18 did nothing to address the discrepancy of TSR MIPS consuming more
energy than TMR MIPS. Figure 19 is an update of Figure 11 that shows the updated
software simulation results along with the original software simulation results. This
shows that both TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS use more energy when their memulators
are included on the same FPGA, as expected, but TMR MIPS still uses more energy
than TSR MIPS. The gap between TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS energy usage has
been greatly reduced, but still does not address the fact that the HITL simulations
show TSR MIPS using considerably more energy than TMR MIPS. Once again,
other factors are affecting the HITL results that are not accounted for in software
simulations.
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Figure 19. First HITL Attempt Software Simulation Energy with Updated Energy
Estimates

4.5.3

Second Attempt Methodology

The second attempt at error free HITL simulation is setup so that one Intel Cyclone V FPGA on a Terasic DE10-Standard board is programmed to run a processor
and a separate Intel Cyclone V FPGA on another Terasic DE10-Standard board is
programmed to run the Memulator. This setup is designed to enable measurement
of the energy used by the processor alone. The processor can be Basic MIPS, TMR
MIPS, TSR MIPS (which is Basic MIPS), or AHR MIPS and the Memulator is one
that is appropriate for the associated processor on the first FPGA; namely a Basic
MIPS program, TMR MIPS program (which is the Basic MIPS program), TSR MIPS
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program, or AHR MIPS program respectively. The two DE10-Standard boards are
connected using the on board general purpose input-output (GPIO) 40-pin header
and two GPIO 40-pin headers on a Terasic HSTC to GPIO Daughter Board connected to each DE10-Standard. Of the 120 pins available on the three GPIO 40-pin
header connections, 32 are used for the address signal, 32 for data to write to memory,
32 for data to read from memory, 1 for the read enable signal, 1 for the write enable
signal, 1 for memory ready signal, and 1 for done signal upon program completion;
this is a combined total of 100 signals. Additional pins are used to establish a common ground between the two boards. For full details on the interconnections between
the two DE10-Standard boards, please refer to the Air Force Institute of Technology
technical report on DE10 Pins and Other Connections which can be made available
upon request [37].
In addition to the signals above, a UART error signal, the o DONE signal, and an
additional ground are exported from individual pins on the daughter board attached
to the DE10-Standard board running the Memulator as described in the DE10 Pins
and Other Connections AFIT technical report. The UART error signal is used to
monitor whether the processor has encountered an error. The o DONE signal is
monitored by an oscilloscope to determine the end of the program running on the
DE10-Standard board running the processor as well as the restarting of the program.
The ground signal is used as a reference point for the UART error signal.
After connecting all the wires between the boards, each connection is tested with
a continuity meter to ensure that all connections were successfully made. These
measurements are made by touching one lead of the continuity meter to one of the
GPIO pins solder beads on the back of the DE10-Standard or daughter card and
the other lead to the connected pins solder beads on the back of the other DE10Standard or daughter card. All paired pins must demonstrate successful continuity
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in order to conduct HITL simulations or the processor and Memulator will not be
able to communicate with one another.
The UART error signal sends UTF-8 characters to indicate various error codes
associated with TMR and TSR MIPS processors. These error codes are generated
by the Memulator. In addition to being designed to function as a memory, the
Memulator has also been programmed to determine if any control flow errors occur.
For example, the Memulator knows that if the previous instruction was not a load
word, store word, or branch instruction, that the next read request from the processor
will be for the next instruction in memory (i.e. next address = last address + 4). If
this is not the case, the Memulator signals an error. If the last instruction was a load
word, the Memulator calculates the address from which the processor should read and
signals an error if that address is not read. If the last instruction was a store word,
the Memulator calculates the address to which the processor should write and signals
an error if the processor reads instead of writing or attempts to write to the wrong
address. If the last instruction was a branch instruction, the Memulator calculates
the next instruction address and the branch address. The Memulator only signals an
error if the processor does not attempt to read from the next instruction address or
branch address because the Memulator has no way of knowing whether the processor
should take the branch or not. The Memulator can also determine when TMR or TSR
MIPS are attempting to recover from an error, or when the processors have failed to
recover from an error. In the case of TMR MIPS, the Memulator can determine
whether TMR has encountered a single processor error or multiple processor error.
The error signals are recorded by a laptop. A complete summary of the error codes
are provided in Table 12.
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Table 12. Memulator Error Codes

Code
A
B
C
D

Architecture
TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR

E
F
G
H
I
J

TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR
TMR/TSR
TMR

K

TMR

L
M

TSR
TSR

N
S
X

TMR/TSR
TMR
TMR/TSR

Description
Expecting write after SW but received read request
Expecting read after LW but reading wrong address
Branch to incorrect location
Last instruction not LW, SW, or branch. Reading
next instruction from wrong address. PC 6= PC+4
End of program incorrectly reached
Attempt to read from out of bounds memory location
Writing word to wrong address after SW
Unexpected write to memory when last instruction not SW
Attempt to write to out of bounds memory location
TMR timeout reached - TMR may be attempting
Type A error recovery
Read word from save/restore point in memory.
TMR Type B error recovery in progress
TSR error recovery started
Error recovery code entered by failed return from
save/restore point creation
No error
Creating save/restore point
Timeout exceeded - failed to read from memory.
Prcoessor locked up or failed

Current and voltage measurements are made the same way as in the first attempt
and are illustrated in Figure 14. The overall experimental setup is shown in Figure
20.
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Figure 20. HITL Attempt 2 Experimental Setup

Timing measurements are also made for the second attempt in the same manner
they were made for the first attempt. The current, voltage, and timing data are also
used to calculate energy usage as before. Baseline data is recorded prior to each
Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS data collect. As before, each
data collect consists of capturing five program completions on the oscilloscope and
doing that twice for each program so that 10 program completions are recorded. The
baseline energy is again subtracted from the energy used by the program running on
the FPGA to determine the energy used only by the specific architecture running the
program.
Section 4.5.4 discusses the results of the second HITL attempt.
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4.5.4

Second Attempt Results

Learning from the first attempt that implementing a processor and its memulator
on the same FPGA confounds any sort of meaningful energy analysis, the second
attempt at a HITL simulation placed a processor on one FPGA and its memulator
on a separate FPGA. Unfortunately, the various MIPS processors failed to function
properly when operating in this fashion. This problem was explored in detail for the
TMR MIPS processor.
The first step in the troubleshooting process was to use the light emitting diodes
(LEDs) and hex displays on the processor and memulator DE-10 Standard boards
to display meaningful signal and state information. These visual indicators revealed
that TMR MIPS attempts to read the first instruction from the memulator. The
memulator then provides data back to TMR MIPS and TMR MIPS appears to receive
that data. At this point, the TMR Voter fails to transition to the next state in which
it should provide the results from memory back to the three Basic MIPS processors.
Instead, it stays in the state where it continues to request the first instruction from
memory.
The next step was to implement a clock divider on both FPGAs. The clock divider
on each FPGA could be varied by adjusting the switches on each DE-10 Standard
board. The clock dividers were independent of one another and only set the clock
speed for the FPGA on the same board. Reducing the clock speed to approximately 2
Hz on both FPGAs caused the TMR MIPS processor to function correctly. Increasing
the clock frequency on both boards would allow TMR MIPS to function properly for
a while, but would then encounter a Type A or Type B error when no errors were
being injected. Occasionally, the TMR MIPS processor would freeze up as observed
in the first troubleshooting step, but the processor would stop at different TMR Voter
and Basic MIPS processor states than the one observed in the first step. Operating
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TMR MIPS at such a low frequency would prevent any meaningful measurements of
program runtime and energy usage, so more troubleshooting steps were pursued.
The third troubleshooting step was to use Quartus II to perform a timing analysis
on the TMR MIPS processor and TMR Memulator. These timing analyses showed
that neither could run at the default 50MHz clock frequency, but could run at 25MHz.
A clock divider that reduced the clock frequency to 25MHz was implemented on the
processor and memulator and Quartus II indicated that the updated designs passed
the timing analysis. When implemented in hardware, the results were identical to
what was revealed in the first troubleshooting step.
The final troubleshooting step built upon the third troubleshooting step by utilizing the Quartus II SignalTap tool to monitor the signals on the TMR MIPS processor
and TMR Memulator while in operation. The results of the SignalTap analysis were
identical to the results of the first troubleshooting step once again.
The results of this troubleshooting process suggest that there is a problem with
how Quartus II implemented the TMR MIPS processor design in hardware that was
somehow partially corrected when the switched clock divider was implemented. It
is beyond the scope of this research to delve into the inner workings of Quartus II
and discover how it makes its hardware implementation decisions. Future work may
implement the TMR Voter in the same manner as the Basic MIPS processor; the
TMR Voter may be implemented entirely from NAND gates and D-flip-flops rather
than using high-level VHDL language to describe a state machine. This approach
may force Quartus II to implement the hardware such that the TMR Voter does not
fail to make a state transition after receiving a response from memory.
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4.6

Summary
This chapter discussed the approach to verifying that Basic MIPS (unmitigated

processor) TMR MIPS (TMR strategy), TSR MIPS (TSR strategy), and AHR MIPS
(AHR strategy) worked as designed. It further examined the method whereby the
architectures could be compared to one another in terms of program runtimes and
energy usage in the absence of errors so that useful determinations could be made
about the relative advantages and disadvantages of each architecture with the goal of
highlighting the advantage of AHR over TMR or TSR alone. It was shown that, in
the absence of errors, AHR does combine two different redundancy methods, allows
switching between these redundancy methods, provides flexibility in selecting when
to switch between these redundancy methods, and opens up tradespace in time and
energy allowing AHR to function more like TMR or TSR or anywhere in between in
terms of time and energy performance.
This chapter also discussed how to perform Hardware-in-the-Loop (HITL) simulations in order to collect representative data on the performance of these architectures
when implemented in hardware.
These simulations, analyses, and HITL simulations have not yet demonstrated
the ability of AHR to operate in radiation environment where SEUs and SETs may
occur. Chapter V will examine how to inject errors into TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS
for the purpose of evaluating their performance in the presence of errors in Chapter
VI.
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V. Error Injection Development

5.1

Introduction
The software simulations, analyses, and hardware-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations

in the previous chapter established a baseline of performance for each of the architectures and provide a basis of comparison between them; however, the previous chapter
did not indicate how the architectures will behave in the presence of errors. Error injection is the next step toward evaluating the architectures when Single Event Upsets
(SEUs) and Single Event Transients (SETs) are present, but one must first determine
the rate at which errors are expected to occur. Section 5.2 discusses the method used
to determine the appropriate error rate. Then, Section 5.3 discusses the architecture
needed to inject errors. Section 5.4 provides the analysis tools that will be used to
evaluate the performance of TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS with regards to time and
energy when errors are injected.

5.2

Error Rate Determination
Section 2.4 previously introduced the concept of radiation comparisons and the

idea of comparing the radiation testing performed in this research to that of previous
experiments by Normand et al. [67, 66] and the Cibola flight experiment [108]. While
a number of radiation tests were devised to probe the vulnerability of the Cyclone V
FPGA in Section 5.2.1, the results of the neutron testing in Section 5.2.2.1 proved
the most useful in determining an error rate for error injection purposes.

5.2.1

Radiation Testing

Radiation testing is used to determine the vulnerability of the Intel Cyclone V
FPGA to SEUs and SETs in terms of upset rate or failures-in-time (FIT). This
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information is key in determining how much mitigation TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS
provide as well as how frequently errors should be injected into these architectures
in simulations and analyses. Section 5.2.1.1 discusses the checkerboard pattern used
to test the Cyclone V’s vulnerability. Section 5.2.1.2 discusses the test methods used
for neutron, carbon ion, and proton radiation experiments. The section concludes by
discussing the limitations of these experiments in Section 5.2.1.3.

5.2.1.1

Checkerboard Implementation

Implementing a static checkerboard pattern directly in the Cyclone V’s user logic
was not possible because the Intel Quartus II Version 14.1 synthesizer replaced the
registers with constants. To overcome this problem, each register had its output fed
back to the input through an inverter. This feedback loop caused the checkerboard
pattern to alternate on every clock cycle. The alternating checkerboard pattern made
it impossible to compare the output of each register to a fixed value; therefore, each
register was paired with a complementary register storing the opposite value. The
outputs of the two registers become the inputs to an exclusive-nor (XNOR) gate.
The output of the XNOR gate is 0 when the two registers differ in value and 1 when
they have the same value. The two registers can only have the same value when
an error has occurred. Note that if both registers have an error, the output of the
XNOR could still be 0; however, this is expected to be a rare event. The occurrence
rate of this rare event is considered to be insignificant because this experiment was
intended to discover a relative level of vulnerability to radiation rather than a precise
vulnerability estimate. Figure 21 shows how each checkerboard memory location is
formed.
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Figure 21. Checkerboard Location Register Pair with XNOR Gate

Outputs of all checkerboard locations are subsequently added to determine the
total number of errors in the checkerboard pattern. These additions are carried out
by a network of carry select adders. The XNOR outputs of the first three checkerboard
locations (0, 1, and 2) are supplied as the A, B, and carry-in inputs of a 1-bit carry
select adder. The outputs of the next three checkerboard locations (3, 4, and 5) are
supplied as the A, B, and carry-in inputs of another 1-bit carry select adder. The
sum and carry-out outputs of each 1-bit carry select adder are concatenated to form
a single 2-bit sum that ranges in value from 0 to 3. These 2-bit sums are supplied to
the A and B inputs of a 2-bit carry select adder. The carry-in of the 2-bit carry select
adder is from checkerboard location 6. The sum and carry-out outputs of each 2-bit
carry select adder are concatenated to form a single 3-bit sum that ranges between 0
and 7. At this point, a pattern is beginning to form. An n-bit adder has two n-bit
inputs and a carry-in. The sum and carry-out of the n-bit adder are concatenated to
form a single n+1-bit sum; that ranges between 0 and 2n+1 − 1. The overall sum for
2N bits requires the last adder have two N bit inputs and a carry-in input, and the
final sum has N + 1 bits; however, the maximum value is still limited to 2N because
2N bits are summed together. Figure 22 shows a small subset of the adder network.
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It depicts how the first 15 checkerboard memory locations’ error signals are added
together. The pattern for the adder network is readily discernible from this subset.
-

-

-

-

Figure 22. Subset of Checkerboard Adder Network Showing First Three Levels to Add
Error Signals from the First 15 Memory Locations

Due to FPGA routing constraints, the maximum value for N was N = 13. Quartus
II failed to converge on a solution to fit a design with N >= 14 on the FPGA.
The largest possible value for N was selected in order to maximize the amount of
vulnerable configuration memory and user logic on the FPGA, which increases the
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likelihood that SEUs and SETs will be observable during testing.
In addition to the checkerboard pattern and associated adders, a buffer and serial
transmitter were created to export the data during testing. The buffer detects every
time a change in the error count occurs. If the error buffer and serial transmitter are
idle when a change occurs, the error buffer provides the least significant 8 bits of the
error count to the serial transmitter for transmission followed by the UTF-8 comma
character as a delimiter. The serial transmitter transmits data at 11,520 bytes per
second. The transmitted data is recorded on a computer running Matlab.
The checkerboard pattern, buffer, and serial transmitter used 20,980 of the Cyclone V’s 41,910 adaptive logic modules (ALMs). Each ALM has eight inputs, an
adaptive look-up table (LUT), and four registers [44]. A total of 16,437 of the Cyclone V’s 166,036 user registers were used; 214 were used by the checkerboard and
53 by the buffer and serial transmitter. The DE10-Standard drew between 0.36A
and 0.38A when not operating in a radiation environment. This current range is
the DE10-Standard’s nominal current. When the DE10-Standard current exceeds
this range, it is interpreted as a configuration memory SEU causing a short circuit
between two signals.

5.2.1.2

Testing

The Cyclone V implementing the checkerboard pattern was exposed to neutron,
carbon ion, and proton radiation. Carbon ion and proton tests required the Cyclone
V chip to be de-lidded. De-lidding is the process of removing packaging material from
a chip and is commonly done for ion tests so that the ion beams can produce SEUs
and SETs in the electronic device being tested. Without de-lidding, the ions used
in testing would lack sufficient energy to penetrate the packaging material and chip
silicon to produce SEUs and SETs in the electronic device. Ions in space have more

123

energy and are able to penetrate packaging materials [51]. The Cyclone V is not a flipchip design, so the carbon ion and proton beams had to penetrate the metal layers to
produce SEUs and SETs in the memory cells and combinational logic. (De-lidding is
unnecessary for neutron testing as neutrons readily pass through packaging materials
with little impact upon their ability to cause SEUs and SETs in the electronic device.)
During the course of testing, there were several instances where the Cyclone V
stopped transmitting data and the current draw increased. Whenever this occurred,
the DE10-Standard board had to be reset, reprogrammed, and checked for functionality before testing could resume. Each time the DE10-Standard was reset and
reprogrammed, it passed functional tests and no permanent device failures occurred.
The DE10-Standard was also reset and reprogrammed if the error count reached 255,
the maximum value that can be reported (see Section 5.2.1.3 for more details).
Testing was conducted at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Ion Beam Laboratory (IBL). Neutron testing was conducted using the IBL’s 350 kV High Voltage
Engineering Europa (HVEE) Implanter with a D-T neutron source producing 14MeV
neutrons. Carbon ion and proton experiments were performed with the High Voltage
Engineering (HVE) 6 MV Tandem accelerator with DE10-Standard boards placed
in the end station of the Qualification Alternative to the Sandia Pulse Reactor 3
(QASPR-3) beam line. The DE10-Standard boards were mounted in the QASPR-3
chamber so that the text on the Cyclone V chip was right-side-up. Prior to each
carbon ion or proton test, the board was reset and reprogrammed before closing the
testing chamber. The chamber was then evacuated so that the vacuum pressure was
on the order of 10−5 torr. The carbon ion and proton beam spots were square, but
much smaller than the Cyclone V chip; therefore, multiple beam shots were fired
and the DE10-Standard moved between shots to completely irradiate the Cyclone V.
These shots were performed in overlapping squares on a grid pattern to ensure the
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entire chip was irradiated to the same average fluence levels. Three different DE10Standard boards, each with its own Cyclone V FPGA, were used in the tests; one
board was used for each radiation type (one for all neutron tests, one for all carbon
ion tests, and one for all proton tests).

Neutron Testing The DE10-Standard was placed in direct contact with
the canister housing the D-T neutron source and positioned so that the Cyclone V
was in the same horizontal plane as the beam striking the target to maximize neutron
fluence on the Cyclone V. The Cyclone V was approximately 6mm from the canister’s
outer wall. The neutron source was continuously active for one week with only a few
dropouts.
During these tests, Matlab was set to record data in 15 minute intervals. At the
end of each 15 minute interval, the data was saved before recording data for another
15 minutes. This was done continuously, with few exceptions, from before the D-T
source was activated until after it was deactivated. Baseline data was collected prior
to D-T source activation and after deactivation to ensure no errors were detected in
the absence of radiation.
Carbon Ion Testing The carbon ions used in this testing were 35MeV C6+
ions. A total of three tests were performed. The average fluence for each test was
9.693 × 107 , 1.097 × 107 , and 9.834 × 105 . It was anticipated that the first test would
not produce a large number of errors and that the second and third tests would
increase the average fluence from one test to the next with a corresponding increase
in the number of errors, but that was not the case. Because the number of errors was
so large after the first test, the fluence was decreased in an attempt to decrease the
number of errors on the last two tests.
The beam fluence was not uniform such that highest fluence levels were in the
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shape of a circle in the middle of the square and there was a significant decrease in
fluence at the edges and corners of the square. This required significant overlap of
the beam between adjacent shots, so the DE10-Standard was moved in a 5x5 grid
pattern.
During these tests, Matlab was set to record a few seconds worth of data starting
just before each beam shot was fired and ending just after each beam shot was fired
for each carbon ion test. As a result, up to 25 data sets were recorded for each
carbon ion test; one data set was collected for each grid location. These data sets
were numbered starting with 0 increasing to 24.

Proton Testing The IBL’s QASPR3 beam line generated 4.5MeV protons
for these tests. The beam fluence was uniform with some decrease in fluence along
the edges of the square. This required minimal overlap of the beam between adjacent
shots, so the DE10-Standard was moved in a 4x5 grid pattern. A total of three tests
were performed. The average fluence for each test was 9.454 × 109 , 9.939 × 1010 , and
9.173 × 1012 .
During these tests, Matlab was set to record data for the entire length of time
over which the beam shots would be fired. However, during the third test, the beam
shots took longer than anticipated and Matlab stopped recording as the predefined
timeout was exceeded. Between beam shots, Matlab recording was restarted. The
timeout period was exceeded again before testing was completed. In total, four data
sets were collected during the third test.

5.2.1.3

Experiment Limitations

Carbon ion and proton beam testing could not target specific gates, transistors, or
active regions of the FPGA because the locations of those elements are proprietary.
Reverse engineering the Cyclone V to determine the locations of these elements is out
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of scope for this research.
The maximum error count that can be recorded is 255 even though the true error
count may be higher because only the least significant 8 bits of the error count are
transmitted. When the serial transmitter repeatedly sends an error count of 255, this
indicates that the error count is constantly changing, but that the value of the error
count is always at or above 255. These changes are no longer observable and add no
value to the results. The decision to only use the least significant 8-bits was made
for two reasons. First, it was incorrectly assumed that the error count would not be
higher than 255 during the testing time periods of interest. Second, the data rate
is maximized by only transmitting the least significant 8-bits. Maximizing data rate
was seen as a method to capture errors as soon as they occurred. A lower data rate
might allow multiple errors to occur without logging between transmitting periods.
Another decision made to maximize the data rate was to not implement handshaking between the serial transmitter and Matlab. Handshaking would also have
required additional circuitry on the FPGA that would have been vulnerable to radiation induced errors. This vulnerability might have caused the serial transmitter to
fail if it could not respond to handshaking signals appropriately. Without handshaking, there was no way to timestamp individual data transmissions because Matlab
samples and stores the incoming data continuously and is only able to track the time
at which the data collection started and finished. For example, if 15 minutes of data
were collected when Matlab was set to collect 15 minutes of data, then it would be
possible to determine when every single byte was received during that time period.
However, if only 5 minutes of data were received, it would be impossible to determine
when each byte was received. This ambiguity in data timestamping is also a result of
the decision to only have the error count transmitted when the error count changes
rather than transmitting the error count continuously.
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The second problem arising from the lack of handshaking is that Matlab could lose
synchronization with the FPGA serial transmitter. If the transmitter is transmitting
data before and during the time period when Matlab data collection begins, it is
possible for Matlab to view any falling transition as the start bit of the serial data
transmission. In the best-case scenario, this would occur at the correct start bit.
In the second-best-case scenario, it would occur at one of two falling transitions in
the middle of transmitting the comma character which is used as a delimiter. In this
second-best-case scenario, the start of the comma is received as the last few bits of one
byte and the end of the comma is received as the first few bits of the next byte. The
start and stop bits transmitted by the serial transmitter are received in the middle of
every byte received by Matlab. Data can be extracted by searching for these broken
up commas and determining data to be in between them. Unfortunately, because
two of the data bits will be interpreted as start and stop bits, only six bits of data
are recoverable and the remaining two bits could cause the data to have one of four
values. In the worst-case scenario, Matlab would detect the transition in the middle
of a byte of data rather than a comma. In this scenario, commas would be impossible
to locate and data would be impossible to recover. All three of these scenarios were
observed during the experiment.

5.2.2

Radiation Testing Results and Analysis

5.2.2.1

Neutron Testing

During the neutron testing period, 655 data sets of 15 minutes each were collected.
During this time period, there were 23 continuous data collections between interruptions where data transmission stopped and current draw increased. The shortest
collections were individual 15 minute data sets while the longest collection contained
39, 15 minute data sets. The data collected for the longest continuous collection is
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plotted in Figure 23. The plot includes dividers to differentiate between individual
data sets which range from set number 538 to 576. Error counts of -10 are used to
indicate data was not transmitted or unrecoverable. Plotting every single data point
was impossible due to the large amount of data recovered. Instead, envelopes of the
error count are plotted. When the error count alternates between two values, the plot
shows the maximum and minimum values. There are still some instances where the
maximum and minimum values fluctuate rapidly. During some data sets, the plot
splits into four different colors where data was not received synchronously, but was
recoverable. These colors indicate the four different values the data could be. In this
plot, it appears that the correct error count is indicated by the red data every time
the data was recovered from out of sync data. When the only visible data is blue, that
means that the data was collected synchronously and the all possible lower bound
values are identical to one another and all possible upper bound values are identical
to one another. The last thing to note about this figure is that the data appears to
show a linear increase in error count over time.
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Figure 23. Neutron Test 538-576

Figure 24 shows a plot of the FIT rates from each continuous data collection. The
FIT rates were calculated by dividing the error count at the last “stable” point in
the continuous data set by the time over which the data was collected. The time
period used is the stop time of the last data set in which the data appeared to be
“stable” minus the start time of the first set. The stop time used does not match
the true stop time due to the ambiguity in the data’s time of arrival because the lack
of handshaking between the FPGA and the computer. The upper bound FIT rate
is taken to be the maximum value of the upper bound where the last “stable” point
appears divided by time in hours, then multiplied by 109 to convert from error rate
to FIT rate. The lower bound similarly uses the minimum value of the lower bound
where the last “stable” point appears. In Figure 23, the last “stable” point is near
the end of set 573. The FIT rate plot in Figure 24 appears to follow the trend of
decreasing neutron fluence over time as the neutron source is depleted. The neutron
production rate is shown in Figure 25 where the time scale shows the time in hours
from the time the neutron source was activated. The two plots viewed together show
that the number of neutrons being produced appears to have a direct impact on the
FIT rate as both plots show a downward trend.
The unmitigated Cyclone V FIT rates shown are roughly 1010 or higher. In order
to compare this rate to the Cibola rate, a comparison of the two fluence levels is
in order. First, the neutron production rate is assumed to be 109 /sec because the
production rate is greater than or equal to 109 /sec as shown in Figure 25. The
neutron flux is then given by

φ=

109
n
PR
=
≈ 1.15 × 1010 2
2
2
4πr
4π(5cm) · sec
cm · hr

(32)

This flux is approximately ten times greater than the neutron flux in the Normand
et al. experiments [67, 66] and indicates that the FIT rate seen here is ten times
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greater than the FIT rate that would have been seen if exposed to the same neutron
environment as the Normand experiments; therefore, the neutron experiment FIT rate
should be divided by ten to be comparable to the Cibola Flight Experiment FIT rate.
The Cibola Flight Experiment FIT rate was 3.25 × 107 and the neutron experiments
adjusted FIT rate is approximately 109 or higher. The Cibola Flight Experiment experienced 0.78 SEUs/device/day and the Cyclone V experienced approximately 240
SEUs/device/day before the neutron flux adjustment and 24 SEUs/device/day after
the neutron flux adjustment. This error rate is equivalent to an unadjusted rate of
1
1
1
SEUs/s) or an adjusted rate of 1 SEU/hour (
10 SEUs/hour ( SEUs/min,
6
360
60
1
SEUs/min,
SEUs/s). One additional assumption in making this comparison is
3600
that the monoenergetic 14 MeV neutrons in this experiment are comparable to the
broad spectrum neutrons in the Normand et al. experiments. Another assumption
is that the Xilinx FPGAs used in the Cibola mission will experience the same upset
rates as the Cyclone V used in this experiment. Finally, after making all of these
assumptions, all of which are questionable, and having a desire to develop a rough,
order of magnitude comparison between the neutron test results presented here and
the Cibola mission, the neutron experiment FIT rate is approximately one hundred
times greater than the mitigated FIT rate seen in the Cibola Flight Experiment. This
FIT rate is unacceptable in space, which underscores the necessity of radiation mitigation for FPGAs. Additionally, since most of the programs in Section 4.4 completed
in 50ms or less, it would be expected to see an error once in approximately every
72,000 program runs based on an average upset rate of 1 SEU/hour. This further
bolsters the results of error free software simulations since it is far more likely that a
program will complete without experiencing an SEU than a program will experience
an SEU while running. It also provides assurances that the switching capability and
flexibility demonstrated by AHR in error free simulation and analysis will be realized
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in implementation because errors are so infrequent.
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Figure 24. Neutron Test FIT Rates
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Figure 25. Neutron Test - Neutron Production Rate

5.2.2.2

Carbon Ion Testing

Section 5.2.1.2 previously discussed the test approach for carbon ion testing. The
first carbon ion test had a fluence of 9.693 × 107 . No errors were detected for data
sets 0 through 6 corresponding to grid locations 0 through 6. Errors were detected for
data sets 7 through 9. No further data was recovered after set 9. The checkerboard
error counts recorded during the first carbon test are plotted in Figure 26. All of
the data was collected synchronously by Matlab, so the four possible values of the
data were identical, unlike those shown in Figure 23. Error counts of -10 are used to
indicate data was not transmitted or unrecoverable. The remaining points indicate
individual error counts.
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It appears that the sudden change in the plot near data point number 8 × 104 is
when the beam shot was fired during collection of data set 8. It also appears that the
beam shot in data set 9 was fired around data point number 12×104 . A trend in error
count over time could not be established because the error count changed erratically
throughout the test. After data set 9, no further data was recovered and the current
draw jumped to 0.6A. After re-pressurizing and opening the chamber, the DE-10 was
observed to have two LEDs lit and the remaining LEDs off when all LEDs should have
been in a dim “half-on” state. Some segments of the six 7-segment displays were also
lit and none of the segments should have been lit. This indicates that a significant
number of configuration errors occurred because electrical pathways to the LEDs were
connected to force them on or off and other electrical pathways were connected to
turn on the 7-segment displays. Resetting and reprogramming the DE-10 caused the
LEDs and 7-segment displays to return to their expected appearance. The DE-10’s
current draw also returned to nominal levels and the DE-10 passed functional tests.
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Figure 26. Carbon Test One

Data collected from the second carbon ion test with a fluence of 1.097 × 107 are
plotted in Figure 27. No data was collected for sets 0 through 3, indicating that no
errors occurred prior to set 4. There were severe synchronization issues for sets 4
through 7 that appear to have resolved during collection of set 7. Set 7 experienced
synchronization issues such that the each recovered data point could have taken one
of four possible values. Judging by the sets after set 7, it is assumed that error count
values in red are the correct ones. The graph exhibits a general upward trend in error
count on each subsequent test after test 3, though the shape is difficult to discern
due to the lack of data from sets 4, 5, and 6. Sets 8 and 10 show evidence of a
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major shift in the error count when the beam shot was fired. The rapidly changing
error count at the end of set 11 may also indicate when the beam shot was fired,
but data transmission stopped immediately afterward. The observed current draw
after set 11 was 0.56A and no bytes were transmitted after set 11. The chamber was
re-pressurized and opened in order to reset and reprogram the DE-10. The DE-10
then passed functional tests before proceeding to test three.

Figure 27. Carbon Test Two

Data collected from the third carbon ion test with a fluence of 9.834 × 105 are
plotted in Figure 28. Due to the sparse nature of the data in sets 9, 10, and 11,
no trend for error count over time could be established. Sets 7 and 8 do show an
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increasing error count over time. The DE-10 stopped transmitting data after set 11.
After re-pressurizing the chamber and resetting and reprogramming the DE-10, it
passed functional tests.

Figure 28. Carbon Test Three

The erratic nature of carbon ion experimental results made it impossible to determine a Cyclone V FIT rate when exposed to carbon ions. Future tests will need
to be designed to determine the carbon ion radiation FIT rate.
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5.2.2.3

Proton Testing

During the first proton test, the error count alternated between 0 and 1 indicating
a possible configuration error. It is possible that a configuration error could replace
one register input to an XNOR gate with a constant in one of the checkerboard
locations. The other register in that checkerboard location would still alternate on
every clock cycle causing the XNOR gate output and the error count to alternate.
During the second proton test, only 319 data points were recoverable due to
synchronization problems. The third proton test yielded no recoverable data. This
highlights the experiment limitations mentioned in Section 5.2.1.3 and the difficulty
in acquiring data from radiation experiments. No FIT rate could be established for
the Cyclone V when exposed to proton ion radiation. By the end of the second and
third tests, the DE-10 stopped transmitting data. The DE-10 was drawing 0.6A and
0.9A at the end of the second and third tests respectively. After re-pressurizing the
chamber, resetting, and reprogramming, the DE-10 passed functional tests after the
second and third tests.

5.3

Error Injection Architecture
Now that the error rate has been determined to be 1 SEU/day, the next step is

to determine how to inject errors. It was determined that the most effective method
of injecting errors was to forcibly flip bits stored in registers in the Basic MIPS
processor(s) of TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS. These types of injected errors have the
same impact as a SEU. These injected errors are not too dissimilar from SETs since
SETs only become errors if they are latched into a register. Now that the mode of
error injection is selected, the Basic MIPS registers to target must be determined.
The Basic MIPS registers are a 32-bit instruction register and a 4-bit state machine
register in the Controller as well as a 30-bit program counter register, thirty-one 32-bit
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general purpose registers used by the program to compute results, and two registers
used to delay signals necessary for branch instruction processing in the Datapath.
In order to ensure a meaningful, apples-to-apples timing and energy performance
comparison between TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS, it is necessary to target registers
that will allow all three architectures to detect and correct the error. If an error
is injected such that one architecture does not detect the error but another does,
the architecture which fails to detect the error would not suffer any performance
degradation, but would produce erroneous results. The next few paragraphs explore
what could happen if an error were injected into each type of register in Basic MIPS
and its effect on TMR and TSR MIPS. The effect on AHR MIPS is not explored
in this discussion because AHR MIPS operates in either TMR or TSR mode at any
given time and the effects would be identical to the effects on TMR and TSR MIPS.
Should an error occur in the instruction register such that an instruction is changed
into an unrecognized instruction, Basic MIPS is designed to reject the instruction and
request the instruction from memory once again. This would protect both TMR and
TSR MIPS. In the event that an error causes one valid instruction to be changed
to another valid instruction, TMR and TSR MIPS would both be able to detect an
erroneous result in most cases. In contrast, if a TSR branch comparison instruction
were changed to another instruction, TSR would realize an error it would not detect if
one of the two copies of the value to be compared were also in error. TSR would also
suffer from errors in the store word instructions if the instruction were corrupted such
that it was no longer a store word instruction or if the instructions register reference
were corrupted such that the wrong register value was stored to memory. TMR MIPS
would detect all of these errors because the voter would detect that one of the three
Basic MIPS processors was in error. An instruction register error does not lend itself
to an apples-to-apples performance comparison between TMR and TSR MIPS.
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If an error were to occur in the state machine register of Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS
would be able to detect that one of its three Basic MIPS processors is out of step
with the other two. In contrast, TSR MIPS only has one Basic MIPS processor and
a state machine register error could cause TSR MIPS to jump to an unrecoverable
state or skip over important state transitions when conducting branch comparisons or
store word instructions which would go undetected. State machine register errors are
also not a good way to compare TMR and TSR MIPS performance in the presence
of errors.
A program counter error would be detected by TMR MIPS because one of the
three Basic MIPS processors would attempt to read an instruction from a different
memory address than the other two. A program counter error in TSR MIPS could
cause a significant portion of the TSR MIPS program to be skipped. It could also
cause a comparison instruction or a store word instruction to be skipped and allow
an undetected error to occur. Therefore, program counter errors do not provide an
apples-to-apples comparison between TMR and TSR MIPS.
An error injected to any one of the general purpose registers would be detected and
corrected by both TMR and TSR MIPS. TMR MIPS would detect the error when
the data that one Basic MIPS processor is attempting to write to memory differs
from the other two. TSR MIPS would detect the error when the branch comparison
instruction is evaluated and determines that the duplicated registers are not equal.
This represents an apples-to-apples comparison between TMR and TSR MIPS.
An error injected into the delay registers used by branch instructions could cause
a branch to be not taken when it should be taken or a branch to be taken when it
should not be taken. TMR MIPS would detect this error so long as only one Basic
MIPS processor is affected by this error. TSR MIPS would not detect this error and
there is a potential that an error in one of two duplicated registers would be missed
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by the branch comparison instruction should a branch delay register error occur. This
is also a case where an error would be detected by TMR MIPS and not TSR MIPS
and is therefore not a good way to compare TMR and TSR MIPS performance.
Based on this thought experiment, errors will only be injected into general purpose
registers. The next step is to determine when to inject the errors. The determination
was made to only inject errors into registers that are going to be stored to memory
and to do so immediately before they are stored in memory. The errors are injected
at the beginning of the clock cycle in which an instruction to store a register value to
memory is being read from memory for TMR MIPS. For TSR MIPS, the errors are
injected at the beginning of the clock cycle in which the branch instruction before a
store word instruction is being read from memory. This ensures that both TMR and
TSR MIPS are able to detect and correct the error. If other registers were selected
that serve as intermediate results for later instructions that eventually store another
register to memory, the error would propagate through multiple instructions before
being detected. This method would also produce detectable errors, but would make
it more difficult to predict exactly when an error would be detected for simulation
and timing analysis purposes.
Error injection is physically implemented by adding hardware to the Basic MIPS
architecture. The hardware allows a bit flip to be injected to a specific register at a
specific time. That specific time is when the Basic MIPS Controller FSM is in state
0, the program counter is at a store word instruction in a TMR MIPS program and a
branch comparison instruction in TSR MIPS, and the loop counter in R31 is also at
a specific value. The hardware then flips a bit in the user definable register which is
about to be stored to memory. This is accomplished by overriding the register select
signal to the GPR Bank to write to the pre-selected register. The value written to the
pre-selected register is the output of that register with a pre-selected bit from that
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register inverted. A schematic showing the error injection module integrated into the
Basic MIPS Datapath is shown in Figure 29. The original Datapath is shown in Figure
30 and can also be located in the “Triple Modular Redundancy MIPS Architecture
Version 1.4” report [38]. Changes to the original Datapath to add error injection are
shown in red in Figure 29.
Note that the Error Inject module’s data input is connected to GPR Bank
register output o Q## to indicate that the register number can be any number
between 1 and 31. The i state input comes from the Basic MIPS Controller. The
i P C input is from the output of the PC Register. The Datapath is modified
to include a multiplexer between the original multiplexer to select the GPR Bank
i data input and the updated i data input. The Datapath is also modified to include
a multiplexer between the original multiplexer to select the GPR Bank i sel input
and the i sel input. These multiplexers normally allow the original signals to pass
through to the GPR Bank, but switch to the input defined by the Error Inject
module when an error is to be injected. This is accomplished by the Error Inject
module changing the output of o error to 1 when an error is to be injected and leaving
o error at 0 when no error is to be injected.
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Figure 29. Basic MIPS Datapath with Error Injection Schematic
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Figure 30. Basic MIPS Datapath Schematic

5.4

Software Simulation with Error Injection
Software simulation with error injection will be used to determine the effects of

error injection on the various architectures in terms of time and energy to complete
programs. The runtimes of equivalent programs across the various architectures can
be compared when looking at best-case and worst-case errors. The number of errors
to inject into a program is one error per program iteration. This was determined
from experiments performed to assess the vulnerability of the Cyclone V FPGA as
described in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. In neutron testing, the Cyclone V FPGA
experienced an average of 1 error every 360 seconds (and an adjusted rate of 1 error
every 3600 seconds. See Section 5.2.2.1). Since each program is expected to take
about 50 milliseconds or less to run based upon the error free software simulation
results in Section 4.4, one error per program run represents the maximum number of
errors that would ever be expected to occur during any one program run.

5.4.1

Runtime Calculations

These simulations are able to provide timing information on error recovery operations for TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS that could not previously be
determined during error free operation. The simulations also establish upper and
lower bounds for program runtime based on the best-case and worst-case scenarios
for all programs.
These simulations cannot be run to completion due to the resource constraints
of the computer running the simulations. Instead, the save/restore point and error
injection times were modified to capture the time required to recover from an error.
This timing information was also used to determine the amount of time from the start
of save/restore point creation to encountering an error at the end of save/restore point
creation for TMR and TSR MIPS worst-case scenarios which will be discussed shortly.
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The timing information is used to calculate the total program runtime.

5.4.1.1

TMR MIPS Runtime

The first error scenario for TMR MIPS is a single processor error referred to as a
Type A error. In this scenario, the program resumes from the same point at which
the error occurred after error recovery is completed. The Type A error is illustrated
in Figure 31. This figure shows a program executing from start to end in TMR MIPS.
The first instruction is executed at the start and the last instruction is executed at
the end. Save/restore points are created where indicated by “SRP”. The red “X”
indicates that an error occurred in Basic MIPS processor 1 while the green circles
indicate that Basic MIPS processors 0 and 2 were in agreement when the error was
detected. The blue arrows indicate that error recovery returned code execution to
the point at which the error occurred.

Figure 31. TMR MIPS Type A Error Timing Diagram

The runtime for a TMR MIPS Type A error is given in Equation 33 where
TT M R

M IP S

is the time for TMR MIPS to complete a program in the absence of

an error given in Equation 3, TT M R
error, TT M R

recA

ttdA

is the time it takes TMR MIPS to detect the

is the time to recover from a single processor error, TT M R

time to return to the instruction at which the error occurred, and TT M R
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retA

is the

repA

is the

time required to repeat the instruction at which the error occurred. The last four of
these values are determined from the simulation.

TT M R

ErrA

= TT M R

M IP S

+ TT M R

ttdA

+ TT M R

recA

+ TT M R

retA

+ TT M R

repA

(33)

The second error scenario for TMR MIPS is a multiple processor error (possibly
caused by a multiple-bit upset) referred to as a Type B error. In this scenario,
the TMR Voter cannot determine if any processor is correct, so it resets all three
processors and reloads their internal states from the most recently created save/restore
point. This is illustrated in Figure 32 where all three processors are marked with a red
“X” to indicate that the voter cannot determine which of the processors are correct.
The blue arrows indicate that error recovery returned code execution to the most
recent save/restore point.

Figure 32. TMR MIPS Type B Error Timing Diagram

The Type B error is bounded by best-case and worst-case error scenarios. The
best-case error minimizes the number of instructions which must be executed after
error recovery to return to the point in the program at which the error occurred while
the worst-case error maximizes this same number of instructions.
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The Type B Best-case error occurs immediately after creation of a save/restore
point. The error is injected immediately prior to the first store word instruction after
creating a save/restore point. The error is injected into the register to be stored to
memory. Specifically, two different bits of this register are inverted on two different
processors. For example, R1 on one processor might be changed from a 0 to 32 while
-

-

R1 on another processor might be changed from a 0 to 128. The Type B Best-case
error is shown in Figure 33.

-

-

Figure 33. TMR MIPS Type B Best- and Worst-Case Error Timing Diagram

The runtime for TMR MIPS Type B Best-case error is given in Equation 34 where
TT M R

ttdB

is the time it takes TMR MIPS to detect the error, TT M R

to recover from a multiple processor error, TT M R

retB Best

recB

is the time

is the time to re-accomplish

the instructions between the last completed save/restore point and the instruction at
which the error occurred. The time to detect the error and the time to recover from
the error are determined from the simulation, but the time to return from the error
to the point at which the error occurred is determined by analysis.

TT M R

ErrB Best

= TT M R

M IP S

+ TT M R

ttdB
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+ TT M R

recB

+ TT M R

retB Best

(34)

While there are many TMR Type B errors, there can only be one Best-case error. There are many nearly Best-case errors, one after each save/restore point, but
the absolute Best-case error is the one that minimizes the number of instructions
between the return from save/restore point creation and the store word instruction
following it. In order to determine which pairing of save/restore point creation and
store word instructions has the shortest distance between them, the loop count and
instruction index of every save/restore point creation and store word instruction must
be determined. The store word instruction indices are simply located by examining
the program. Equation 35 shows how to calculate where save/restore point creation
occurs where SIT M R is a vector containing the instruction index in the TMR program
where save/restore points are created, SLT M R is a vector containing the program loop
count values where the save/restore points are created, and STT M R is a vector containing the amount of time from the beginning of the program to the points at which
save/restore points are created. STT M R is not used now in calculating the TMR Type
B-Best program completion time, but will be used shortly.
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f or m = 0 to nSRP − 1
if m = 0
SIT M R (m + 1) = 1
SLT M R (m + 1) = 0
STT M R (m + 1) = 0
else
SIT M R (m + 1) = mod(m · nsave − nT M R init , NT M R ) + nT M R init + 1


m · nsave − nT M R init
SLT M R (m + 1) =
nT M R
PSIT M R (m+1)−1
Tadd = n=nT M R init +1 tIT M R n
STT M R (m + 1) = TT M R
(m − 1) · TT M R

init

+ TT M R

loop

(35)

· SLT M R (m + 1) + Tadd + · · ·

SRP

end
end
The next step is to compute all possible differences (SD1 ) between save/restore
point indices and store word indices as shown in Equation 36 where SITTM R is the
transpose of SIT M R . This formula states SD1 is a matrix of row vectors such that the
nth row subtracts each value of SIT M R from the nth SWT M R value. Note that SWT M R
is a vector containing the indices of every store word instruction in a program.

f or n = 1 to length(SWT M R )
SD1 (n, :) = SWT M R (n) − SITTM R

(36)

end
Next, because some of the values in SD1 may be negative because a save/restore
point may occur at the end of one loop and the next store word may occur at the
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beginning of the next loop, SD1 is modified so that all values are positive as shown in
Equation 37. In this equation, the “<” and “>” operators are logical operators that
populate a matrix with ones or zeros depending on whether the individual matrix
entries are less than or greater than the argument to the right of the operator. The
term SD1 . · (SD1 > 0) creates a matrix with all the positive values of SD1 and where
all the negative values of SD1 are set to zero (the “.·” operator denotes elementwise
multiplication). The term SD1 . · (SD1 < 0) creates a matrix with all the negative
values of SD1 and where all the positive values of SD1 are set to zero. The term
NT M R · (SD1 < 0) creates a matrix where all the negative values of SD1 are replaced
by NT M R and all the positive values of SD1 are set to zero. The term SD1 . · (SD1 <
0) + NT M R · (SD1 < 0) creates a matrix where all the negative values of SD1 are
replaced by the positive number of instructions from the save/restore point at the
end of a loop to the store word instruction at the beginning of the next loop and
accounts for the fact that code execution jumped from the end of the loop back to
the start of the loop. Finally, SD2 contains all the positive instruction distances
between save/restore points and the store words following them.

SD2 = SD1 . · (SD1 > 0) + (SD1 . · (SD1 < 0) + NT M R · (SD1 < 0))

(37)

The next step is to determine the minimum distance between a save/restore point
creation and a store word instruction. Equation 38 is used to calculate the minimum
distance where min is a function that returns the minimum value of each column
vector of a matrix in the row vector a1 and returns the index of each minimum value
in each column vector in the row vector b1 . For a vector, min returns the minimum
value in c1 and the index of the minimum value in d1 . The value d1 is as an index into
the columns of SD2 and tells which column contains the minimum distance between
a save/restore point and a store word. The value b1 (d1 ) is an index into the rows of
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SD2 and tells which row contains the minimum distance between a save/restore point
and a store word. Because the columns of SD2 correspond to the save/restore point
indices SIT M R and the rows correspond to the store word indices SWT M R , SIT M R (d1 )
is the address of the instruction at which the save/restore point is created closest to
the store word instruction at the address specified to SWT M R (b1 (d1 )). In other words,
this is the absolute shortest distance between the creation of a save/restore point and
when an error could occur at a store word and constitutes the best-case multiple
processor error for TMR MIPS.

[a1 , b1 ] = min(SD2 )

(38)

[c1 , d1 ] = min(a1 )
The formula for determining TT M R

retB Best

is now presented in Equation 39. The

reason for the if-else statement is because the program is in a loop and SWT M R (b1 (d1 ))
could be less than SIT M R (d1 ).

if SWT M R (b1 (d1 )) ≥ SIT M R (d1 )
PSWT M R (b1 (d1 ))
TT M R retB Best = n=SI
tIT M R
T M R (d1 )

n

(39)

else
TT M R

retB Best

=

PnT M R init +NT M R
n=SIT M R (d1 )

tIT M R

n

+

PSWT M R (b1 (d1 ))
n=nT M R

init +1

tIT M R

n

end
The definition of the min function in Equation 38 presents an interesting situation
when SWT M R or SIT M R is a scalar rather than a vector. In this situation, SD2 will
be a vector instead of a matrix and performing the operations in Equation 38 will not
provide usable results for proper indexing into SW and SI in Equation 39. If SWT M R
is a scalar, b1 is used as the indexing variable into SIT M R and no index variable is
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used for SWT M R because it is a scalar. These adjustments are made to Equation 39
as shown in Equation 40. If SIT M R is a scalar, b1 is used as the indexing variable
into SWT M R and no index variable is used for SIT M R because it is a scalar. These
adjustments are made to Equation 39 as shown in Equation 41.

if SWT M R ≥ SIT M R (b1 )
P T MR
TT M R retB Best2 = SW
n=SIT M R (b1 ) tIT M R

n

(40)
else
TT M R

retB Best2

=

PnT M R init +NT M R

tIT M R

n=SIT M R (b1 )

n

+

PSWT M R

n=nT M R

init +1

tIT M R

n

end

if SWT M R (b1 ) ≥ SIT M R
PSWT M R (b1 )
TT M R retB Best = n=SI
tIT M R
T MR

n

(41)
else
TT M R

retB Best

=

PnT M R init +NT M R
n=SIT M R

tIT M R

n

+

PSWT M R (b1 )
n=nT M R

init +1

tIT M R

n

end
The Type B Worst-case error maximizes the number of instructions which must
be executed after error recovery to return to the point in the program at which
the error occurred. Therefore, the worst-case error occurs at the end of creating a
save/restore point so that the error is detected before successful save/restore point
creation. The multiple bit error is injected when attempting to write the loop counter
when creating the save/restore point such that a multiple processor error is detected
and triggers recovery operations. In this scenario, 10,000 instructions and save/restore
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point creation must be repeated to return to the point in the program at which the
error occurred. The Type B Worst-case error is shown in Figure 33.
The runtime for TMR MIPS Type B Worst-case error is given in Equation 42
where TT M R

SRP Err

is the time it takes TMR MIPS to encounter an error during

creation of a save/restore point when the error occurs in the program counter of multiple processors when attempting to save the program counter to memory, TT M R
is the time to recover from a multiple processor error, TT M R

retB W orst

is the time

to return to the instruction at which the error occurred. The time TT M R
determined from the simulation, but TT M R

TT M R

ErrB W orst

TT M R

recB

= TT M R

+ TT M R

retB W orst

M IP S

recB

SRP Err

is

is determined by analysis.

+ TT M R

SRP Err

+···

(42)

retB W orst

To compute the worst-case scenario time to return to the instruction at which
the error occurred, the worst-case time between save points must first be determined according to Equation 43 where STT M R was previously defined in Equation 35,
SLT M R (m) is the number of full loops completed by the time the mth save/restore
point creation is reached, Tadd is the time from the start of the loop in which the
save/restore point is created to the instruction in that loop at which the save/restore
point is created, STT M R (m) is the time from the beginning of the program to the
time at which the mth save/restore point creation begins, SDTT M R is the save time
difference between consecutive save points, and WSIT M R is the index of the worstcase SDTT M R . The value of SDTT M R is obtained by subtracting the 1st value of
STT M R from the second value, the second value from the third, and so on until the
(nSRP − 1)th value is subtracted from the nth
SRP . The maximum value of SDTT M R is
TT M R

retB W orst .

155

SDTT M R = STT M R − [0, STT M R (1 to length(STT M R ) − 1)]
[TT M R

retB W orst , WSIT M R ]

(43)

= max(SDTT M R )

While multiple-bit upsets are assumed to be unlikely events, they are included in
order to test TMR MIPS Type B Best-case and Worst-case scenarios that would not
otherwise occur if only SEUs and SETs were permitted. The TMR MIPS multiple
processor error upset errors are referred to as Type B errors and are further denoted
as Type B-Best and Type B-Worst for the best-case and worst-case multiple processor
errors respectively. It should be expected that Type A and Type B-Best errors would
minimize the time and energy added to complete a program while Type B-Worst
errors would maximize the time and energy added to complete a program.

5.4.1.2

TSR MIPS Runtime

TSR MIPS error recovery process is much like the TMR MIPS Type B error
recovery process in that TSR MIPS always returns to the most recent save/restore
point. This is illustrated in Figure 34 which also shows how the program jumps from
an error, to error recovery code, then back to the save/restore point. TSR MIPS
errors are similarly divided into best-case and worst-case scenarios.

Figure 34. TSR MIPS Error Timing Diagram
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The best-case scenario minimizes the number of instructions which must be executed after error recovery to return to the point in the program at which the error occurred. Therefore, the best-case error occurs immediately after creation of a
save/restore point. The error is injected immediately prior to the branch comparison instruction before the first store word instruction after creating a save/restore
point. The error is injected into one of the registers to be compared. The TSR MIPS
Best-case error is shown in Figure 35.

-

-

-

Figure 35. TSR MIPS Best- and Worst-Case Error Timing Diagram

The TSR MIPS Best-case error is computed using Equation 44 where TT SR
was previously defined in Equation 6, TT SR

Rec

M IP S

is the time to perform error recovery

operations and is determined from simulation results, and TT SR

Ret

is the time needed

to return from the most recent save/restore point to the instruction at which the error
occurred.

TT SR

Best

= TT SR

M IP S

+ TT SR
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Rec

+ TT SR

Ret

(44)

The time to return to the instruction at which the error occurred is determined
using Equation 45 where nT SR

init

is the number of instructions needed to initialize

a TSR program (4 instructions) and SWT SR is a vector containing the instruction
indices of all store word instructions in a TSR MIPS program.

TT SR

ret

=

NX
T SR

SWT SR (1)

tIT SR

n

+

n=NT SR −3

X
n=nT SR

tIT SR

(45)

n

init +1

The TSR MIPS Worst-case scenario maximizes the number of instructions which
must be executed after error recovery to return to the point in the program at which
the error occurred. Therefore, the worst-case error occurs at the end of creating a
save/restore point. This error would specifically target the loop counter, which is the
last register to be written to the save/restore point during save/restore point creation.
This error would force TSR MIPS to restore itself from the previous save/restore point
and then proceed past the end of the next save/restore point creation, which means
completing 250 program loops all over again. Additionally, the worst-case error will
occur when creating the save/restore point in the second segment of save/restore
point memory rather than the first segment because the second segment takes longer
to create. The TSR MIPS Worst-case error is also shown in Figure 35.
The TSR MIPS Worst-case error is computed using Equation 46 where TT SR
was previously defined in Equation 7 and TT SR

SRP 1 Err

loop

is the time from the start of

save/restore point creation to the time at which an error is detected in the difference
between the loop counter and duplicate loop counter. The value of TT SR SRP 1 Err is
P T SR
determined from the simulation. The term N
n=NT SR −3 tIT SR n is the time to complete
the loop after performing error recovery and the term 250 · TT SR
re-complete the 250 loops between save/restore points.
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loop

is the time to

TT SR

W orst

250 · TT SR
5.4.1.3

= TT SR
loop

M IP S

+ TT SR

+ TT SR

Rec

+

PNT SR

n=NT SR −3 tIT SR

n

+···

(46)

SRP 1 Err

AHR MIPS Runtime

AHR MIPS suffers from all the same errors as TMR MIPS when in TMR mode
and TSR MIPS when in TSR mode; however, the calculation of time to complete a
program is complicated by the TMR to TSR transition.
TMR errors can affect the location of the transition because the transition only
occurs after 15,000 instructions are completed without an error. This means that
15,000 instructions must be completed after the initial error before the transition can
take place. This means a greater portion of the program will complete in TMR and
a smaller portion in TSR than if no error had occurred. This becomes more evident
as the error types are examined in detail.
When AHR MIPS encounters a TMR Type A error, it handles the error the same
way that TMR MIPS would. However, the location of the error relative to the TMR
to TSR transition point will impact the program’s runtime. If the error occurs early
in the program, such as at the first store word instruction in the program, the TMR to
TSR transition point is only moved by a few instructions as shown in Figure 36. This
is referred to as a Type A Early error and it has a minimal impact on the program
runtime.
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Figure 36. AHR MIPS TMR Type A Early Error Timing Diagram

Equation 47 shows how to calculate the AHR MIPS Type A Early error timing
where Ploops

T M R A Early

is the new transition point loop count determined according

to Equation 48 and nCSRP

A Early

is the number of save/restore points to create prior

to the transition determined by Equation 49. The TMR to TSR transition point
determines how many save/restore points are created in TMR and TSR mode. The
TMR mode save/restore points are determined by nCSRP

A Early ,

but the number of

TSR mode save/restore points depends on where the transition occurs relative to the
creation point for the TSR mode save/restore points which only occur at 250, 500, and
750 loops. This is the rationale for the if-else statements in these equations. There is
also a possibility that the Type A error may push the TMR to TSR transition point
out past the end of the program, in which case, AHR MIPS never enters TSR mode.
Also note that tCT M RAE

T MR

and tCT M RAE

T SR

are the time AHR MIPS spends in

TMR and TSR mode respectively when encountering a TMR Type A Early error.
The time spent in TMR and TSR are separated to make the energy calculations
simpler.
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tnom

TT M R
terr

= tT M R

AE

SRP

AE

· nCSRP

= TT M R

if Ploops

init

+ TT M R

T M R A Early
T MR

tCT M RAE

T SR

SRP 0

= tnom

tCT M RAE

T SR

TT SR

SRP 0

+ TT M R

+ terr

SRP 1

T M R A Early
AE

retA

loop

+···

+ TT M R

+ terr

T M R A Early
AE

+ terr

conc

· tT SR

− TT SR

T SR

tCT M RAE

T MR

tCT M RAE

T SR

TT SR

= tnom

AE

+ terr

= (nloops − Ploops

+···

loop

+···

< 500
AE

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R A Early )
conc

− TT SR

· tT SR

skip

< 750
AE

AE

(47)

+ tT M R→T SR
loop

+···

loop

+···

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R A Early )

· tT SR

conc

elseif Ploops
tCT M RAE
TT M R

T M R A Early

T MR

SRP

tCT M RAE

= tT M R

≥ nloops
init

+ nloops · TT M R

· (nSRP − 1) + terr

T SR

loop

AE

=0

end
TCT M R

loop

skip

= (nloops − Ploops T M R A Early ) · tT SR
2
TT SR SRP 1 + TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3
elseif 750 ≤ Ploops T M R A Early < nloops
tCT M RAE

A Early

repA

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R A Early )

+ TT SR

SRP 1

= tnom

AE

+ TT SR

= (nloops − Ploops

+ TT SR

T MR

AE

= tnom

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RAE

recA

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops
T MR

· TT M R

< 250

+ 2 · TT SR

tCT M RAE

T M R A Early

A Early

ttdA

tCT M RAE

TT SR

+ Ploops

= tCT M RAE

T MR

+ tCT M RAE
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T SR

+···



Ploops

T M R A Early

SWT M R (1) + ntransition − nT M R init
=
NT M R


nCSRP

A Early

=

Ploops

T M R A Early

· NT M R + nT M R init


(48)


(49)

nsave

If the TMR Type A error occurs late in the program, such as at the last store
word instruction before the TMR to TSR transition, the TMR to TSR transition is
moved by nearly 15,000 instructions past the point at which it would have occurred
if there were no error. This is shown in Figure 37. This is referred to as a Type A
Late error and it causes the program to execute more instructions in TMR MIPS and
fewer instructions in TSR MIPS than if no error had occurred. The expected effect
is a significantly shorter runtime and increased energy usage.

Figure 37. AHR MIPS TMR Type A Late Error Timing Diagram

Equation 50 shows how to calculate the AHR MIPS Type A Late error timing
where Ploops

T M R A Late

is the new transition point loop count determined according

to Equation 51 and nCSRP

A Late

is the number of save/restore points to create prior

to the transition determined by Equation 52. Also note that tCT M RAL
tCT M RAL

T SR

T MR

and

are the time AHR MIPS spends in TMR and TSR mode respectively
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when encountering a TMR Type A Late error.

tnom

TT M R
terr

= tT M R

AL

SRP

AL

· nCSRP

= TT M R

if Ploops

init

+ TT M R

T M R A Late

< 250

T MR

tCT M RAL

T SR

= tnom

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RAL

T MR

tCT M RAL

T SR

TT SR

T MR

+ terr

AL

SRP 1

AL

SRP 1

+ TT SR

loop

+···

+ terr

AL

conc

· tT SR

− TT SR

T SR

tCT M RAL

T MR

tCT M RAL

T SR

TT SR

= tnom

AL

conc

· tT SR

− TT SR

loop

tCT M RAL
TT M R

T MR

skip

+ terr

AL

+ terr

AL

(50)

+ tT M R→T SR
loop

+···

loop

+···

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R A Late )

· tT SR

SRP

tCT M RAL

≥ nloops

= tT M R

init

+ nloops · TT M R

· (nSRP − 1) + terr

T SR

loop

AL

=0

end
A Late

= tCT M RAL

T MR

+···

< 750

= (nloops − Ploops

T M R A Late

+···

+ tT M R→T SR

conc

elseif Ploops

TCT M R

loop

skip

= (nloops − Ploops T M R A Late ) · tT SR
2
TT SR SRP 1 + TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3
elseif 750 ≤ Ploops T M R A Late < nloops
tCT M RAL

repA

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R A Late )

+ TT SR

AL

+ TT M R

< 500

T M R A Late

= tnom

retA

T M R A Late )

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RAL

· TT M R

+ TT M R

T M R A Late

= tnom

+ TT SR

SRP 0

AL

recA

= (nloops − Ploops

+ 2 · TT SR

SRP 0

T M R A Late

A Late

ttdA

tCT M RAL

TT SR

+ Ploops

+ tCT M RAL
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T SR

+···



Ploops

T M R A Late

SWT M R (length(SWT M R )) + ntransition − nT M R init
=
NT M R


nCSRP

A Late

=

Ploops

· NT M R + nT M R init
nsave

T M R A Late


(51)


(52)

AHR MIPS may also encounter TMR MIPS Type B-Best errors early or late and
these are referred to as TMR Type B-Best Early and TMR Type B-Best Late errors.
As with the TMR Type A Early error, the TMR Type B-Best Early error has a
minimal impact on runtime. As with the TMR Type A Late error, the TMR Type
B-Best Late error is expected to significantly decrease runtime and increase energy
usage. The TMR Type B-Best Early error is shown in Figure 38 while the TMR
Type B-Best Late error is shown in Figure 39.

-

Figure 38. AHR MIPS TMR Type B Best-Case Early Error Timing Diagram
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-

Figure 39. AHR MIPS TMR Type B Best-Case Late Error Timing Diagram

In order to determine the AHR MIPS runtime for programs with Type B-Best
Early and Late errors, some of the variables used in computing TMR MIPS runtime
for programs with Type B-Best errors need to be modified. The variable SIT M R needs
to be modified so it only contains instruction indices of save/restore points that occur
before the original TMR to TSR transition was expected to take place. The values of
SLT M R and STT M R must also be updated. These updates are illustrated in Equation
53 where the SLT M R (SLT M R < Ploops ) returns the vector of SLT M R where the values
of SLT M R are less than the TMR to TSR transition point and all other values of the
original SLT M R vector are excluded.

SLCT M R = SLT M R (SLT M R < Ploops )
SICT M R = SIT M R (1 to length(SLT M R ))

(53)

STCT M R = STT M R (1 to length(SLT M R ))
Next, all possible differences between save/restore point indices and store word
indices are calculated according to Equation 54. Note that this is different when
compared with Equation 36 because this formula must account for the fact that an
error cannot be allowed to occur after the TMR to TSR transition or it would be a
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TSR error rather than a TMR Type B Error.

f or n = 1 to length(SWT M R )
SD3 (n, :) = SWT M R (n) − SITTM R
if SLCT M R (length(SLCT M R )) = Ploops
if SD3 (n, length(SLCT M R )) < 0
SD3 (n, length(SLCT M R )) = 10

(54)
6

end
end
end
Then just as Equation 37 made all values of SD1 positive, Equation 55 make all
values of SD3 positive as well.

SD4 = SD3 . · (SD3 > 0) + (SD3 . · (SD3 < 0) + NT M R · (SD3 < 0))

(55)

The next step is to determine which store word indices minimize the difference
between each store word and save index. This is computed in Equation 56. Note
that this differs from Equation 38 because there is no second step to determine the
absolute minimum distance. This is because it is desirable to determine the early
and late scenarios for a Type B-Best error. The absolute minimum of SD4 might not
minimize or maximize the number of instructions computed in TMR mode. Instead,
each possible combination of minimum distance from a save index to a store word
index is evaluated for total program completion time. The total program completion
time for each scenario is then evaluated against the completion times to determine
which is slowest (Early) and which is fastest (Late).

[a2 , b2 ] = min(SD4 )
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(56)

Equations 57, 58, and 59 show how to compute the time to complete each program for each possible combination of minimum distance from a save index to a store
word index. Equation 59 is a continuation of Equation 58 because the entire equation
could not fit on one page. It also shows that the Type B-Best Early solution is the
maximum of these times and the Type B-Best Late solution is the minimum of these
times. The F lag variable is used to keep track of whether a particular combination
of save index and store word index is allowed. The flag is 1 if the combination is not
allowed because the store word following the save index would occur after the TMR to
TSR transition. The variable Ploops

T M R B Best (n)

is the new TMR to TSR transition

point based on the error location for the nth save index. The variable nCSRP

B Best (n)

is the new number of save/restore points to create for the nth save index. The variable
Tadd (n) is the amount of time required to return from the save index to the store word
index at which the error occurred for the nth save index. The time to complete the
TMR portion of the program for the nth save index is tCT M RBB

T M R (n).

The time to

complete the TSR portion of the program for the nth save index is tCT M RBB
The value N aN is assigned to tCT M RBB

T M R (n)

and tCT M RBB

T SR (n)

T SR (n).

when F lag = 1

because the max and min functions ignore N aN values and return only numerical values. Finally, tCT M RBBE

T M R (n),

tCT M RBBE

T SR (n)

are the time AHR MIPS

spends in TMR and TSR mode when a TMR Type B-Best Early error is encountered.
Similarly, tCT M RBBL

T M R (n),

tCT M RBBL

T SR (n)

are the time AHR MIPS spends in

TMR and TSR mode when a TMR Type B-Best Late error is encountered.
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f or n = 1 to length(b2 )
F lag = 0
if SICT M R = 1
Ploops

T M R B Best (n)

= Ploops

else
Ploops T M R B Best (n) = · · ·


SICT M R (n) + SLCT M R · NT M R + ntransition − nT M R init
NT M R
end

nCSRP

B Best (n)

=

Ploops

T M R B Best (n)

· NT M R + nT M R init



nsave

(57)

if SICT M R (n) ≤ SWCT M R (b2(n)) − 1
PSWCT M R (b2(n))−1
Tadd (n) = m=SI
tIT M R m
CT M R (n)
elseif SLCT M R (n) < Ploops T M R B Best (n)
PnT M R init +NT M R
P CT M R (b2(n))−1
Tadd (n) = m=SI
tIT M R m + nSW
tIT M R
T M R init +1
CT M R (n)
else
Tadd (n) = 0
F lag = 1
end
end
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m

f or n = 1 to length(b2 )
if F lag = 1
tCT M RBB

T M R (n)

tCT M RBB

T SR (n)

= N aN

= N aN

else
tnom

TT M R
terr

= tT M R

BB

SRP

BB

· nCSRP

= TT M R

if Ploops

+ Ploops

init

+ TT M R

ttdB

T M R B Best (n)
T M R (n)

tCT M RBB

T SR (n)

SRP 0

+ 2 · TT SR

T M R (n)

tCT M RBB

T SR

TT SR

BB

+ terr

SRP 1

= tnom

BB

+ TT SR

T M R (n)

SRP 1

BB

− TT SR

BB

conc
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· tT SR

loop

+···

skip

+ tT M R→T SR

− TT SR

· tT SR

loop

+···

loop

+···

skip

< 750

+ terr

T SR

(58)

< 500

T M R B Best (n))

T M R B Best (n)

= tnom

conc

+ terr

+ TT SR

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R B Best (n))

+ TT SR

T M R B Best (n)

BB

BB

= (nloops − Ploops T M R
2
SRP 1 + TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3

tCT M RBB

+···

+ Tadd (n)

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RBB

recB

= (nloops − Ploops

tCT M RBB

SRP 0

loop

< 250

= tnom

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops

TT SR

· TT M R

B Best (n)

tCT M RBB

TT SR

T M R B Best (n)

+ tT M R→T SR

B Best (n))

· tT SR

elseif 750 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RBB

T M R (n)

tCT M RBB

T SR

elseif Ploops
tCT M RBB
TT M R

tCT M RBB

= tnom

BB

T M R B Best (n)

= tT M R

BB

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R B Best (n))

· tT SR

loop

+ TT SR

conc

≥ nloops
init

· (nSRP − 1) + terr
T SR

< nloops

+ terr

= (nloops − Ploops

T M R (n)

SRP

T M R B Best (n)

+ nloops · TT M R

loop

+···

BB

=0

end

(59)

end
end
[TCT M R

B Best Early , b3 ]

tCT M RBBE

T MR

tCT M RBBE

T SR

[TCT M R

= tCT M RBB
= tCT M RBB

B Best Late , b4 ]

tCT M RBBL

T MR

tCT M RBBL

T SR

= max(tCT M RBB

= tCT M RBB

+ tCT M RBB

T SR )

T M R (b3 )
T SR (b3 )

= min(tCT M RBB

= tCT M RBB

T MR

T MR

+ tCT M RBB

T SR )

T M R (b4 )
T SR (b4 )

Remembering that the min function used in Equation 56 is defined and used in the
same manner as in Equation 38, the same problem with SD2 possibly being a vector
arises for SD4 as well. This affects the indices used in Equation 57 and Equation
58. If SWT M R is a scalar, Equation 57 is rewritten in Equation 60. If SICT M R is a
scalar, these equations are rewritten in Equations 61, 62, and 63 where Equation 63
is a continuation of Equation 62.
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f or n = 1 to length(b2 )
F lag = 0
if SICT M R = 1
Ploops

T M R B Best (n)

= Ploops

else
Ploops T M R B Best (n) = · · ·


SICT M R (n) + SLCT M R · NT M R + ntransition − nT M R init
NT M R
end

nCSRP

B Best (n)

=

Ploops

T M R B Best (n)

· NT M R + nT M R init

nsave

if SICT M R (n) ≤ SWCT M R − 1
P CT M R −1
Tadd (n) = SW
m=SICT M R (n) tIT M R

else
Tadd (n) = 0
F lag = 1
end
end
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(60)

m

elseif SLCT M R (n) < Ploops T M R B Best (n)
P T M R init +NT M R
P CT M R −1
Tadd (n) = nm=SI
tIT M R m + SW
nT M R init +1 tIT M R
CT M R (n)



m

F lag = 0
if SICT M R = 1
Ploops

T M R B Best

= Ploops

else
Ploops T M R B Best = · · ·


SICT M R + SLCT M R · NT M R + ntransition − nT M R init
NT M R
end

nCSRP

B Best

=

Ploops

· NT M R + nT M R init
nsave

T M R B Best


(61)

if SICT M R ≤ SWCT M R (b2) − 1
PSWCT M R (b2)−1
Tadd = m=SI
tIT M R m
CT M R
elseif SLCT M R (n) < Ploops T M R B Best (n)
PnT M R init +NT M R
P CT M R (b2)−1
Tadd = m=SI
tIT M R m + SW
tIT M R
nT M R init +1
CT M R
else
Tadd = 0
F lag = 1
end
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m

if F lag = 1
tCT RM BB

T MR

tCT RM BB

T SR

= N aN
= N aN

else
tnom

BB

TT M R
terr

= tT M R

· nCSRP

SRP

BB

if Ploops

= TT M R

T MR

tCT RM BB

T SR

SRP 0

T MR

tCT RM BB

T SR

BB

+ terr

SRP 1

· TT M R

BB

T SR

tCT RM BB

T MR

tCT RM BB

T SR

TT SR

+···

loop

+···

= tnom

− TT SR

BB

skip

(62)

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R B Best )

+ TT SR

BB

conc

· tT SR

< 500

+ terr

T M R B Best

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R B Best )

= (nloops − Ploops
SRP 1

BB

conc

− TT SR

· tT SR

= tnom

BB

+ terr

conc
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+···

loop

+···

loop

+···

< 750

+ terr

= (nloops − Ploops

loop

skip

BB

+ tT M R→T SR

= (nloops − Ploops T M R B Best ) · tT SR
2
TT SR SRP 1 + TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3
elseif 750 ≤ Ploops T M R B Best < nloops
tCT RM BB

loop

+ Tadd (n)

+ TT SR

T M R B Best

= tnom

+ TT SR

T MR

recB

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops
tCT RM BB

T M R B Best (n)

< 250

+ 2 · TT SR

tCT RM BB

SRP 0

+ TT M R

= tnom

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops

TT SR

+ Ploops

B Best (n)

ttdB

T M R B Best

tCT RM BB

TT SR

init

BB

+ tT M R→T SR

T M R B Best )

· tT SR

elseif Ploops
tCT RM BB
TT M R

T MR

= tT M R

init

+ nloops · TT M R

· (nSRP − 1) + terr

SRP

tCT RM BB

≥ nloops

T M R B Best

loop

+···

BB

=0

T SR

end
end
TCT M R

(63)
B Best Early

tCT RM BBE

T MR

tCT RM BBE

T SR

TCT M R

= tCT RM BB
= tCT RM BB

B Best Late

tCT RM BBL

T MR

tCT RM BBL

T SR

= tCT RM BB

= tCT RM BB

+ tCT RM BB

T SR

T MR
T SR

= tCT RM BB

= tCT RM BB

T MR

T MR

+ tCT RM BB

T SR

T MR
T SR

AHR MIPS may also encounter TMR MIPS Type B-Worst errors early or late
and these are referred to as TMR Type B-Worst Early and TMR Type B-Worst Late
errors. As with the TMR Type A Early error, the TMR Type B-Worst Early error
has a minimal impact on runtime. As with the TMR Type A Late error, the TMR
Type B-Worst Late error is expected to significantly decrease runtime and increase
energy usage. The TMR Type B-Worst Early error is shown in Figure 40 while the
TMR Type B-Worst Late error is shown in Figure 41.
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Figure 40. AHR MIPS TMR Type B Worst-Case Early Error Timing Diagram

-

Figure 41. AHR MIPS TMR Type B Worst-Case Late Error Timing Diagram

Equation 64 shows how to compute the time to complete a AHR MIPS program with a TMR Type B-Worst Early error where Ploops

T M R B W orst Early

is the

number of loops at which the transition point occurs when accounting for the error, nCSRP

B W orst Early

is the number of save/restore points to create in TMR MIPS

when accounting for the error, and TCT M R

retB W orst Early

is the time needed to return

to the point at which the error occurred after recovering from the error. Note that
tCT M RBW E

T MR

and tCT M RBW E

T SR

are the time AHR MIPS spends in TMR and
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TSR mode respectively when encountering a TMR Type B-Worst Early error.

tnom

BW E

TT M R
terr

SRP

BW E

if Ploops

= tT M R

init

· nCSRP

= TT M R

SRP Err

T MR

tCT M RBW E

T SR

= tnom

+ 2 · TT SR

tCT M RBW E

T MR

tCT M RBW E

T SR

T MR

BW E

+ terr

BW E

conc

loop

+···

BW E

+ terr

+ TT SR

BW E

+ tT M R→T SR

− TT SR

BW E

+ terr

· tT SR

T SR

tCT M RBW E

T MR

tCT M RBW E

T SR

elseif Ploops

SRP

BW E

T MR

+ terr

= (nloops − Ploops

= tT M R

init

BW E

(64)

BW E

T M R B W orst Early )

loop

tCT M RBW E

BW E

B W orst Early

= tCT M RBW E

T MR

· tT SR

+···
T SR

+ tCT M RBW E
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loop

+···

loop

+ TT SR

+ tT M R→T SR

=0

end
TCT M R

+···

+ tT M R→T SR

+ nloops · TT M R

· (nSRP − 1) + terr

loop

< 750

≥ nloops

T M R B W orst Early

tCT M RBW E
TT M R

= tnom

+···

skip

= (nloops − Ploops T M R B W orst Early ) · tT SR
2
TT SR SRP 1 + TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3
elseif 750 ≤ Ploops T M R B W orst Early < nloops
tCT M RBW E

loop

+ tT M R→T SR

− TT SR

conc

· tT SR

skip

T M R B W orst Early )

T M R B W orst Early

= tnom

retB W orst Early

< 500

T M R B W orst Early

SRP 1

+ TCT M R

T M R B W orst Early )

+ TT SR

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RBW E

· TT M R

< 250

SRP 1

= tnom

+ TT SR

SRP 0

recB

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops

TT SR

+ TT M R

T M R B W orst Early

SRP 0

T M R B W orst Early

B W orst Early

tCT M RBW E

TT SR

+ Ploops

T SR

conc

The time TCT M R

retB W orst Early

is computed according to Equation 65 where

SDTCT M R is the save time difference between consecutive save points and WSICT M R
is the index of the worst-case SDTCT M R . This is nearly identical to Equation 43.
SDTCT M R = STCT M R − [0, STCT M R (1 to length(STCT M R ) − 1)]
TCT M R

retB W orst Early

(65)

= SDTCT M R (2)

Next, the loop count at which the TMR to TSR transition will occur after encountering an error is determined using Equation 66.

if SLCT M R (1) = 0
Ploops

T M R B W orst Early

= Ploops

else
(66)
P
=···

 loops T M R B W orst Early
SICT M R (1) + SLCT M R (1) · NT M R + ntransition − nT M R init
NT M R
end
And finally, nCSRP

B W orst Early


nCSRP

B W orst Early

=

is determined according to Equation 67.

Ploops

T M R B W orst Early

· NT M R + nT M R init



nsave

(67)

Equation 68 shows how to compute the time to complete a AHR MIPS program with a TMR Type B-Worst Late error where Ploops

T M R B W orst Late

is the

number of loops at which the transition point occurs when accounting for the error, nCSRP

B W orst Late

is the number of save/restore points to create in TMR MIPS

when accounting for the error, and TCT M R

retB W orst Late

is the time needed to return

to the point at which the error occurred after recovering from the error. Note that
tCT M RBW L

T MR

and tCT M RBW L

T SR

are the time AHR MIPS spends in TMR and

TSR mode respectively when encountering a TMR Type B-Worst Late error.
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tnom

BW L

TT M R
terr

SRP

BW L

if Ploops

= tT M R

init

· nCSRP

= TT M R

T M R B W orst Late

< 250

tCT M RBW L

T SR

= tnom

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RBW L

T MR

tCT M RBW L

T SR

T MR

BW E

conc

T SR

tCT M RBW L

T MR

tCT M RBW L

T SR

elseif Ploops

+ terr

BW E

< 750

+ terr

TT M R

SRP

= tnom

T MR

+ terr

BW E

= (nloops − Ploops

= tT M R

init

tCT M RBW L

T SR

· tT SR

BW E

BW E

Late )

· tT SR

T M R B W orst Late )

· tT SR

loop

+···

BW E

T MR

+ tCT M RBW L
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loop

+···

loop

+ TT SR

+ tT M R→T SR

+ nloops · TT M R

= tCT M RBW L

+···

+ tT M R→T SR

=0

B W orst Late

loop

(68)

end
TCT M R

+···

skip

≥ nloops

· (nSRP − 1) + terr

loop

skip

T M R B W orst Late )

T M R B W orst Late
BW E

· tT SR

+ tT M R→T SR

− TT SR

= tnom

retB W orst Early

− TT SR

conc

+ TT SR

SRP 1

T M R B W orst Late

tCT M RBW L

+···

+ tT M R→T SR

= (nloops − Ploops T M R B W orst
2
TT SR SRP 1 + TT SR conc − TT SR skip
3
elseif 750 ≤ Ploops T M R B W orst Late < nloops
tCT M RBW L

loop

< 500

T M R B W orst Late
BW E

+ TCT M R

T M R B W orst Late )

+ TT SR

= (nloops − Ploops

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops
tCT M RBW L

+ terr

BW E

SRP 1

= tnom

+ TT SR

SRP 0

recB

= (nloops − Ploops

+ 2 · TT SR

SRP 0

· TT M R

B W orst Late

+ TT M R

T MR

TT SR

T M R B W orst Late

SRP Err

tCT M RBW L

TT SR

+ Ploops

T SR

conc

The time TCT M R

is computed according to Equation 69. This is

retB W orst Late

nearly identical to Equation 43.

TCT M R

retB W orst Late

(69)

= SDTCT M R (length(SDTCT M R ))

Next, the loop count at which the TMR to TSR transition will occur after encountering an error is determined using Equation 70.

if SLCT M R (length(SDTCT M R ) − 1) = 0
Ploops

T M R B W orst Late

= Ploops

else
P
=···
& loops T M R B W orst Late
SICT M R (length(SDTCT M R ) − 1) + · · ·

(70)

SLCT M R (length(SDTCT M R ) − 1) · NT M R + · · ·
'

NT M R
ntransition − nT M R init
end
And finally, nCSRP

B W orst Late


nCSRP

B W orst Late

=

is determined according to Equation 71.

Ploops

T M R B W orst Late

· NT M R + nT M R init

nsave


(71)

In contrast to the TMR errors which can affect the TMR to TSR transition point,
TSR errors do not affect the transition point; however, TSR worst-case errors may be
affected by the transition point. The best-case errors are unaffected by the transition
point.
When AHR MIPS encounters a TSR Best-case error, it encounters it immediately
after the creation of a save/restore point. This could be the save/restore point created
by the transition from TMR to TSR, or any of the save/restore points created by TSR
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MIPS after AHR MIPS enters TSR mode. Regardless of where the which save/restore
point the TSR Best-case error occurs after, the recovery time is always the same.
This is because of the way the TSR MIPS Best-case error was defined to be injected
immediately prior to the branch comparison instruction before the first store word
instruction after creating a save/restore point. A few examples of AHR MIPS TSR
Best-case errors are shown in Figures 42, 43, 44, and 45 where the transition occurs
before the first, second, or third TSR save/restore creation point or after the third
TSR save/restore creation point respectively.
-

Figure 42. AHR MIPS TSR Best-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 1
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Figure 43. AHR MIPS TSR Best-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 2

-

Figure 44. AHR MIPS TSR Best-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 3
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-

Figure 45. AHR MIPS TSR Best-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 4

The time needed to complete a AHR MIPS program experiencing a TSR Best-case
error is given in Equation 72 where TT SR

Rec

and TT SR

ret

were previously defined in

Equation 44.

TCT SR

Best

= TAHR

TCT SR

Best

= tAHR

tCT SRB

T MR

tCT SRB

T SR

TCT SR

Best

M IP S
T MR

= tAHR
= tAHR

+ TT SR

+ tAHR

Rec

T SR

+ TT SR
+ TT SR

ret
Rec

= tCT SRB

+ TT SR

T MR

ret

(72)

T MR
T SR

+ TT SR

Rec

+ tCT SRB

+ TT SR

ret

T SR

TSR Worst-case errors in AHR MIPS require special attention. While TSR Worstcase errors in TSR MIPS take place at the end of creating a save/restore point in the
second save/restore point memory segment, that may not be possible in AHR MIPS
depending on when the TMR to TSR transition takes place. If that transition occurs
before the first TSR MIPS save/restore point is created, then the TSR worst-case
error is still encountered at the end of creating a save/restore point in the second
segment; in this case this would be the save/restore point created when the loop
counter is at 250. This scenario is shown in Figure 46.
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Figure 46. AHR MIPS TSR Worst-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 1

When the TMR to TSR transition occurs after what would have been the first
TSR MIPS save/restore point creation and before the second TSR MIPS save/restore
point creation, there are two possibilities for a worst-case error. These possibilities are
shown in Figure 47. Note that the first save/restore point created after the transition
is always to the second save/restore point memory segment. This means that an error
at the end of this save/restore point creation may not be the worst-case error. The
worst-case error may be the one that occurs at the end of the next save/restore point
creation which saves to the first save/restore point memory segment. The time to
recover from the error and return to the point at which the error was encountered is
calculated for both of these scenarios and the one that takes longer is the worst-case
error.
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Figure 47. AHR MIPS TSR Worst-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 2

If the TSR Worst-case error occurs after the second TSR MIPS save/restore point
creation and before the third, then it is unclear what the worst-case error might be.
According to the original definition of a TSR MIPS Worst-case error, it is an error that
maximizes the number of instructions that TSR MIPS must re-execute. Therefore,
the error may occur at the end of creating the third TSR MIPS save/restore point
or at the last branch comparison at the end of the program. The amount of time to
return to the point at which the error occurred is calculated for both scenarios, and
the one that takes longer is the worst-case scenario. This is illustrated graphically in
Figure 48.
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Figure 48. AHR MIPS TSR Worst-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 3

Finally, if the TSR Worst-case error occurs after the last TSR MIPS save/restore
point creation, the worst-case error occurs at the last branch comparison at the end
of the program as shown in Figure 49.
-

Figure 49. AHR MIPS TSR Worst-Case Early Error Timing Diagram 4

No errors are injected to Basic MIPS because it has no way of detecting or correcting the errors. Any errors injected into a register to be stored to memory would
not impact the runtime or energy usage of Basic MIPS.
Equation 73 and Equation 74 show how to compute the time to complete a AHR
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MIPS program experiencing a TSR Worst-case error where Equation 74 is a continuation of Equation 73. If the transition point occurs before the completion of the
first 250 loops, the AHR MIPS TSR worst-case error is identical to the TSR MIPS
worst-case error in that the added time to complete the program is the same as in
Equation 46.
If the transition point occurs between the completion of 250 loops and 500 loops,
there are two possibilities for the worst-case error. The first is that the error occurs at
the end of creating the save/restore point upon completion of 500 loops, in which case
all loops after the TMR to TSR transition must be re-completed and the save/restore
point must be completed without error as well (ctsrw1 ). The second is that the error
occurs at the end of creating the save/restore point upon completion of 750 loops, in
which case all loops after previous save/restore point creation must be re-completed
and the save/restore point at loop number 750 must be completed without error as
well (ctsrw2 ).
If the transition point occurs between the completion of 500 loops and 750 loops,
there are two possibilities for the worst-case error. The first is that the error occurs at
the end of creating the save/restore point upon completion of 750 loops, in which case
all loops after the TMR to TSR transition must be re-completed and the save/restore
point must be completed without error as well (ctsrw3 ). The second is that the error
occurs at the last store word instruction in the program and the nearly 250 complete
loops since the creation of the save/restore point at loop 750 must be re-completed
(ctsrw4 ). The only way to know which takes longer to complete is to calculate the
values for both, compare the results, and select the larger of the two. If the transition
point occurs after the completion of 750 loops, the worst-case error occurs at the last
store word at the end of the program and all loops from the TMR to TSR transition
to the end of the program must be re-completed.
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Note that tCT SRW

and tCT SRW

T MR

are the time AHR MIPS spends in TMR

T SR

and TSR mode respectively when encountering a TSR Worst-case error.

if Ploops < 250
tCT SRW

T MR

tCT SRW

T SR

250 · TT SR

= tAHR
= tAHR

loop

T MR
T SR

+ TT SR

+ TT SR

+

Rec

n=NT SR −3 tIT SR

n

+···

SRP 1 Err

elseif 250 ≤ Ploops < 500
P T SR
ctsrw1 = TT SR Rec + N
n=NT SR −3 tIT SR
TT SR

PNT SR

n

+ (500 − Ploops ) · TT SR

loop

+···

SRP 1 Err

ctsrw2 = TT SR
tCT SRW

T MR

(73)
Rec

+

= tAHR

PNT SR

n=NT SR −3 tIT SR

n

T MR

if ctsrw1 > ctsrw2
tCT SRW

T SR

= tAHR

T SR

+ ctsrw1

T SR

= tAHR

T SR

+ ctsrw2

else
tCT SRW
end
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+ 250 · TT SR

loop

+ TT SR

SRP 0 Err

elseif 500 ≤ Ploops < 750
P T SR
ctsrw3 = TT SR Rec + N
n=NT SR −3 tIT SR
(750 − Ploops ) · TT SR

loop

+ TT SR

T MR

= tAHR

+···

SRP 1 Err

P T SR
ctsrw4 = TT SR Rec + N
n=NT SR −3 tIT SR
PSWT SR (length(SWT SR )−1)
tIT SR n
nT SR init +1
tCT SRW

n

n

+ 249 · TT SR

loop

+···

T MR

if ctsrw3 > ctsrw4
tCT SRW

T SR

= tAHR

T SR

+ ctsrw3
(74)

else
tCT SRW

T SR

= tAHR

T SR

+ ctsrw4

end
elseif Ploops ≥ 750
tCT SRW

T MR

tCT SRW

T SR

= tAHR
= tAHR

T MR
T SR

(nloops − Ploops − 1) · TT SR

PNT SR

n=NT SR −3 tIT SR n + · · ·
PSWT SR (length(SWT SR )−1)
tIT SR n
loop +
nT SR init +1

+ TT SR

Rec

+

end
TCT SR
5.4.2

W orst

= tCT SRW

T MR

+ tCT SRW

T SR

Energy Calculations

Now that the timing computations are complete, the energy computations must
be performed. These computations are straightforward for TMR MIPS and TSR
MIPS programs even when errors are injected. The time to complete these programs
is multiplied by the dynamic power used by the appropriate architecture. The TMR
Type A, Type B-Best, and Type B-Worst error energy calculations are shown in
Equations 75, 76, and 77 respectively. The TSR MIPS Best-case and Worst-case
error energy calculations are shown in Equations 78, and 79 respectively.
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ErrA

= PT M R

M IP S

· TT M R

ErrA

(75)

ErrB Best

= PT M R

M IP S

· TT M R

ErrB Best

(76)

ErrB W orst

= PT M R

M IP S

· TT M R

ErrB W orst

(77)

Best

= PT SR

M IP S

· TT SR

Best

(78)

W orst

= PT SR

M IP S

· TT SR

W orst

(79)

ET M R

ET M R

ET M R

ET SR

ET SR

While it was trivial to calculate the energy used by TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS
programs experiencing errors, it is more complicated to calculate the energy used
by programs running in AHR MIPS. It is more difficult because of the time divided
between TMR and TSR modes of operation. Fortunately, the times to complete the
TMR and TSR portions were recorded separately to make these calculations simpler.
Equations 80 and 81 show how to calculate the energy used by AHR MIPS when
encountering TMR Type A Early and Late errors respectively.

ECT M R

ECT M R

A Early

= PCT M R

M IP S

· tCT M RAE

A Late

= PCT M R

M IP S

· tCT M RAL

T MR

T MR
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+ PCT SR M IP S · tCT M RAE

+ PCT SR M IP S · tCT M RAL

T SR

T SR

(80)

(81)

Equations 82 and 83 show how to calculate the energy used by AHR MIPS when
encountering a TMR Type B-Best Early and Late error respectively.

ECT M R

PCT SR M IP S · tCT M RBBE
ECT M R

B Best Late

M IP S

· tCT M RBBE

M IP S

· tCT M RBBL

= PCT M R

B Best Early

+···

T MR

(82)

T SR

= PCT M R

PCT SR M IP S · tCT M RBBL

T MR

+···

(83)

T SR

Equations 84 and 85 show how to calculate the energy used by AHR MIPS when
encountering a TMR Type B-Worst Early and Late error respectively.

ECT M R

B W orst Early

= PCT M R

PCT SR M IP S · tCT M RBW E
ECT M R

B W orst Late

· tCT M RBW E

M IP S

· tCT M RBW L

T MR

+···

(84)

T SR

= PCT M R

PCT SR M IP S · tCT M RBW L

M IP S

T MR

+···

(85)

T SR

Equations 86 and 87 show how to calculate the energy used by AHR MIPS when
encountering a TSR Type Best-Case and Worst-Case error respectively.

Best

= PCT M R

M IP S

· tCT SRB

W orst

= PCT M R

M IP S

· tCT SRW

ECT SR

ECT SR

T MR

+ PCT SR M IP S · tCT SRB

T MR
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T SR

+ PCT SR M IP S · tCT SRW

T SR

(86)

(87)

5.5

HITL Simulation with Error Injection
During HITL simulation with error injection, all of the aforementioned best-case

and worst-case scenarios would be implemented in random selection of the 1,000
programs to determine how much energy was consumed by the various architectures
when handling the errors. These experiments would also allow for current, voltage,
and duration measurements that would enable energy consumption calculations as
previously performed for the error free HITL simulations in Section 4.5. As before,
a DE10-Standard energy usage baseline will be established immediately before each
individual experiment so that the baseline energy usage may be subtracted from the
energy used while conducting an individual HITL simulation with error injection
experiment.
The error injection in HITL is performed by using the same VHDL code used to
inject errors in the software simulations. This VHDL code, which was simulated in
Mentor Graphics QuestaSim, is also easily implemented in hardware by the Quartus
software used to program the Cyclone V FPGA. However, because it will be implemented in hardware, no modifications need to be made to accommodate the computer
resource limitations encountered with software simulations. This means that each Basic MIPS, TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS program will run in its entirety
with errors present.
Due to the aforementioned hardware problems which prevented HITL simulation
measurements of processor energy usage, no HITL energy results are available for
HITL simulation with error injection. However, some HITL timing results are available for error injection into TMR and TSR MIPS. These HITL simulations with error
injection to measure timing were accomplished using the same methods presented in
Section 4.5.1, but make use of the Terasic DE-10 Standard rather than the Terasic
SoCKit.
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5.6

Summary
This chapter discussed the rate at which errors should be injected as well as the

time, location, and method to inject errors. This chapter also presented the analytical
framework necessary to compute the time and energy required to complete programs
in TMR, TSR, and AHR MIPS in the presence of errors. Finally, this chapter touched
on the method to perform HITL simulations with error injection. The next chapter
will discuss the results of the error injection simulations and analyses.
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VI. Error Injection Analysis and Results

6.1

Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of the error injection software simulations, anal-

yses, and hardware-in-the-loop simulations discussed in Chapter V, Sections 5.4 and
5.5. This chapter provides analyses which demonstrate Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy’s (AHR’s) ability to provide space vehicle designers, mission planners, and
operators the flexibility to optimize processing speed and energy usage according to
mission needs and error conditions.
Section 6.2 discusses the results of simulations and analyses that were performed
with error injection; these simulations and analyses were first discussed in Section 5.4.
This section also evaluates AHR’s performance against Triple Modular Redundancy
(TMR) and Temporal Software Redundancy (TSR) in the presence of errors; using
the error free unmitigated approach as a baseline. Section 6.3 discusses the work done
on HITL simulations with error injection first discussed in Section 5.5.

6.2

Software Simulation with Error Injection
This section examines the results of software simulations and computational anal-

ysis when errors are injected as described in Section 5.4. Only one error is injected
into each program. The types of errors injected into TMR MIPS programs are TMR
Type A and B errors. TMR Type A errors occur when a single error is injected into
a register that will be stored to memory. A TMR Type B error occurs when different
errors are injected into a register that will be stored to memory of two different processors. TMR Type B errors are further divided into best-case (TMR Type B-Best)
and worst-case (TMR Type B-Worst) errors. TMR Type B-Best errors minimize the
amount of rework needed to recover to the point at which the error initially occurred
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while a TMR Type B-Worst error maximizes the same. A TSR error is an error
injected into one of a pair of duplicate registers that will be stored to memory. TSR
errors are also divided into best-case and worst-case errors in the same way as TMR
Type B errors. AHR MIPS can experience either TMR or TSR errors. For AHR
MIPS, TMR Type A, TMR Type B-Best, and TMR Type B-Worst errors are further
subdivided into early and late errors. An early error occurs early during a program’s
execution and does not significantly impact the TMR to TSR transition point or the
program’s overall runtime when compared to no error occurring. A late error occurs
close to the error free TMR to TSR transition point and causes the transition point
to move 15,000 instructions away from the point at which error recovery resumes, assuming the TMR to TSR transition point occurs after 15,000 error free instructions.
This causes the program to run in TMR MIPS for significantly more instructions than
in the error free case. The result is that the program runs faster and uses much more
energy when a late error is experienced than when an early error of the same type
(A, B-Best, B-Worst) or no error is encountered. Review Section 5.4.1 and Figures
31 to 49 for more details.
This section first looks at TMR MIPS errors, then TSR MIPS errors, and finally
AHR MIPS errors.

6.2.1

TMR MIPS Error Injection Results

As discussed in Section 5.4, TMR MIPS errors are divided into Type A and Type
B errors. The results of Type A, Type B-Best, and Type B-Worst error injection
for the 1,000 programs discussed in Section 4.4 are shown in Figure 50. This figure
shows the time and energy needed to complete each program for each TMR error
type as well as the average time to complete a program for each error type (including
no error). The differences between Type A errors, Type B-Best errors, and no errors
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results are indiscernible in this figure. This result meets expectations because Type
A errors and Type B-Best errors were chosen to minimize the impact on TMR MIPS
performance. Type B-Worst errors significantly increase the time and energy required
to complete the program. This result also meets expectations because Type B-Worst
errors were chosen to maximize the impact on TMR MIPS performance.

Figure 50. Software Simulation of TMR MIPS Errors - Energy vs. Time to Complete

6.2.2

TSR MIPS Error Injection Results

TSR MIPS errors are divided into best-case and worst-case errors. The results of
TSR MIPS error injection for the 1,000 programs discussed in Section 4.4 are shown
in Figure 51. This figure shows the time and energy needed to complete each program
for each TSR error type as well as the average time to complete a program for each
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error type (including no error). The differences between best-case errors and no
errors results are indiscernible in this figure. This result meets expectations because
best-case errors were chosen to minimize the impact on TSR MIPS performance.
Worst-case errors significantly increase the time and energy required to complete the
program. This result also meets expectations because worst-case errors were chosen
to maximize the impact on TSR MIPS performance.

Figure 51. Software Simulation of TSR MIPS Errors - Energy vs. Time to Complete

6.2.3

AHR MIPS Error Injection Results

AHR MIPS errors are divided into TMR Type A Early, TMR Type A Late, TMR
Type B-Best Early, TMR Type B-Best Late, TMR Type B-Worst Early, TMR Type
B-Worst Late, TSR Best, and TSR Worst errors. The results of AHR MIPS error
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injection for the 1,000 programs using a TMR to TSR transition point of 15,000
instructions discussed in Section 4.4 are shown in Figure 52. The differences between
TMR Type A Early, TMR Type B-Best Early, TSR Best, and no errors results are
indiscernible in this figure. This result meets expectations because these errors were
chosen to minimize the impact on AHR MIPS performance. The TMR Type A
Late and TMR Type B-Best Late errors use more energy than AHR MIPS with no
errors, but complete in less time. This is because the late errors cause AHR MIPS to
remain in TMR mode longer than if no error occurred. This result meets expectations
because TMR Type A Late errors and TMR Type B-Best Late errors were chosen to
maximize time spent in TMR and minimize total program run time. The TMR Type
B-Worst Early, TMR Type B-Worst Late, and TSR Worst errors use more energy
and take more time to complete than AHR MIPS with no errors. These results
meet expectations because TMR Type B-Worst and TSR Worst errors cause the
maximum amount of program re-computation (must re-compute more instructions
than any other error type). It was also expected that AHR MIPS would recover from
TMR Type B-Worst errors more quickly than TSR Worst errors, but require more
energy to do so. This becomes even more evident when viewing only the averages of
all 1,000 programs in Figure 53.
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Figure 52. Software Simulation of AHR MIPS Errors - Energy vs. Time to Complete
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Figure 53 shows the average time and energy for TMR MIPS, TSR MIPS, and
AHR MIPS to complete programs in the presence and absence of errors. This figure
illustrates how AHR MIPS bridges the gap between TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS
performance. The AHR MIPS TMR Type A and Type B-Best errors appear to fall
on a line between the TSR MIPS Best-case error and TMR MIPS Type A and Type
B-Best errors. A similar pattern appears for AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst and
TSR Worst-case errors which appear to nearly fall on a line between the TMR Type
B-Worst and TSR Worst-case errors. However, this figure does not tell the entire
story as the best-case, worst-case, early, and later errors define boundaries for AHR
MIPS performance in the presence of errors.
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Figure 53. Averaged Results of Software Simulation of All Errors - Energy vs. Time to Complete
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Figure 54 shows the bounding boxes when the TMR to TSR transition point
occurs at 15,000 instructions. Note that the points plotted in this figure are the same
as those plotted in Figure 53 and represent the average program completion times;
however, the TMR Type B-Best, TSR Best-Case, AHR TMR Type A Early, AHR
TMR Type B-Best Early, and AHR TSR Best-Case errors have been omitted from
this plot. The TMR Type B-Best case error result was nearly identical to the TMR
MIPS with no error result. The TSR MIPS Best-Case error result was nearly identical
to the TSR MIPS with no error result. The AHR TMR Type A Early, AHR TMR
Type B-Best Early, and AHR TSR Best-Case error results were nearly identical to
the AHR MIPS with no error result. The bounding boxes indicate that the average
program completion time should fall somewhere within the bounding box when errors
are present.
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Figure 54. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 15,000 Instructions
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The corners of the bounding box encompassing the TMR MIPS Type B-Best and
Type B-Worst errors is shown as a dotted blue line. This box indicates that average
program completion time and energy usage for a TMR MIPS program encountering
a Type B error will end up within this box and it nearly overlaps the second box
indicated by a solid blue line. The second box is used to outline the average performance of TMR MIPS when errors may or may not be present. It includes the no
error, TMR Type A, and TMR Type B errors.
The corners of the bounding box encompassing the TSR MIPS Best- and Worstcase errors is shown as a red dashed line with the red square and the red diamond at
opposing corners to indicate the average Best- and Worst-case error program runtime
and energy usage. A second box with a red solid line is used to outline the average
performance of TSR MIPS when errors may or may not be present. It includes the
no error, TSR Best-case, and TSR Worst-case errors. Once again, these boxes almost
overlap one another.
The corners of the bounding box encompassing the AHR MIPS TMR Type A
Early and Late errors is shown as a gray dashed line to indicate how a program will
perform in terms of time and energy usage on average when a TMR Type A error
will occur. Similarly, the purple dashed line indicates the average performance of
a program experiencing a TMR Type B-Best case error. The orange dashed line
indicates the average performance of a program experiencing a TMR Type B-Worst
error, however, no such box is visible in this figure as the TMR Type B-Worst Early
and Late errors are identical in this figure. A dark blue dashed line bounding box
extends from the left most plus sign (+) to the right most “X” and from the AHR
MIPS no error (green circle) to the top most “X” to show the average bounds of
a AHR MIPS program that encounters any TMR Type B error. The dashed teal
line indicates the bounds of a AHR MIPS TSR error. Finally, the solid green line
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indicates the average bounds for a AHR MIPS program experiencing any TMR error,
TSR error, or no error.
Note that the portion of the bounding box extending to the left of the average
AHR MIPS no error runtime and energy usage does not necessarily indicate that an
error could occur such that the runtime would decrease without a change in energy
usage. It should be expected that a decrease in runtime would correspond to a
greater number of instructions being performed in TMR mode and a resulting energy
increase; however, there is insufficient analysis at this time to determine a more precise
boundary region and the creation of such a region is left for future work.
Now, because the bounding boxes indicate that the average time and energy used
to complete a program in the presence of errors should fall within the boxes, they
should not be treated as program specific bounding boxes. It would be trivial to create
program specific bounding boxes, but these are not shown here for brevity. However,
the next figures will begin to show the versatility of the AHR MIPS approach as the
TMR to TSR transition point is varied.
Figures 55 to 62 show what happens to the bounding boxes as the TMR to
TSR transition point increases from 11,000, to 20,000, 30,000, 40,000, 50,000, 60,000,
70,000, and 80,000 instructions. As the transition point increases, The overall bounding box begins to grow, then shrinks down to match the TMR MIPS bounding box.
Note that in some of these figures, the AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst Early and
Late errors do not always coincide. Also note how the size and shapes of the smaller
bounding boxes change. As the TMR to TSR transition point increases, the AHR
MIPS TMR Type B-Best bounding box increases in size, then decreases in size until
it becomes nonexistent. The AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst bounding box increases
in size from nonexistence, then decreases in size until becoming nonexistent again.
The AHR MIPS TMR Type A box also increases then decreases in size until becom-
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ing nearly nonexistent. The AHR MIPS TSR box decreases in size until becoming
nearly nonexistent. Figure 63 shows what it looks like when the bounding boxes from
Figures 55 to 62 are overlaid on the same figure.
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Figure 55. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 11,000 Instructions
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Figure 56. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 20,000 Instructions
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Figure 57. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 30,000 Instructions
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Figure 58. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 40,000 Instructions
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Figure 59. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 50,000 Instructions
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Figure 60. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 60,000 Instructions
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Figure 61. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 70,000 Instructions

23

213

Energy to Complete Program(µ J)

500
TMR MIPS
TMR MIPS Type B-Worst Error
TSR MIPS
TSR MIPS Worst-Case Error
AHR MIPS
AHR MIPS TMR Type A Late Error
AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Best Late Error
AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst Early Error
AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst Late Error
AHR MIPS TSR Worst-Case Error

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Time to Complete Program(ms)
Figure 62. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point at 80,000 Instructions
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Figure 63. Average Performance Bounds for AHR MIPS with a TMR to TSR Point varying from 11,000 to 80,000 Instructions

While these figures represent the average performance for 1,000 programs, they
have greater utility when created for a specific program to show how the expected
program runtime and energy usage change as the TMR to TSR transition point
is changed. A satellite designer, mission planner, or operator could use these to
determine the best transition point based on the needs of the system. For example, the
TMR to TSR transition point could be selected in order to meet certain performance
criteria such as staying under maximum runtime or energy constraints.
Figure 64 shows the same things as Figure 53, but allows the TMR to TSR transition point to vary from 11,000 to 80,000 instructions in increments of 1,000. This
figure also provides a slightly different view to the bounding boxes in the previous
figures. It is most useful in visualizing how the average program runtime and energy
usage for each error scenario changes as the TMR to TSR transition point changes.
Curves for all AHR MIPS error scenarios, and the no error scenario, become evident.
When there are only 11,000 instructions completed in TMR before the TMR to TSR
transition point, AHR MIPS behaves much more closely to TSR MIPS. As the transition point moves towards 80,000 instructions, the AHR MIPS results begin moving
up and to the left until they coincide with the TMR MIPS results. Note that the
AHR MIPS TSR Best- and Worst-case scenarios collapse to the no error solution for
TMR MIPS when very little, if any time is spent in TSR MIPS because the TMR
to TSR transition point is no longer reached during the duration of most programs.
Similarly, the AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst scenarios converge to the TMR Type
B-Worst error scenario.
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Figure 64. TMR to TSR Transition Varying from 11,000 to 80,000 Instructions - Energy vs. Time to Complete
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Another interesting comparison is to look at the average percent difference in
runtime and energy usage for each error scenario and no error scenario when compared
to Basic MIPS with no errors. The average percent difference for the no error scenarios
were previously given in Equations 17 to 22. The average percent difference for the
programs experiencing errors are given in Equations 88 to 113.

P DT ime T M R ErrA v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TT M R ErrA (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime T M R ErrB Best v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms TT M R ErrB Best (n) − TBasic
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

M IP S (n)

P DT ime T M R ErrB W orst v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms TT M R ErrB W orst (n) − TBasic
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

M IP S (n)

(88)


× 100%

(89)


× 100%

(90)

P DT ime T SR Best v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TT SR Best (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(91)

P DT ime T SR W orst v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TT SR W orst (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(92)

P DT ime CT M R A Early v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms TCT M R A Early (n) − TBasic
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
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M IP S (n)


× 100%

(93)

P DT ime CT M R A Late v

PNprograms TCT M R
n=1

=···
A Late (n) − TBasic
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
Basic

M IP S (n)

P DT ime CT M R B Best Early v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms TCT M R B Best Early (n) − TBasic
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime CT M R B Best Late v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms TCT M R B Best Late (n) − TBasic
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime CT M R B W orst

PNprograms TCT M R

n=1


× 100%

(95)


× 100%

(96)

M IP S (n)

M IP S (n)

=···
W orst Early (n) − TBasic
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(94)

Early v Basic
B

n=1

P DT ime CT M R B W orst

PNprograms TCT M R


× 100%

=···
W orst Late (n) − TBasic
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

M IP S (n)


× 100%

(97)


× 100%

(98)

Late v Basic
B

M IP S (n)

P DT ime CT SR Best v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms TCT SR Best (n) − TBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DT ime CT SR W orst v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms TCT M R W orst (n) − TBasic
n=1
TBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
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M IP S (n)


× 100%

(99)

(100)

P DEnergy T M R ErrA v

PNprograms ET M R
n=1

=···

ErrA (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
Basic

P DEnergy T M R ErrB Best v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ET M R ErrB Best (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

P DEnergy T M R ErrB W orst v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ET M R ErrB W orst (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

M IP S (n)

M IP S (n)


× 100%


× 100%

(101)

(102)

(103)

P DEnergy T SR Best v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms ET SR Best (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(104)

P DEnergy T SR W orst v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms ET SR W orst (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(105)

P DEnergy CT M R A Early v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT M R A Early (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
P DEnergy CT M R A Late v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT M R A Late (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms
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M IP S (n)

M IP S (n)


× 100%

(106)


× 100%

(107)

P DEnergy CT M R B Best Early v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT M R B Best Early (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms


× 100%

(108)


× 100%

(109)

M IP S (n)

P DEnergy CT M R B Best Late v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT M R B Best Late (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

M IP S (n)

P DEnergy CT M R B W orst Early v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT M R B W orst Early (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

P DEnergy CT M R B W orst Late v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT M R B W orst Late (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

M IP S (n)

M IP S (n)


× 100%

(110)


× 100%

(111)

P DEnergy CT SR Best v Basic = · · ·


PNprograms ECT SR Best (n) − EBasic M IP S (n)
× 100%
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(112)

P DEnergy CT SR W orst v Basic = · · ·

PNprograms ECT SR W orst (n) − EBasic
n=1
EBasic M IP S (n)
Nprograms

(113)

M IP S (n)


× 100%

The average percent difference equations were used to calculate the average per220

cent difference for all programs experiencing errors and no errors when the TMR
to TSR transition point from 11,000 to 80,000 in increments of 1,000. The results
for the runtime calculations are shown in Figure 65 and the results for energy usage
calculations are shown in Figure 66. These figures really highlight how AHR MIPS
runtime and energy performance changes when compared to Basic MIPS as the TMR
to TSR transition point changes. As in some of the previous figures, the TMR Type
A and TMR Type B-Best error results are omitted because they are nearly identical
to the TMR no error results. The same is true for the TSR Best error results because
they are identical to the TSR no error results. Additionally, the AHR TMR Type A
Early, AHR TMR Type B-Best Early, and AHR TSR Best error results have been
omitted because they are nearly identical to the AHR no error results. The first thing
to note from these figures is how the AHR MIPS no error, AHR TMR Type A, AHR
TMR Type B-Best, AHR TSR Best, and AHR TSR Worst average percent differences approach the TMR average percent difference as the number of instructions
before the TMR to TSR transition increases. This is consistent with prior results
because AHR MIPS performance is nearly identical to TMR MIPS performance as
the number of instructions that AHR MIPS processes in TSR mode approaches zero
and nearly all instructions are processed in TMR mode. Additionally, the AHR MIPS
TMR Type B-Worst average percent differences approach the TMR Type B-Worst
average percent difference, which is also expected for the same reasons just given.
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Figure 65. AHR MIPS TMR to TSR Transition Varying from 11,000 to 80,000 Instructions - Energy vs. Time to Complete
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Figure 66. AHR MIPS TMR to TSR Transition Varying from 11,000 to 80,000 Instructions - Energy vs. Time to Complete
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There are a few other things to note from the percent difference figures. The first
is that programs experiencing an AHR TMR Type A Late error complete faster than
programs experiencing a AHR TMR Type B-Best Late error. Both of these complete
faster than AHR MIPS programs experiencing no error, AHR TMR Type A Early,
AHR TMR Type B-Best Early, and AHR TSR Best-case errors. The no error, AHR
TMR Type A Early, AHR TMR Type B-Best Early, and AHR TSR Best-case error
scenarios all take less time to complete than programs experiencing AHR TMR Type
B-Worst Early, AHR TMR Type B Worst Late, and AHR TSR Worst-case errors.
Programs experiencing AHR TMR Type B-Worst Late errors always complete faster
than those experiencing AHR TMR Type B-Worst Early errors. AHR MIPS programs
experiencing TSR Worst-case errors have the worst runtime when the TMR to TSR
transition point is under about 30,000, but runs faster than programs experiencing
TMR Type B-Worst Early errors when the transition point is greater than 31,000
instructions and faster than programs experiencing TMR Type B-Worst Late errors
when the transition point is greater than about 37,000 instructions.
AHR MIPS programs experiencing no error, TMR Type A Early, TMR Type BBest Early, and TSR Best-case all take about the same amount of energy to complete
and use less energy than a AHR MIPS program experiencing any other type of error.
AHR MIPS programs experiencing TMR Type B-Worst Late errors use the most
energy followed by programs experiencing TMR Type B-Worst Early errors, then
TMR Type A Late errors, then TSR Worst-case errors.
One final thing to note are the jump discontinuities in the AHR MIPS TMR Type
B-Best Late and AHR MIPS TMR Type B-Worst Late timing and energy percent
differences. These are a direct result of the TMR to TSR transition point moving
passed one of the TMR save/restore point creation times which occur every 10,000
instructions. Note that these discontinuities occur as the TMR to TSR transition
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point passes 20,000, 30,000, and 40,000 instructions. This is because these late errors
go from having a minimal impact when the TMR to TSR transition point occurs
immediately before a save/restore point creation to a maximum impact when the
TMR to TSR transition point occurs immediately after a save/restore point creation.
Figures 67 and 68 are essentially derivative plots of Figures 65 and 66 except that
they use the average time and energy results rather than the percent differences. Each
point on these graphs represent the difference in average time and average energy to
complete 1,000 different programs with the given error type (or no error at all) from
one AHR transition point value to the previous AHR transition point value where
these transition points started at 11,000 instructions, ended at 80,000 instructions,
and had step sizes of 1,000 instructions. Plots like these may help a mission planner
determine the most optimal point, in terms of processing speed and energy usage, at
which to transition AHR from TMR mode to TSR mode.
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Figure 67. Time Difference Between Successive Steps of TMR to TSR Transition Point
When Varying from 11,000 to 80,000 in Steps of 1,000
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Figure 68. Energy Difference Between Successive Steps of TMR to TSR Transition
Point When Varying from 11,000 to 80,000 in Steps of 1,000

6.3

HITL Simulation with Error Injection
Due to the difficulties described in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.4, only a few HITL

simulations with error injection were performed, but these only examined error injection into TMR and TSR MIPS when each architecture was implemented on the
same FPGA as its associated memulator. This means that timing measurements were
recorded, but not energy measurements. AHR MIPS HITL simulations could not be
accomplished because the combined size of AHR MIPS and the AHR memulator on
the FPGA was such that timing did not close. This means that some of the signal
wires on the FPGA were so long that it takes more than one clock cycle for them to
travel from source to destination. The AHR MIPS HITL timing simulations should
be completed in the future once the timing hurdle is overcome. Additionally, the
energy measurements should be completed once the hardware problems associated
with placing the processor and memory on separate boards have been resolved.
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Table 13 shows the results of error injection for a single program implemented in
TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS. Timing information was collected for each error type.
The first column indicates the architecture and type of error (or no error) injected.
The second column shows the time to complete the program according to simulation
and analysis. The third column shows the measured time to complete the program in
HITL simulations. The time to complete each program in this column is the average
time to complete the program based upon ten runs of the program. The fourth column
shows the time difference between the HITL simulation and the software simulation
and analysis. The fifth column provides the same time difference information as the
fourth column, but presents it in terms of 50MHz clock cycles rather than time in
nanoseconds. All times shown are in nanoseconds.
Table 13. TMR MIPS and TSR MIPS HITL Timing Results With Error Injection for
One Program

Architecture &
Error Type
Basic MIPS No Err
TMR MIPS No Err
TMR MIPS Type A
TMR MIPS Type B-Best
TMR MIPS Type B-Worst
TSR MIPS No Err
TSR MIPS Best
TSR MIPS Worst

S&A

HITL

Difference

8012480
13254940
13269740
13280080
16295000
1628920
16334480
20403300

8012566
13255117
13269436
13280266
16283375
16299055
16328236
20399340

86
177
-304
186
-11625
135
-6244
-3960

Clock
Cycles
4.30
8.85
-15.20
9.30
-581.25
6.75
-312.20
-198.00

Most of the HITL simulation results match the expected software simulation and
analysis simulation results. Minor discrepancies are explained by clock jitter and skew
in the FPGAs clock oscillator. In other words, the FPGA’s clock oscillator is not able
to provide a perfect 50MHz clock. Larger difference between HITL simulations and
software simulations and analyses were noted for TMR MIPS Type B-Worst, TSR
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MIPS Best, and TSR MIPS Worst errors. There are two possible explanations for
these discrepancies. The first is that timing delays could have been introduced into
the FPGA by the software that programs the FPGA. This could be due to signal
routing timing issues and signal routing timing issues were observed during the first
attempt at error free HITL simulation. The second is that there is some difficulty
in translating the timing of error injection from software simulation and analysis to
HITL simulations. This is because the software simulation and analysis uses one
method of tracking the program loop count and processor program counter and the
VHDL code uses a different method of tracking the program loop count and processor
program counter. In software simulation, the loop count starts at one and increases to
its final value while in VHDL code, the loop count starts at a high value and decreases
to zero. Additionally, the HITL simulations track the program counter as starting
at one and increasing by one at a time while the VHDL code tracks the program
counter as starting at zero and increasing by four at a time. More work is needed to
determine the cause of these large discrepancies.

6.4

Results Summary
This chapter discussed the results of the simulations and analyses that were pro-

posed in Chapter V, Sections 5.4 and 5.5. The results demonstrated that AdaptiveHybrid Redundancy (AHR) provides an advantage over standalone Triple Modular
Redundancy (TMR) or Temporal Software Redundancy (TSR). Regardless of whether
errors are present, AHR uses less energy than TMR and processes faster than TSR.
However, it does this at the expense of not being as fast as TMR or as energy efficient
as TSR. However, with the AHR approach, a satellite designer now has the ability to
choose when to transition from TMR to TSR based on the performance needs of the
mission.
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VII. Conclusions

The conclusion of this dissertation returns to the research question posed at the
beginning of this dissertation.
1. Can multiple redundancy methods be incorporated into the redundancy design?
2. Is it possible to allow flexibility in redundancy methods for the duration of a
space vehicle’s lifetime?
3. Is it possible to switch between these methods based on mission needs?
4. What are the timing and energy tradespaces available to a designer, mission
planner, or operator?
To answer the first question, an Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR) architecture
called AHR MIPS was developed in Chapter III and its function was verified in Section
4.2, thus demonstrating that at least two redundancy methods could be incorporated
into a redundancy design.
The second, third, and fourth questions were answered in Chapters IV and VI.
Chapter IV examined the performance of AHR in the absence of errors and demonstrated the ability of AHR to switch between TMR and TSR modes at any time
which provides a “Yes” answer to the second and third questions. Chapter IV also
explored the AHR time and energy tradespace in the absence of errors. This exploration demonstrated that the selection of the point at which AHR transitions from
TMR to TSR has a direct impact on processing speed and energy usage. The more
time AHR spends in TMR mode, the more closely AHR’s performance mirrors TMR
performance. Similarly, the more time AHR spends in TSR mode, the more closely
AHR’s performance mirrors TSR performance. Splitting the time between TMR and
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TSR modes allows for speed and energy performance that neither TMR or TSR could
achieve alone. However, Chapter IV only answers these questions in the absence of
errors. VI answers these questions in the presence of errors. Once again, the answers
to questions two and three are both “Yes” because AHR demonstrated the ability
to switch between TMR and TSR even when errors occurred. VI also explored the
AHR time and energy tradespace in the presence of errors. As AHR spends more
time in TMR mode, the impact of TSR errors on time and energy performance are
diminished. Similarly, as AHR spends more time in TSR mode, the impact of TMR
errors on time and energy performance are diminished.
Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR) has been proven by analysis and simulation
to be a viable approach to combine disparate redundancy techniques in a single architecture to allow space systems designers and operators the flexibility and tradespace
to maximize performance and energy efficiency during both the design phase and
operational phase of a mission. This added flexibility also means that a particular
mitigation strategy is not permanent once the space system has been designed and
built. For previous systems, a single mitigation strategy was selected and could not
be changed for the duration of the mission. Admittedly, many previous mitigation
strategies are more complex than the simple TMR or TSR examined in this work,
but none allowed significant changes to the mitigation strategy after implementation.
The AHR approach provides the ability to operate fully in TMR, TSR, or anywhere
in between depending on the setting of the TMR to TSR transition point at any time
during the life of the mission.
In addition to showing AHR to be an excellent mitigation approach, this work
also further explored the relative advantages and disadvantages of TMR and TSR,
contrasted against an unmitigated strategy and confirmed many expectations.
For example, it was shown that TMR processes faster and uses more energy than
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TSR as expected. It was also shown that a TMR mitigation strategy takes longer to
complete programs than a no mitigation strategy due to the overhead of all memory
interactions being checked by a voter in the TMR approach and the need to create
save/restore points to periodically store the processors’ internal state. It was also
shown that TMR uses more than three times as much energy to complete programs
than the unmitigated approach due to the triplication of processors, addition of the
voter, and extra time needed to complete a program.
It was also shown that TSR takes at least twice as long as the unmitigated approach due to the duplication of instructions and need to create save/restore points
to periodically store the processor’s internal state. It was also shown that TSR uses
more than double the energy to complete programs than the unmitigated approach
due to the extra time required to complete TSR programs.
Finally, the Cyclone V FPGA vulnerability to SEUs and SETs has been measured
and found to be approximately 100 times more vulnerable to SEUs than a similar
FPGA utilizing TMR and configuration memory scrubbing and was flown in space.
This is the first known instance where an Intel FPGAs vulnerability to SEUs and
SETs has been measured. This is also the first known instance where a comparison has
been made between the 14MeV neutron environment at Sandia National Laboratories
Ion Beam Laboratory and the radiation environment experienced on a satellite for
the purpose of comparing SEU rates. This work was discussed in “Intel Cyclone V
FPGA Radiation Vulnerability” and submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Device
and Materials Reliability Journal [39].

7.1

Contributions
A new redundancy approach to Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event Tran-

sient (SET) radiation effects called Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy (AHR) was pro-
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posed and demonstrated to use less energy than Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
and run faster than Temporal Software Redundancy (TSR). AHR was comprised of
TMR and TSR in such a manner that allowed it to switch between TMR and TSR.
AHR was shown to be more flexible than existing redundancy methods and to equip
space vehicle designers, mission planners, and operators the ability to determine how
much time to spend in TMR and TSR operating modes in order to optimize performance for their particular missions.
In order to evaluate AHR when compared to the TMR and TSR approaches upon
which AHR was based and an approach with no mitigation strategy, a new set of
equations was developed to analyze the performance of no mitigation, TMR, TSR,
and AHR approaches in terms of time to complete programs and energy used to
complete programs.
In order to evaluate the unmitigated, TMR, TSR, and AHR approaches, programs
had to be created which could run on all architectures, but fundamental differences
between the architectures necessitated the creation of distinct, but equivalent programs. The programs for the no mitigation and TMR approaches were identical.
The TSR approach utilized a program that had been modified from the no mitigation
and TMR approaches such that it incorporated Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions (EDDI). The TSR program was equivalent in that the final results stored to
memory were identical and TSR also computed identical intermediate results as well.
The AHR approach required a program that contained the TMR and TSR programs
so that it could switch between the two programs. A paper titled “Adaptive-Hybrid
Redundancy for Rad-Hardening” was presented at the 2019 IEEE National Aerospace
and Electronics Conference and covers the performance of AHR when compared to
no mitigation, TMR, and TSR approaches in the absence of errors.
The architecture chosen as the basis for TMR, TSR, and AHR was a simplified
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MIPS-like architecture called Basic MIPS and was developed specifically for this
research to allow for error injection. Because it was a custom designed architecture,
existing benchmarks could not be used. As a result, many sets of equivalent programs
were randomly generated to evaluate the architectures against programs of varying
lengths and mixtures of instructions.
To facilitate hardware testing, a “memory” was created using Very High Speed
Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language (VHDL) code so that
the “memory” could be implemented in the logic of a Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA). This FPGA was made to act as memory emulator called a “memulator”;
however, the memulator functioned as more than a simple memory. The aforementioned compiler which was tasked with creating the programs for the unmitigated,
TMR, TSR, and AHR approaches also created the VHDL encoded memulator for
each program and added error detection code for the TMR and TSR memulators.
The error detection code is capable of detecting errors in the flow of program control
in the TMR and TSR approaches because the compiler has perfect knowledge about
how the program should execute and is able to add error checking accordingly. The
purpose of the error detection was to provide an error signal that was immune to the
effects of SEUs and SETs by making it external to the processor.
The memulator was also physically separated from the processor by placing it on a
separate FPGA so that Hardware-in-the-Loop simulations would allow measurements
of energy usage for the processor only that would not include the energy used by
the memulator. Early HITL simulations co-located the processor and memulator.
The results of these early HITL simulations contradicted the expectations of relative
performance for TMR and TSR that were established in literature. After further
analysis, it was determined that co-locating the processor and memulator was partly
to blame for this contradiction and future HITL simulations will physically separate
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the memulator from the processor.

7.2

Future Work
Immediate future work consists of successfully implementing Basic MIPS, TMR

MIPS, TSR MIPS, and AHR MIPS on an FPGA with associated memulators on a
separate FPGA by overcoming the hardware issues discussed in Sections 4.5.2 and
4.5.4. Completion of this work will enable comparisons of HITL simulations to software simulations as well as enable error injection into HITL simulations.
Another area of future work is to re-examine the boundary boxes in Figures 54 to
63 to define a more precise boundary region. This could be accomplished by analyzing
every possible error injection for every single program rather than just the edge cases
(TMR Type A Early/Late, TMR Type B-Best/Worst Early/Late, TSR Best/Worst).
The next step for AHR will be expanding AHR to include more redundancy methods from the literature. This will further expand the flexibility that satellite designers,
mission planners, and operators will have when trading between performance, energy
efficiency, and robustness to SEUs and SETs. For example, a more comprehensive
TSR approach utilizing signature detection could be implemented in AHR to provide
a TSR approach that uses only slightly more time and energy than EDDI, but provides a similar level of protection against program counter errors as traditional Dual
Modular Redundancy (DMR) or TMR approaches. AHR could also add DMR in
the lower radiation environments when it is expected that encountering an error and
then rolling back the processor to a previous save restore point would be infrequent
enough that DMR would save energy over TMR. When error rates are high, but insufficient to cause multiple processor errors, TMR outperforms DMR because DMR
would experience frequent rollbacks which would greatly increase runtime and energy
usage while TMR would quickly correct the error and move on. In low radiation
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environments, TMR still consumes 1.5 times more energy than DMR (because it has
three processors instead of two), but DMR is not expected to have to roll back often,
and would therefore not suffer as great a time or energy penalty. Additionally, DMR
would offer similar energy performance to EDDI because both involve duplication
(not triplication as was the case for TMR), but run at TMR speeds (because there is
still the overhead of the voter/comparator).
Another possibility for future work is to implement AHR on an ASIC in such a
way that the processor and memulator are physically separated so that the memulator
could be physically shielded from radiation and voltage and current measurements for
the processor could be made independently from the memulator. This would greatly
ease the hardware issues encountered with attempting to implement the processor
and memulator on separate FPGAs.
Future work may also examine the implementation of AHR on COTS processors.
Such an approach may also make use of AHR operating modes that are based on
redundancy approaches designed to work in super-scalar architectures. Alternatively,
an approach of this nature could seek to force COTS processors to operate in lockstep
to facilitate more historical/traditional redundancy methods.
Future work should also examine radiation testing for TMR, TSR, and AHR in
a laboratory setting to determine how these architectures respond to real SEUs and
SETs rather than errors injected into simulations and analyses. This would be a true
test of AHRs performance when compared to TMR and TSR. These tests would also
make full use of the memulator’s error detection capabilities.
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Appendix A. AHR MIPS Architecture Detailed Diagrams
Figure 69 provides a detailed view of how the Adaptive-Hybrid Redundancy
(AHR) Controller exercises control over the various signals between the Basic MIPS
processors, TMR Voter, and Memulator through the use of multiplexers. Figure 70
is a more detailed version of Figure 10 in Section 3.5.2 and shows all of the signals
between the Basic MIPS processors, TMR Voter, AHR Controller, and Memulator.
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Figure 69. AHR Controller Detailed Block Diagram
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Figure 70. AHR MIPS Detailed Block Diagram
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